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Abstract: This report presents results of research on the failure of 
the inflation accounting standard in New Zealand. Presentation of 
the results in three narratives highlights that any such research is a 
series of interlocking and overlapping events, and that narrative is a 
direct and efficient means of communicating both causal and trans-
actional components which contributed towards the outcomes. Iso-
lation of the three narratives was chosen to demonstrate that it is 
not useful to extol an explanatory or interpretative paradigm for 
accounting history if it is advocated at the expense of sequential 
accounts of events. 
To undertake an oral history project in accounting is to be 
immersed in narratives of those to whom the microphone is 
directed. As researchers listen and then transcribe, they imbue 
resonances and drama, even trauma, from accounting events as 
experienced by their group of interviewees, to the point when 
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debate on narrative and counternarrative [Funnell, 1998] seems 
unrelated to the day-to-day problems of recording, transcrip-
tion, analysis, and writing up. However, acting on the proposal 
by Funnell [1998, p. 144] that "to comprehend the constitutive 
effect of the narrative is to open the prospect for liberation 
from our sanctioned and settled past," the following report of 
this oral history research project was isolated into three narra-
tives. The separation illuminates the constitutive power of nar-
rative in accounting history and, from such illumination, an 
advocacy of the utility and role of narrative. 
One aspect of narrative analyses in literary studies is the 
identification of hegemonic forces which influence, shape, and 
order the meanings of events and the manner of remembrance. 
There are exemplary studies in other disciplines, such as the 
analysis by Landau of "Human Evolution as Narrative" [1984] 
in which was presented an analysis of narrative used in ac-
counts of human evolution, utilizing established methods of 
analysis of folk stories. Just as explanations of human evolution 
inevitably utilize narrative and can be analyzed using literary 
methods, so also research histories can be analyzed as struggles 
for success, with both malevolent and benevolent powers driv-
ing events outside the control of individuals. 
In this case of the debate about current cost accounting 
(CCA) and the introduction of "inflation accounting standards," 
the hegemonic process is one whereby the interests of other 
groups (account preparers and users) are coordinated with 
those of the dominant group. However, hegemony, as a social 
process, is continually resisted, limited, altered, and challenged 
[Brow, 1990, p. 1]. The failure of the CCA standard is one ex-
ample of such resistance; ultimately, it delineated limitations 
on the standard-setters' power. It is inevitable to the normative 
nature of standard setting that the process should produce 
standards which could fail. A failure in the standard-setting 
process can be clearly understood when a narrative structure 
identifies the significance of different events in the process of 
resistance and change. Added to this are the perceptions of 
those involved who, with the benefit of hindsight and contem-
plation, provide their own accounts of the failure which pro-
vides an understanding of events different from analyses of the 
causes of failure based on reasons in company reports. 
THE FIRST NARRATIVE: THE RESEARCH PROJECT 
The first narrative relates the story of the research, why 
and how it was developed and the methods used. This introduc- 11
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tion ensures that other scholars may gain sufficient information 
not only to judge the results of the research but also to apply or 
extend these methods if they are deemed beneficial. 
The failure of the CCA standard was chosen as an oral 
history subject because the 1982 promulgation of the CCA 
standard was rejected on a scale unprecedented within New 
Zealand's generally "obedient" accounting community. 
The failure of current cost accounting standards has been 
subject to scrutiny elsewhere. For U.K. events see Tweedie and 
Whittington [1984] and Pong and Whittington [1996], while a 
summary of continuing developments in Australia in the use of 
current value accounting is provided by Jones and Love [1995]. 
Compliance with the standard in New Zealand was less 
than ten percent of listed company reports over the two to three 
years of financial reports studied [Peterson et al., 1984]. Unlike 
other countries, the resistance was not so much from practi-
tioners as much as companies and their boards, largely at-
tributed at the time to the lack of acceptability for tax purposes 
[Peterson et al., 1984]. Eventually, in October 1985, the stand-
ard was dropped. It went out with a whimper, not a bang; yet, 
these events still continue to impact the development of ac-
counting in New Zealand. 
The resonance of this event is such that it is ideally suited 
for oral h is tory research . Jus t as the orally t r a n s m i t t e d 
whakapapa of the Maori1 in New Zealand are not so much gene-
alogies as records of events and people whose resonance con-
tinued for much time, so this event, the demise of the CCA 
standard, has affected and continues to impact the development 
of accounting. Oral histories have the capacity to pick up such 
resonances, as in this case where the recall of events is filtered 
through the current consciousness of the participants ten years 
after the events. 
Debate concerning the merits and problems with oral his-
tory methods are a well-trammelled ground for historians over 
the last two decades. Since a 1991 review of the potential for 
oral history in accounting [Collins and Bloom, 1991], there 
have been other advocates of the merits of this method in ac-
counting research. For example, oral history is advocated be-
cause it is a dynamic process which creates evidence about the 
past and allows undocumented perspectives to emerge [Tyson, 
1
 Whakapapa are Maori genealogies relating individuals to various tribes 
and/or ancestors. 
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1996, p . 2]. Because it provides insights into how people felt 
about what happened and focuses on individual experiences, 
reactions, and aspirations, this approach enables participants, 
rather than historians, to reconstruct past events [Allen and 
Montell, 1981, p. 20; Hammond and Sikka, 1996, p. 79; Thomp-
son, 1988, p . 99] and addresses the problem of belief transfer-
ence by the historian [Merino and Mayper, 1993, p. 244; Tyson, 
1996, p. 2]. The multiplicity of experiences of individuals in-
volved in an event such as the CCA debate challenges simple 
causal explanations for the failure of the standard. Hammond 
and Sikka [1996, p. 81] described the potential of oral history 
was to show that "history is a lived experience which is full of 
contradictions, contestation and unforseen consequences." 
Nevertheless, the merits of the methodology are still de-
bated, especially the subjective nature of the testimonies, be-
cause they are complex cultural products [Edwards, 1993, p . 
28]. Specifically, the memory of past events may be subject to 
biased reinterpretation, selective retention, or innocent amne-
sia. In addition, the context in which the interview is under-
taken is very important to the perspective supplied. "We who 
use life stories need to understand . . . they always have to be 
structured, according to known conventions, in order to convey 
the desire . . . of this teller to present a self to the listener, at 
this particular moment" [Tonkin, 1990, p. 34]. 
It is not the purpose of this report to review fully the merits 
and disadvantages of this method. Suffice it to note that the 
oral history approach requires a conscious trade-off between 
the potential and the problems in such a method, given the time 
available and the opportunities presented in the ongoing re-
search process. In this case, the research began in August 1993. 
Assistance from the Oral History Section of the National Li-
brary of New Zealand included the Fyfe and Manson [1991] 
guide, Oral History and How to Approach It, the ethical code 
established by the National Oral History Association of New 
Zealand, the legal release form, and the interviewee informa-
tion sheet which has to accompany any tape deposited in the 
archives. The use of a legal release form at the start of each 
interview was particularly impor tant as it reminded inter-
viewees that their agreements meant tapes and transcripts 
would move into the public domain. All interviewees signed this 
form unconditionally although the form does allow for condi-
tions on release if required. 
An initial approach was made to those who were consid-
ered to be most cognizant of these events. Of the ten men ini-
13
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tially approached or corresponded with, two did not reply. A 
lengthy communication with one potential interviewee, who 
considered that the research should focus only on technical 
aspects of CCA, resulted in his declining the interview for the 
proposed subject matter of this project. After starting the inter-
views, four more interviewees were approached, resulting in 
eleven interviews between August 1993 and February 1994 (see 
Appendix A). The length of interviews varied, most being ap-
proximately one hour. 
It can be observed from Appendix A that the standard set-
ters and academics interviewed formed a homogeneous group 
of New Zealand pakeha2 males. This project did not attempt to 
seek responses from rank-and-file practitioners or from corpo-
rate financial controllers. Although one of the strengths of oral 
history is its capacity to allow other voices (especially of minor-
ity groups) to be heard [Hammond and Sikka, 1996, p. 79], this 
would have resulted in a much extended field of inquiry. 
The objective of this project, as described in the letters to 
interviewees requesting their participation, was to use oral his-
tory techniques in order to contribute to the historical record of 
the CCA debate in New Zealand; in particular, asking about 
recollections or reminiscences of the events surrounding the 
dropping of the CCA standard and how this debate revealed 
aspects of the relationship between practitioners and account-
ing standard-setting authorities between 1975 and 1985. The 
emphasis in the research shifted to the first objective as there 
was little interest by interviewees in the second objective. Com-
ments in response to the questions concerning the second ob-
jective were perfunctory or disinterested. 
The questions asked of each interviewee were: 
1. What events before the standard was promulgated indi-
cated that there might be considerable noncompliance? 
2. What key events caused the withdrawal? 
3. Do you think CCA as an accounting standard is likely to be 
resurrected during other periods of inflation? 
2
 This term means a white/Caucasian New Zealander. The uniformity of 
the gender, race, and status of the subjects meant those interviewed all pro-
vided a sense that they were men living their lives "as their own." This empha-
sis is widely recognized by oral historians; for example, in Bertaux-Wiame's 
[1982, p . 193] study, she noted it was from their work that men derive their 
sense of identity, and present themselves "as the subjects of their own lives — 
as the actors . . . in contrast with men's accounts, women will not insist on 
what they have done; but rather on what relationships existed between them-
selves and persons close to them." 14
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4. What was the impact on the status of the profession? 
5. What does this event tell us about what users want from 
financial statements? 
Interviews progressed in a relatively unstructured manner. 
Sometimes after termination the interviewees would move on 
to personal reminiscences or memories of different individuals 
involved and subsequent events in their lives. In other cases, the 
interviewees would answer largely on the basis of questions 
asked, choosing not to recall or comment on issues they did not 
consider within the scope of the questions. 
Following the copying and transcription of all tapes, a copy 
of the interview was sent to each interviewee with a prog-
ress report in August 1994. Master copies were lodged with a 
copy of transcripts and a project report in the Oral History 
Archives in Wellington, New Zealand upon completion of the 
research. 
The most effective method of analysis was utilization of a 
"cut-and-paste" method, facilitated by holding data in multiple 
files on a computer with duplication marked carefully. This cut-
and-paste into 16 topics reduced the 53,000 plus words in the 
transcripts to about 23,000 words. The responses were then 
reanalyzed to identify commonalities, differences, or particular 
phrases which clearly illustrated responses to the topics. 
The analysis of the transcripts was an emergent, evolving 
process because as segments were identified within the data, 
different connections between segments became apparent. The 
researcher had to reread transcripts, given the new information 
and new structures which were emerging within the data. Sort-
ing and sifting led to seemingly interesting and meaningful dis-
coveries. This process could continue ad infinitum in the ab-
sence of constraints in regards to money, time, or energy. 
During the interviews, the interviewees raised related issues 
including the international context, price controls, the price 
freeze, inflation rates, the achievements and quality of the 
Richardson Report, the personality of the prime minister (Sir 
R. D. Muldoon), the "Waikato Project,"3 and the New Zealand 
Society of Accountants Awards for Annual Reports. 
It is apparent that some other questions could have been 
used as a starting point. For example, the question "Why was 
3
 The Waikato Project on Inflation Accounting published purchasing 
power and price indices, as well as providing education series for practitioners 
and new graduates. 15
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CCA developed in the first place?" might have given a different 
emphasis to their perceptions concerning why the standard was 
eventually withdrawn. However, the original objective of the 
research was to apply theories addressing the issue of the ef-
fect of withdrawal of a standard on the legitimation of the 
profession through its standard-setting process. The emphasis 
was not on the technical aspects of current value accounting. 
During analysis it became apparent that the differences be-
tween the New Zealand and U.K. events were of significance. 
The thesis topic changed from an initial single objective to two 
foci — (1) an examination of the similarities and differences 
between the attributed causes of the failure of the CCA stand-
ard from research at the time, compared with the attributed 
causes from the oral history record; and (2) a comparison of the 
differences between U.K. and New Zealand events. The result-
ing thesis was completed by the end of 1994. 
THE SECOND NARRATIVE: THE CONSTRUCTION AND 
WITHDRAWAL OF THE CCA STANDARD 
A shared characteristic of the second and third narratives is 
the objective to "gather the data and present them in such a 
manner that 'the informants speak for themselves'" [Strauss 
and Corbin, 1990, p. 21]. The resulting presentation of chunks 
of transcript inserted into text allows to every degree possible 
the spontaneous and meaningful ways in which the inter-
viewees' memories were expressed. 
The second narrative commenced a considerable time be-
fore the research started in 1993. In 1967, the Consumer Price 
Index in New Zealand started to record annual changes over 
4%, the s tar t of a long period of steadily increasing inflation. It 
did not fall below this level again until 1991. The start of the 
CCA project was linked in interviewees' minds to this inflation 
of price indices. The rapid increase was considered to be the 
driver behind efforts which led to the promulgation of the 
standard, and a subsequent perceived decrease was considered 
(by some people) the cause of its failure. Eventually, the Con-
sumer Price Index in New Zealand increased from 6-7% per 
annum in 1970 to 17% in 1980. 
A n u m b e r of countr ies publ ished Current Purchas ing 
Power (CPP) proposals throughout the 1970s. In Australia, the 
Current Value Accounting exposure draft was based on revalua-
tion to replacement cost. When inflation rose sharply in the 
U.S. in the 1970s, the Securities and Exchange Commission and 16
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the Financial Accounting Standards Board in SFAS 33 required 
supplementary statements, comprising a "real terms" mixture 
of replacement cost and purchasing-power data. In January 
1974, the U.K. Sandilands Committee was appointed, reporting 
back on inflation accounting in June 1975. In the U.K., the 
deliberations of the Morpeth Committee resulted in the devel-
opment by the Accounting Standards Committee of ED 18, 
eventually promulgated as SSAP 7. 
ED 10, Accounting for the Changes in the Purchasing Power 
of Money, was the first exposure draft published by the New 
Zealand Society of Accountants (NZSA) in March 1975. The 
draft was largely based on the U.K. SSAP 7 and similarly rec-
ommended the CPP approach. Inflation was over 10% per an-
num in New Zealand between 1975 and 1988, with the excep-
tion of the years in which the government initiated a price 
freeze (mid-1982-1984). In March 1976, an analysis of the re-
sponses to ED 10 was published in the New Zealand Ac-
countants Journal. It was clear that the vast majority of re-
spondents were opposed to CPP, with some responden t s 
preferring to wait and see what was going to happen overseas. 
Others urged that more research should be undertaken in New 
Zealand or suggested there would be confusion over presenting 
two sets of financial statements to shareholders, as required by 
ED 10. Overall, the CPP method was seen as being seriously 
deficient although many agreed that it was a step in the right 
direction. 
The National Party in New Zealand won the 1975 elections 
under the leadership of Rob Muldoon, who was duly declared 
prime minister. Muldoon was particularly remembered for be-
ing of strong character, and the significance of his opposition 
to attempts to establish the CCA standard for taxable income 
measurement after the standard as promulgated was frequently 
mentioned by interviewees because he was an accountant and 
had given support to efforts in the 1970s to develop a form of 
inflation accounting. 
ED 14, Accounting in Terms of Current Costs and Values, 
published in March 1976, recommended that assets should be 
shown in the balance sheet at their "value to the business," and 
profit should be the result of matching costs with revenues, 
both expressed in current terms. 
The Americans . . . experimented by having some of the 
big companies disclose the current values of their as-
sets and, in other words, I think they probably had a 
very sensible approach in that they tried to do it incre- 17
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mentally. Whereas we tried to do it, not only us, but 
the U.K. and to some extent Australia, tried to go in 
boots and all; whereas they just said 'No, let's experi-
ment with the valuation, you disclose the current val-
ues of your assets,' and I think it just became more 
apparent that that was a stumbling block. It is a very 
basic one [Frank Devonport].4 
In September 1976, the Richardson Committee, a commit-
tee appointed by the National Government, released the Report 
of the Committee of Inquiry into Inflation Accounting. Consider-
ing CPP, CCA, and Continuously Contemporaneous Accounting 
(CoCoA), the report recommended that some form of CCA be 
required. The inflation rate was then close to 17%. In December 
that year, the prime minister pledged support for the Waikato 
Inflation Accounting Research Project. The project was ex-
tended to t ra in potent ial and new employees (account ing 
graduates) of 120 companies in different "inflation accounting" 
methods. 
Throughout 1977 and 1978, the NZSA increased its involve-
ment in "inflation accounting" education through publications 
in the Accountants Journal and by offering seminars on CCA in 
May 1977. However, it was not until December 1978 that GU 1, 
Supplementary Financial Statements in Terms of Current Costs 
and Values, was published by the NZSA. GU 1 followed the 
Richardson Report recommendations very closely. 
Parallel to these events was the publication of "inflation 
accounting" standards elsewhere — SFAS 33, Financial Report-
ing and Changing Prices, was promulgated in the U.S. in 1979, 
and in 1980 SSAP 16, Current Cost Accounting, was promul-
gated in the U.K. In New Zealand there were signs of resistance 
to change and concern with the immediate effects of CCA on 
company profits and taxation revenue. 
At the end of 1980, there was a plea by the chairman of the 
Accounting and Research Standards Board, Malcolm McCaw, 
to members of the NZSA to maintain the commitment to devel-
oping a CCA standard. He said, "despite uncertainty in the 
problems of transition it was essential for the Society to take a 
firm step in the interests of the public, investors and those who 
protected investors" [McCaw, 1980, p . 40]. Members were also 
reminded that many accountants now considered that historic 
4
 Readers are referred to Appendix A for a description of the careers of the 
interviewees. 
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cost accounts were not sufficient to satisfy legal requirements 
for a "true and fair view." 
In response to GU 1, ED 25, Current Cost Accounting, was 
prepared. Although it was very similar to the recommendation 
of the Richardson Report and to the U.K. SSAP 16, a major 
difference compared with SSAP 16 occurred in the calculation 
of the gearing adjustment which took into account revaluation 
surpluses on fixed assets. 
Seven months later in March 1982, CCA 1, Information Re-
flecting the Effects of Changing Prices, was published by the 
NZSA. It was almost identical to ED 25 and followed the U.K. 
SSAP 16 in almost all respects excepting the composition of 
monetary working capital and the current cost reserve items to 
which the gearing adjustment was to be applied. 
The awareness of the levels of noncompliance led to the 
offering of a one-day series of workshops and the distribution 
of a 20-minute video distributed through the NZSA. However, 
in the first major analysis of 147 companies with a financial 
year ending around March 1983 [Peterson et al., 1984], there 
was only an 8.2% compliance rate. A further study [Cameron 
and Heazlewood, 1985] noted an 8.6% compliance rate with 
CCA 1 in the reports of 185 companies for reporting periods 
ending between the end of March 1983 and February 1984. The 
price freeze through price controls was continued for only a 
few months after the Labour Party won the election in July 
1983. Inflation rates during the freeze had been 6-7%. Inflation 
rose again to 13-15% for three years before the sharemarket 
"crash" in October 1987. 
Two years later in October 1985, the NZSA decided that the 
"standard" status of CCA 1 should be dropped, and that it 
should be reduced in status to "recommended best practice." In 
the U.K., SSAP 16 was also made nonmandatory. ED 38, Ac-
counting for the Effects of Changing Prices, was developed to 
replace ED 35 in the U.K., but eventually was not formally 
issued. SFAS 33 was being reassessed in the U.S. 
It's very difficult for a country, both for the profession 
internationally and for the Government, to go down 
one path where everyone else is standing still, or going 
off somewhere else. . . . It's not a field in which New 
Zealand can go it alone [Sir Ivor Richardson]. 
This narrative of the events indicates standard setting was 
seen as a process whereby those controlling the standard set-
ting wished to achieve a public good by improving financial 
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reporting, but lost their "battle" because of factors beyond their 
control, such as international events. 
I think we did a better job than any of the other coun-
tries. The English, Scots had got sorely embarrassed by 
their weak-kneed approach to the whole thing, they 
lost the vote and so on and they couldn't even control 
their own members. . . . The Australians never covered 
themselves with glory at any stage. They probably were 
rather pragmatic I suppose, they were aware that there 
was no great enthusiasm out there in the profession, 
certainly not amongst the companies, the companies 
are the last people that wanted to be saddled with cur-
rent cost accounting. . . . The Australians really fooled 
around with it and didn't do a great deal [Rex Ander-
son]. 
New Zealand provided a scenario which was alternatively 
described as being "an experimental niche" or "we couldn't do it 
alone," typical of a cultural ambivalence common to many as-
pects of New Zealand cultural or intellectual developments. It 
became apparent in the process of the research that the drivers 
to the rise and withdrawal of the New Zealand standard were 
far more influenced by international events than indicated by 
company reports in that period. 
These drivers were different from those identified for the 
U.K., where the rise in domest ic inflation triggered wha t 
Mumford [1979, p. 98] described as a five-year cycle of events, 
ending with a reduction in domestic inflation and interest in 
reform dwindling. In the U.S., SFAS 33 had required supple-
mentary disclosures to reflect CCA, but did not require a re-
vised balance sheet. There were disagreements in the U.S. con-
cerning the t r ea tment of mone ta ry i tems and cont inuing 
opposition from practitioners. Inflation had fallen to 3.2% in 
1983 [Kirkman, 1985, p. 37], and the promised review after five 
years did not eventuate. 
THE THIRD NARRATIVE: CAUSES OF THE FAILURE 
OF THE CCA STANDARD 
The third narrative is focused on the construction of a de-
scription of similarities and differences between the attributed 
causes of the failure of the CCA standard in research in pub-
lished articles at the time, compared with the attributed causes 
from the oral history record. This comparison of the two 
sources demonstrates that utilization of oral history methods 
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provides a valuable and unique perspective which contrasts 
with that provided from analyses of written data and company 
reports. 
The Account of Causes of Failure in Published Articles: There 
were two initial studies of annual reports to identify the attrib-
uted causes of noncompliance. Peterson et al. [1984] evaluated 
the response to CCA 1 after the publication of 147 major corpo-
rate annual reports for the next reporting period ending on or 
after March 31, 1983. This study followed the adoption of the 
standard by the NZSA in 1982. Of these 147 companies, only 
8.2% published supplementary current-cost accounts. Cameron 
and Heazlewood [1985] also analyzed reports for all accounting 
periods commencing on or after April 1, 1982 (totaling 185 
listed companies) and found an overall compliance rate of 
8.6%. The major reasons given for the lack of adoption of CCA 
in these research investigations were: 
1. The benefit of CCA was questioned. This reason was vari-
ously stated: "served little practical or useful purpose," "not 
warranted, confusing, misleading, not cost/beneficial, was 
inappropriate," "gave no meaningful information." This 
reason was cited by 49% of companies in the Cameron and 
Heazlewood [1985] study and 27% in Peterson et al. [1984]. 
2. There was subjectivity and complexity in CCA according to 
3 1 % of the companies studied by Cameron and Heazle-
wood and 24% in Peterson et al. CCA was seen as lacking 
understandability and not enhancing comparability. The 
use of price indices and multiple alternative approaches 
was seen as confusing. 
3. CCA was not mandatory, was not recognized for tax or 
pricing purposes, and was not a Stock Exchange require-
ment. 2 1 % of reports in both the Cameron and Heazlewood 
and the Peterson et al. studies suggested it was being ig-
nored because it did not have legal, fiscal, or economic 
validity. 
4. There was a failure by other public companies to follow the 
standard, a reason indicated in the Freightways Report 
[Peterson et al., 1984, p. 90]. 
In only one case in the Peterson et al. [1984] survey did a 
company mention that the system was not relevant because of 
the "declining" inflation rate, while 3 of the 72 companies 
in the Cameron and Heazlewood study [1985] noted this reason 
for noncompliance. The artificial decline in the inflation rate 
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was caused by the wage and price freeze. Further details of the 
Cameron and Heazlewood results are provided in Appendix B. 
Peterson et al. [1984, p. 91] found it "difficult to accept that 
the reasons mentioned are valid ones for failure to comply with 
the standard." In their view, the primary reason was that CCA 
results in a reduction in reported profits, thus negatively affect-
ing share prices and terms of loan finance. This view was sub-
stantiated by comments from the oral history interviews which 
indicated that management did not want to be seen in a bad 
light. For example, Bob Pope observed, "There were others who 
did not like it because it did in fact portray a much poorer 
result in most cases." 
The results of these two studies were supplemented by 
Wong's 1988 research into 15 New Zealand companies which 
utilized CCA to provide supplementary information to the fi-
nancial accounts during the period from 1977-1981 (i.e., while 
CCA was voluntary). These entities showed higher effective tax 
rates, lower leverage, larger market capitalization, and more 
capital intensity. All these results are consistent with positivist 
theories which focus on incentives to change accounting poli-
cies. 
Reviewing the causes of noncompliance, Cowan [1985, p . 
52] divided the opinions of the accounting profession into two 
groups, those who thought CCA was now a lost cause and those 
who attributed its failure to lack of support from others inside 
and outside the profession. He attributed the noncompliance to 
the following factors: 
1. The proposals were not successful because New Zealand 
had not considered an independent "locally developed" so-
lution but had tried to improvise from methods of account-
ing for inflation advocated in other jurisdictions [Cowan, 
1985, p. 53]. 
2. There were frustrated hopes as some preparers anticipated 
that they would initially provide supplementary informa-
tion using CCA rather than replacing historic-cost-based 
financial reports. Subsequently, when CCA was proven to 
be a fully workable standard, it would then replace the 
modified historic-cost basis. The lack of compliance frus-
trated this objective [Cowan, 1985, p. 53]. 
3. The NZSA had failed to appreciate its role in mediating 
between theoretical or academic purists, and there were 
constraints experienced by pract i t ioners in applying a 
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standard which may have been theoretically pure but was 
too subjective for practitioners. 
4. There were seen to be defects in the CCA model. It was too 
subjective, limited in scope, too complex, and not inte-
grated closely enough with previous techniques of asset 
measurement. 
Cowan [1985, p . 52] argued that the profession had to con-
tinue its advocacy of some system of inflation accounting in 
order to mitigate the extreme misinformation flowing out of 
accounts based on historic cost, even if it meant adjusting the 
"product" to meet the needs of "consumers." "This is no time to 
give up on inflation accounting. The problem which it ad-
dresses is much too serious." By then, virtually everyone else 
had turned their backs on the proposals, and his pleas were 
largely ignored. 
Reasons for Noncompliance from the Oral History: The perceived 
causes of noncompliance from oral history tapes are listed be-
low, with the more frequently described factors listed first: 
1. CCA was not going to be permitted to be used for the calcu-
lation of taxable income after companies had seen it as a 
mechanism to reduce taxable income. This cause was cited 
by Frank Devonport, John Hagen, Roger Hopkins, Bob 
Pope, Malcolm McCaw, Don Trow, and John Hagen. A re-
lated view was that the Government had not given a strong 
enough signal of support, such as endorsement by the Se-
curities Commission (noted by Rex Anderson, Malcolm 
McCaw, and Bob Pope): 
Well, no government was prepared to say they had 
a tax rate of 900 in the dollar. If they accepted that 
current cost accounting was the proper basis for 
reporting financial accounts and for taxation levy, 
they couldn't drop their tax bills, so they would 
have had to, or adjust the tax base in some other 
way, they were just not prepared to do it. It was 
politically unacceptable. That was the crux of the 
matter [Bob Pope]. 
If Muldoon had said you could have had it for tax, 
then probably it would have rolled in. . . . People 
would think they had got a big reduction in tax 
[Frank Devonport]. 
Although it was recognized: 
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We felt obliged to make some modifications to CCA 
for financial reporting purposes for pragmatic tax 
reasons. For example, if we had applied CCA across 
the board for tax purposes there would have been 
an element of taxation of capital gains. We felt that 
really in the climate of the times that that would 
not be acceptable across the board to the public; 
and so we adopted a compromise of recognising for 
tax purposes the benefits of the use of borrowed 
funds, but only up to the point of the CCA deduc-
tions in other respects [Sir Ivor Richardson]. 
2. CCA was either too complicated or complex, or it was too 
radical and too fundamental a change, mentioned by John 
Hagen, Frank Devonport, Roger Hopkins, and Rex Ander-
son: 
It was more a growing belief by the business com-
munity or the financial community generally saying 
'This was too complicated. We don't understand it.' 
There was a sort of gathering storm of protest say-
ing: 'Too complicated' [John Hagen]. 
This standard was the first one which drove to the 
hear t of the measurement process, and I think 
again fundamentally that was something that the 
Society couldn't handle, it was new to them. Here 
we were putting up a Standard, which said you are 
going to have to measure things a different way. It 
is not a question of disclosure and reporting, not a 
question of how you analyse and classify and report 
to people, you are going to have to measure it dif-
ferently and this cut right to the core of the ac-
cepted thinking [Roger Hopkins]. 
3. CCA was not adopted because it showed a lower profit (as 
noted by Malcolm McCaw) and reported less favorable re-
sults (according to John Hagen, Athol Mann, and Don 
Trow): 
The proposal not to use it for tax purposes was the 
thrust of the dagger into the body of CCA that took 
the life out of it. People had not realised, I don't 
think, that that was the moment that CCA died, es-
pecially accountants who were keen to box on; and 
I think, naively, accountants got a bit of surprise 
when they found company directors did just not 
want to produce CCA accounts, because it was con-
trary to what they had said they were going to do, 
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and one hadn't appreciated that these directors, as 
they always are, always had been particularly in 
those days, always wanting to show themselves as 
good performers, never wanting to attract criticism, 
always taking steps to minimise criticism....There is 
no way that company directors in general were go-
ing to produce CCA information, particularly if say 
only a third of the companies were going to do it, 
because their result was invariably going to be a 
worse result; it would have been the very odd com-
pany that might have had a better result, and they 
didn't just want to put themselves into the category 
of those who very clearly had a inferior result [Don 
Trow]. 
4. One reason given was that inflation elsewhere was falling 
(John Hagen), falling in New Zealand (Malcolm McCaw), 
or ceased to have the impact it had had on "true and fair" 
(Bob Pope): 
Then inflation round the world started to reduce, 
and pressure for current cost data reduced. Unfor-
tunately the battle was lost [John Hagen]. 
Inflation disappeared or ceased to have the impact 
that it was previously having on true and fair re-
porting [Bob Pope]. 
5. Another reason was that the indices were too subjective 
(noted by Frank Devonport and Malcolm McCaw): 
We have still got exactly the same problem that was 
being faced then. This was the problem of measure-
ment . You see, even today we are advocat ing 
valuers to value or revalue assets and the valuers 
are scrambling to try and produce a set of stand-
ards for valuation. You can go to two different 
valuers to get the valuation you want. They differ so 
much, and I think this is basically the same prob-
lem as you had with CCA [Frank Devonport]. 
6. John Hagen and Athol Mann considered that noncompli-
ance will follow if the market does not like the standard: 
If I adopted CCA and you didn't, the numbers we 
reported were distorted in the minds of the public 
and to some extent by company directors; they said 
'There are not sufficient companies using it, so 
therefore we are going to stop using it, because it 
shows us in a bad light even though we really do 
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understand it and agree it was the right thing to do' 
[John Hagen]. 
7. Roger Hopkins and Rex Anderson thought it had been too 
cumbersome and costly: 
It was going to take resources and would cost 
money to produce something that nobody really 
saw any great use of [Rex Anderson]. 
8. John Hagen described one of the causes as a case of the 
theory being "miles ahead" of the practice: 
It was a good example of a standard . . . the imple-
mentat ion of an accounting s tandard where the 
theory was miles ahead of the practice and the aca-
demic part of the profession was miles ahead of the 
companies, and there was no intention to take ac-
count of politics in accounting s tandards. . . . I 
think it is because the standard setters at that time 
did not comprehend sufficiently, in any way, that 
you cannot jam standards down peoples throats 
and hope they will accept them. And if they don't 
like them, then the business community will scuttle 
them. 
9. Roger Hopkins noted that we had learned to live with 
(modified) historic cost and allow for it: 
They know how, for instance, allowances for depre-
ciation on historical cost are not going to allow for 
the cost of replacement, but they know that and 
understand it and they make, just as the corporate 
director used to do, the necessary adjustments, if 
they want to transfer from that model into the real 
world of decision making. 
10. A further factor was conservative boards of directors: 
I was sure in those days that a lot of Boards of 
Directors just didn't want to even think about it. 
They just didn't want to go through the hassle of 
understanding what it was all about . . . (there was) 
a desire to keep on the old ways, and, as I say, there 
were a lot of members of our profession who gave 
them some support too. . . . I think probably those 
of us who were keen on it were so enthused with it 
that we assumed that we had the right answer, and 
everybody was going to abide by this [Bruce Christ-
mas] . 
26
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 26 [1999], Iss. 1, Art. 15
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol26/iss1/15
18 Accounting Historians Journal, June 1999 
11. Malcolm McCaw recalled that New Zealand was seen as an 
"experimental niche:" 
A lot of people overseas thought we were an inter-
esting little experimental niche out there, and they 
were interested to see what happened. In the mean-
time they weren't going to do anything; and banks 
and those sort who would have been the ones to 
benefit from this sort of policy, because they had 
their own ways of working out, working out the 
accounts and making adjustments to those fore-
casts to decide on companies and their future pros-
pects et cetera. 
12. Tony van Zijl considered that it was realized that the use-
fulness of the incremental information was close to zero: 
Well, I think one of the things that happened was 
that people started doing empirical research on the 
incremental information content of that kind of in-
formation, and the consensus that emerged from 
that was that it probably was close to zero. Now 
tha t doesn' t mean to say tha t the informat ion 
wasn't of any value, but rather that there were prob-
ably alternative sources for that information, so 
that in terms, anyway, of usefulness to investors, 
the information rated very low. 
13. According to Athol Mann, companies would not utilize CCA 
if their competitors were not: 
In the interests of their own company, people sim-
ply weren't prepared to make a conversion unless 
their competitors did, they couldn't afford, they felt, 
to leave themselves out on a limb in relation to 
accounts published under a CCA approach if their 
competi tors in the same industry didn't do the 
same. 
14. Rex Anderson recalled that at that time academics were 
more inclined to continue debating rather than resolve the 
issues: 
The last thing they want to happen in an academic 
argument, is for resolution to be reached. It's a 
plaything, they like to go on; and the fact that 
somebody knowledgeable by propounding his views 
can slow the whole process down, in fact ruin it, 
doesn't worry them, provided that they get their 
own way. 
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DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE 
EXPLANATIONS FOR NONCOMPLIANCE 
The data presented in the oral history narrative show a 
variety of viewpoints, some of which provide an understanding 
different from the existing consensus in the literature on the 
causes of the failure of the inflation accounting standard in 
New Zealand. Readers will develop their own comparisons 
from the information provided and existing knowledge of expla-
nations for the failure of such standards. This account will 
therefore enable readers to develop further their own under-
standing of these events, given their individual preferences for 
any weighting they may wish to place on the different sources. 
The two sources are of a very different nature, resulting in 
very different emphases. Most of the emphases from insights 
provided by the oral histories were on political or contracting 
costs, whereas the emphases from annual reports analyses were 
on comparability, costliness, and usefulness. Although there 
may be distortions from the effect of memory in oral history, 
other sources of data have different problems of selectivity and 
partiality. However imperfect sources may be, the comparison 
is illuminating. 
The comparison between the analysis of the reasons for 
noncompliance from papers written in 1983-1985 and the oral 
histories shows the major similarity in these two sources is the 
"tax issue." Standard setters looked back with hindsight and 
determined that the lack of CCA 1 acceptance for taxation pur-
poses was its "death sentence." Comments were often phrased 
in the death metaphor. 
The major difference was a compelling insistence, espe-
cially in the comments of Frank Devonport, Roger Hopkins, 
Rex Anderson, and John Hagen, that CCA was a fundamental 
change in the approach to the measurement of income. If one is 
expecting people's behavior to change (which it should do in 
the light of a changed standard), then there are major political 
considerations inherent in the standard-setting process which 
have to be taken into account. This point was most emphasized 
by John Hagen. The analysis closer to the events, as cited, sug-
gested that CCA was "just another s tandard" being imple-
mented, although some standard setters, on reflection, clearly 
saw it as being essentially different to other new accounting 
standards because of the extent to which it represented a funda-
mental change in accounting principles. The CCA standard was 
part of the normative system of standard setting, as Kirk [1988, 
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p. 17] noted, "a normative system, however, has definite limits 
in its ability to point a policy-making body toward incontrovert-
ible solutions to recognition and measurement problems. Good 
intentions and hard work cannot overcome those limits." 
Other reasons derived from the published analyses of the 
reasons for noncompliance from papers written in 1983-1985 
also appear in the standard-setters' perceptions. In addition, the 
oral history reflected memories of an increasing lack of com-
mitment by practitioners, and that CCA would reflect negatively 
the performance of directors and managers. There were no sig-
nificant differences in the views of those interviewees who had 
been in public practice comp>ared with those who had led 
largely academic careers. 
It was also noted by interviewees that directors of larger 
multinational companies in New Zealand were prepared to 
"give it a go" in the early stages of the development of CCA, 
which may be indicative that the thrust to international harmo-
nization was contributing to early support for the standard 
from the corporate sector. Eventually the lack of compliance 
overseas, coupled with the anticipated fall in inflation driven by 
a drop in inflation in New Zealand's major trading partners, 
was driving noncompliance in 1982-1983. 
This contrasting analysis has highlighted that the reasons 
provided by companies for not utilizing the CCA standard are 
not all reflected in the reasons as understood by the standard 
setters. It could be expected that companies would not attribute 
noncompliance to the desire not to show management perform-
ance in a "bad light," or that it was too radical or too funda-
mental a change. It is of note that very few company reports 
referred to the anticipated fall in inflation or the political (price 
freeze) environment. 
This comparison has demonstrated the usefulness of oral 
history methods to identify contrasting dynamics behind stan-
dard setting where hegemonic forces may elude quantitative 
analysis. Oral histories may not result in major revisions, yet 
still "add value" to the extant records of an accounting phenom-
enon. 
SEPARATION AND RECONSTITUTION 
It is in our nature to reconstitute separate pieces of infor-
mation into a coherent body of knowledge. The separation of 
this accounting history research into three narratives was not 
undertaken in order to prevent the coherency of such reconsti-
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tution, but to demonstrate the inevitability of the imposition of 
narrative in interpretative or explanatory paradigms. 
Thus, the first narrative related the progress and comple-
tion of a successful research project. A feature of this research 
was the change in the eventual focus for the thesis. This revised 
focus was the outcome of the usually undocumented process of 
ensuring appropriate scope and coherency to the ultimate re-
search report. It can be assumed that the questions asked of 
interviewees would have been different if the eventual focus of 
the research had been differently identified to interviewees at 
the start. However, if scholars had to remain on an unalterable 
trajectory, the potential for discovery from data could be com-
promised or endangered. The potential of methods such as oral 
history is to allow the data to reveal hypotheses previously un-
anticipated by the researcher, typical of grounded theory where 
the theory is inductively derived from the study of the phenom-
enon it represents [Strauss and Corbin, 1990]. 
Some refusal to participate as described was not unusual in 
such projects and reflects issues of control over the topic. It is 
difficult to determine to what extent there was bias in the selec-
tion of participants, but the resultant data indicated a breadth 
of views was obtained. 
The second narrative related the rise and fall of the stand-
ard in a series of attempts by the standard setters which were 
ultimately unsuccessful. The interviews revealed an importance 
of the international context previously unrecognized in New 
Zealand studies of the failure of the CCA standard [Peterson et 
al., 1984; Cameron and Heazlewood, 1985; Cowan, 1985; Wong, 
1988]. Economic pressures, in particular the inflation rate, 
were observed to have less impact on the failure of the CCA 
standard in New Zealand compared with other jurisdictions. 
The third narrative combined archival data (written expla-
nations for the failure) with the oral history data in order to 
make a comparison. As such, it transversed the two paradigms 
of accounting history as described by Tyson [1996, p. 2]. To 
study causes of lack of compliance is typical of accounting his-
tory studies with an objective of ensuring the utility of account-
ing history. The third narrative reflected that standard setters 
consider there are "lessons to be learned" from the failure of 
the standard. Historical studies should provide a record of past 
experiences which help in current standard-setting issues; yet, 
standard setters continue to attempt to disconnect the CCA epi-
sode from current standard setting. For example, recently in the 
U.K. the ASB announced in the progress paper on the exposure 
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draft of the Statement of Principles for Financial Reporting 
that, "The Board emphatically states that it has never had any 
plans to impose a system of current cost accounting. . . " [Ac-
counting Standards Board, 1996, p. 1] in response to many 
expressions of concern that the ASB was trying to reestablish 
CCA. Such strong denial of any likely role for CCA in future 
standard setting indicates negative resonance from past events 
is ongoing. 
CONCLUSION 
The isolation of the three components of this research into 
separate narratives implies each has now been completed, but 
in reality all three are ongoing. The data could sustain new 
research outputs as the debate about current value accounting 
is ongoing in New Zealand and elsewhere. The composition and 
understanding of these events might also undergo reexamina-
tion and recomposition in the minds of those involved in the 
events 20 years ago. 
Narratives were chosen because they provide a flexible tool 
with which to communicate events; narrative is not characteris-
tic of particular fields of research. It may be less explicit in the 
traditional scientific method of research description, but the 
most rigorous scientific procedures for establishing a method 
of scientific testing are sequential in structure and in the re-
porting thereof. It would have been possible to build up at least 
six or eight narratives, like the layers of an onion, in order to 
report fully this study of the failure of the CCA standard in New 
Zealand. The richness from this record is to be found not in any 
inner kernel of truth, but in the process of reaching the inner-
most layer as each narrative is read and contextualized, allow-
ing its constitutive effect to be appreciated. 
Results presented in this manner highlight that any such 
research is a series of interlocking and overlapping events. Nar-
rative is not only a direct and efficient means of communicat-
ing both causal and transactional elements in events, but also 
clearly delineates delusions and failures. It is a limitation of 
narrative that the conceptual complexity of events is simplified 
into a singular process, but such limitations assist communica-
tion and comprehension. 
The tool of narrative has sometimes been transformed into 
a metaphor for "whiggish" tendencies of history — tendencies 
to highlight successful endeavors which contributed to the as-
cendancy of the present while casting past failures into unre-
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corded shadows. Undoubtedly narrative has been constructed 
to this end, but such uses should not exclude recognition of its 
value, or indeed its inevitability, in explanatory or interpretative 
paradigms. 
This study has provided an example validating Carnegie 
and Napier's [1996, p. 8] view that the strengths of accounting 
history are from its firm basis in the "archive," which includes 
the oral records here presented. Furthermore, it demonstrates 
that "accounting history is enhanced by locating our narratives 
within an understanding of the specific context in which the 
object of our research emerges and operates." Such enrichment, 
through an increasing contribution of oral history studies in 
different jurisdictions, will ensure a fertile database for future 
accounting history studies. 
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APPENDIX B 
Reasons for Noncompliance from 
Analyses of Company Reports 
The following summary is from the study by Cameron and Heazlewood [1985]. 
Their study of 185 company reports with reporting dates between 3/31/83 -
2/29/84 overlapped reports studied by Peterson et al. [1984]. In the Cameron 
and Heazlewood study: 
CCA mentioned but no reason given for 
noninclusion 
CCA mentioned and reasons given for 
noninclusion 
CCA not mentioned 
Companies presenting CCA statements 
Total 












Of the 72 reports which disclosed reasons for noncompliance, 108 reasons 
were given: 
CCA serves little or no purpose. 
CCA is not recognized for tax purposes. 
CCA is confusing or misleading to members. 
Application of CCA to the company's results would not be 
appropriate. 
CCA methods are too subjective. 
There is as yet no agreed uniform method of accounting for 
changes in price levels. 
CCA statements were prepared but not presented. 
CCA will not be implemented until it is more widely understood 
and accepted. 
Time spent on CCA is not cost-beneficial. 
CCA is not warranted. 
Primary accounts already reflect CCA principles in some form 
or another. 
CCA is no longer valid now that the rate of inflation has dropped. 
CCA is not recognized for pricing purposes. 
CCA results do not allow comparability. 
CCA is not a legal requirement. 
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN 
SHIP-ACCOUNTING PRACTICES TO 1900: 
A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THREE 
VESSELS 
Abstract: Accounting has always been utilitarian in nature. It adapts 
to the changes in the business environment by meeting the need for 
new types of information. The change in waterborne transportat ion 
in the U.S. during the 19th century provides an example of such an 
environmental change that led to a need for accounting adaptation. 
With the advent of the steamboat, old accounting methods were 
modified and new ones created to meet the changes in the business 
environment. In the process, a standardized ship-accounting model 
was developed. The model can be seen in the accounting records of 
three ships that sailed at the beginning of the 20th century. 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1903, the p r o m i n e n t Engl i sh accoun t ing a u t h o r , 
Lawrence Dicksee [1976b, p. 3], wrote: "One of the most an-
cient (and therefore one of the simplest) modes of transacting 
business is through the agency of the ship." The early American 
ship-accounting practices were, for the most part, this simple 
agency model in which the value of the ship and cargo were 
combined to act as a separate business transaction for each 
voyage. The development of new accounting procedures to fit 
the changing nature of ships and the shipping business in the 
U.S. shows the adaptive nature of the accounting process as the 
19th century progressed. 
This need for a new ship-accounting model came with the 
advent of the steamboat in 1807. Robert Fulton's Clermont 
showed the world that steam could be used to travel faster on 
the waterways of the American continent. Faster travel led to 
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changes in the accounting practices of the shipping business. 
Steamships began to make the aforementioned ship-agency ac-
counting practice obsolete, especially for American riverboat 
traffic. A ship owner could now make numerous trips with his 
ship in the same period it took the old sailing ships to complete 
one tour to some distant shore. The accounting relationship 
between the business transaction and the ship could now be 
severed. Ship accounting had to adapt to the changes occurring 
in the industry. The questions involved in this transition are 
simple. First, did a "standard" model of accounting develop for 
American shipping during the 19th century? Second, was the 
model used by the shipping companies accurately presented in 
this study? 
In an attempt to answer the questions posed above, this 
paper compares the accounting practices of three ships that 
sailed and traded at the turn of the 20th century. The first ship 
studied was a Great Lakes steamer named the Adella Shores. 
The Shores was par t of a family-owned pa r tne r sh ip tha t 
shipped salt between Michigan and Chicago aboard a small 
fleet of lake vessels. Next, the records of the riverboat or packet 
named the Betsy Ann were reviewed. This ship was operated out 
of Natchez, Mississippi, navigated the lower Mississippi River, 
and was locally owned by a family corporation with multiple 
business interests . Finally, the records of the Richard A. 
Bingham, a schooner that plied the lumber trade in the Carib-
bean, were studied. The schooner was personally owned by the 
manager of a lumber company in Pensacola, Florida. 
The varied modes of ownership of the three ships mirrored 
that of the shipping industry in 1903. The book, Workers of the 
Nation [Willets, 1903, pp. 569-581], said that there were 3,100 
steamers, like the Shores, on the Great Lakes at this time. Of 
this number, only 600 were operated as part of a fleet business. 
The remainder of the ships were presumably individually 
owned and operated. Next, at this point in history, there were 
only about 189 steamers, like the Betsy Ann, left on the Missis-
sippi River. Willets indicated most of these were locally owned 
and operated. Finally, the fleet of American-flagged, ocean-go-
ing schooners, like the Bingham, numbered greater than 16,000 
in 1903. Willets did not discuss an ownership mode for these 
vessels. 
As a final note of introduction, the three ships all sailed 
before the U.S. Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) issued 
orders in 1910 to begin an effort to regulate the waterborne 
traffic in the U.S. Regulations issued by the ICC focused on 
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accounting practices for depreciation and maintenance, as well 
as balance sheet classifications for waterborne carriers affili-
ated with railroads [ICC, 1910, 1912]. The fact that these stand-
ards did not apply to any of the three ships reviewed for this 
study allows for a comparison of their records with contempo-
rary ship-accounting practices. 
THE SHIPS AND THEIR OWNERS 
The Great Lakes Shipper — The Steamer Adella Shores1: Samuel 
Neff and Sons Shipping Company, the owner of the steamer 
Adella Shores, was a family partnership comprised of the father, 
Captain Samuel Neff, and his two sons, Captain Sidney Neff 
and Charles Neff. The Milwaukee-based shipping company be-
gan operations in the late 1880s when Samuel Neff moved from 
Oshkosh to Milwaukee. His two sons joined him in the business 
in the early 1890s. Sidney acted as a ship captain while Charles 
was responsible for the management of the business in Milwau-
kee. The Neff fleet of 1900 consisted of three wooden-hulled 
steamships — the Adella Shores, the Minnie Kelton, and the 
Edwin Tice. These three ships acted as the core of their small 
Great Lakes fleet. In addition, the Neffs purchased two barges, 
the Marion and the O. J. Hale, for the 1900 shipping season. The 
auxiliary log of the O. J. Hale noted that she had sailed with the 
Adella Shores between Chicago, Illinois and Manistee, Michi-
gan. The ships were primarily used to transport salt from cen-
tral Michigan to the port of Chicago for the National Salt Com-
pany, the forerunner of the Morton Salt Company. At the turn 
of the 20th century, salt was an important commodity that was 
used in a range of products from food preservatives to indus-
trial solvents. The ships in the Neff fleet all had long and storied 
histories, but only the records of the Adella Shores and the 
barge O. J. Hale were used for this study. 
According to data from the records of the Runge Collec-
tion, the Shores was a wooden-hulled steam barge that was 
built in 1894 for the Shores Lumber Company of Ashland, Wis-
consin at a cost of $65,000. The ship was 195 feet long and 
displaced 734 gross tons. It was built by the Wolverine Boat 
1
 The history of the Adella Shores and the Neff Family comes from the 
documents of the Wisconsin Marine Historical Society and the Milwaukee 
County Historical Society. These records include the Neff Family Collection 
and the Runge Collection which is a set of ship identification records and 
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Company out of Gibraltar, Michigan. The shipping company of 
Samuel Neff and Sons purchased the ship for the 1898 shipping 
season for an undisclosed amount of money. At the time of the 
purchase, Inland Lloyds indicated that the Shores had a value 
of $35,000. After Samuel Neff died in 1904, the company's as-
sets were split between his two sons. Sidney Neff owned the 
Shores until his death in 1907. The Adella Shores was then ac-
quired, in 1908, by E. M. Carleton of Cleveland, Ohio, and sub-
sequently sank off Grand Island in Lake Superior on May 1, 
1909. Fourteen sailors lost their lives in the accident. 
The O. J. Hale was a wooden schooner built in Trenton, 
Michigan in 1874. It was 138 feet long and displaced 326 tons. 
When the Neffs purchased the ship for $1,500 in October of 
1900, the masts were removed and the hull used as a barge for 
shipping salt across Lake Michigan. No history was available 
after the 1900 season. 
The River Boat — The Packet Betsy Ann2: The packet (or flat-
bottomed riverboat) Betsy Ann was built in Dubuque, Iowa in 
1899 by the Iowa Iron Works. The ship was the first steel-hulled 
riverboat on the Mississippi-Ohio River system. The ship was 
165 feet long with a beam of 33 feet. Its builder and owner was 
Rufus F. Learned of Natchez, Mississippi. The boat was named 
after his wife, Elizabeth. Learned, one of the richest men in 
Mississippi, was the owner of a lumber company and plantation 
in southern Mississippi. He operated the Betsy Ann through the 
Natchez & Bayou Sara Packet Company. From 1899 to its sale 
to Frederick Way in 1921, the Betsy Ann ran mail, passengers, 
and goods between Natchez and Bayou Sara, Louisiana, about 
100 miles south on the Mississippi River. From 1921 to 1931, 
the riverboat spent most of its time cruising the Mississippi-
Ohio River system shipping cotton and ferrying passengers be-
tween Cincinnati, Ohio and Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The Betsy 
Ann was famous for its riverboat races in Cincinnati during the 
1920s. In 1931, she was sold to John Hay of St. Louis, Missouri, 
who used it for towing river barges. In 1940, the Betsy Ann was 
dismantled and her hull used as a barge. 
2
 The history of the Betsy Ann was discussed by Frederick Way, Jr., and the 
biography of R. F. Learned was published in Biographical and Historical Mem-
oirs of Mississippi [Anonymous, 1891]. An additional source is Flesher and 
Soroosh [1987]. The records of the Betsy Ann are part of the Learned Lumber 
Company Collection, housed in the Special Collections Department of the Uni-
versity of Mississippi Library. 
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The Ocean Traveler — The Schooner Richard A. Bingham3: The 
schooner Richard A. Bingham was named for the infant son of 
the owner-operator, Francis Frasier Bingham (F. F. for short) 
of Pensacola, Florida. Born in Michigan in 1872, F. F. Bingham 
moved to Pensacola in 1890 and began working for the South-
ern States Lumber Company where he eventually became one 
of its directors. The company harvested the pine forests of west-
ern Florida and southern Alabama. The pine lumber was then 
shipped from Pensacola to the east coast of the U.S. and to 
Europe. The lumber trade made the city of Pensacola very rich, 
and the port of Pensacola became second only to New Orleans 
for shipments from the Gulf Coast. Pensacola-based ships also 
made trips to Central America where the pine lumber could be 
bartered for heavier woods such as mahogany. It was into this 
market that the Bingham entered in 1903. 
The log of the Richard A. Bingham indicated that the ship 
was chartered (fitted out) on October 21, 1902, and formally 
launched on January 10, 1903. According to the application to 
the U.S. Customs Service for a vessel license, the Bingham was 
a wooden-hulled, one-deck, three-masted schooner that was 
about 90 feet in length and 26 feet wide.4 The ship was built by 
Robert H. Langford, a small shipyard in the Pensacola area. 
The ledger of the Bingham indicated that the cost of the ship 
totaled $7,355. This figure included $3,828 for construction, 
$2,299 for rigging and sails, and $1,227 for equipment. 
The Richard A. Bingham was operated by the A. R. Bing-
h a m Shipping Company whose "owner" was Amos Reed 
Bingham, the father of F.F. Bingham. According to customs 
records, the actual owner and operator was F.F. Bingham, but 
his lumber company duties may not have allowed him to oper-
ate the ship directly. The Bingham's captain was Raymond L. 
Merritt who, according to the bookkeeping records, shared in 
the profits of each of the ship's four voyages. For her short life 
of 350 days and only four voyages, the Richard A. Bingham had 
a very interesting history including a reported mutiny. Three of 
3
 The records of the cons t ruc t ion and sh ipping accoun t s are in the 
Bingham Collection housed at the Special Collections Department of the Bir-
mingham Public Library, Birmingham, Alabama. The biography of F. F. 
Bingham was told by Rucker and Woolsey [1991]. 
4
 The Board of Navigation for the District of Pensacola, Florida through 
the Application or Owners or Master Vessel for Official Numbers a Signal Letters, 
issued the Richard A. Bingham, I.D. number 111442 on January 23, 1903 (Na-
tional Archives Document). 40
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the four trips that the Bingham made were to the Central 
American country of Belize, which was then a small colonial 
outpost called British Honduras. On the fateful fourth voyage to 
Belize, the Bingham was detained by customs authorities in 
Frontera, Mexico. After this problem was rectified, the ship pro-
ceeded to Belize, unloaded its cargo of southern pine, and took 
on mahogany for the return trip. The Richard A. Bingham went 
down in a gale off the coast of Belize on December 18, 1903. 
The partial log entry reads as follows: "Sailed Dec. 17 from 
Belize to Pensacola and that night went on a coral reef outside 
of Belize H a r b o r and became a to ta l loss. Crew saved" 
[Bingham Account Book, 1903, p. 104]. 
As the historical vignettes show, each of the three ships had 
a storied past of adventure, romantic voyages, tragedy, and, of 
course, hard work. The work aspect can be seen in the related 
accounting records that have survived nearly a century in vari-
ous archives and libraries. These records show three distinct, 
but similar methods of accounting for essentially the same ac-
tivity — the commercial voyage of a ship. The similarities in 
accounting procedures between each ship show that a "stand-
ard" ship-accounting model may have developed over the cen-
tury preceding the travels of the Adella Shores, the Betsy Ann, 
and the Richard A. Bingham. 
SHIP-ACCOUNTING PRACTICES 
A 19th Century Ship-Accounting Model: Comparing the account-
ing practices of these three ships would be a superfluous under-
taking without a base-line accounting model with which to 
compare the ships' practices. To detect the base-line model of 
accounting practices available to these three ships, 16 books 
published before 1900 were reviewed for their presentation of 
ship-accounting practices. The books and relevant publication 
data are listed in Appendix A. 
The selection of the books came in three phases. First, a 
review of Bentley and Leonard's classic work, A Bibliography of 
Works on Accounting by American Authors [1970], was con-
ducted. This work noted four specific treatises on ship account-
ing published in the U.S. before 1900, the authors of which 
were Ely Stone [1839], Francis Clark [1837], Peter Duff [1846], 
and James Fleming [1846]. These books were obtained and re-
v iewed. Next , two o t h e r t r e a t i s e s on sh ip a c c o u n t i n g , 
Hemmeter 's [1888] and the Improved Vessel Book [Anonymous, 
1881], were reviewed. These books were found in the Great 
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Lakes Historical Society Library. Finally, the remaining selec-
tions were general texts on accounting published during the 
19th century. Some of that century's most prominent account-
ing authors, such as Bennet, Foster, and Marsh, were repre-
sented in the study. 
Other books were consulted for the study, but only those 
books which contained a discussion of ship accounting (either 
ocean-going or riverboating) were used for the development of 
the ship-accounting model. Two examples of other books con-
sulted for the study included one by the notable team of Bryant, 
Stratton, and Packard who wrote Bryant and Stratton's National 
Book-keeping [1860]. Another was A.B. Mersevey's Book-keep-
ing, Double Entry [1875]. Both books discussed sending and 
receiving merchandise on consignment aboard a streamer, but 
neither discussed the method of accounting for the ship itself. 
Because of this omission, these books were not used to help 
discover the base-line, ship-accounting model. 
Though the list of books consulted for this study does not 
purport to be an exhaustive review of all accounting books pub-
lished in the 19th century, it does represent a fair sampling of 
the contemporary thought on ship-accounting practices. This 
assumption is based on three facts. The books consulted repre-
sented almost every decade of the 19th century so that a devel-
opmental pattern could be noted. Second, the books were writ-
ten by prominent authors of accounting texts as listed by 
Bentley. Finally, in many cases, such as Bennet's The American 
System of Practical Bookkeeping [1976], the books were found to 
have had multiple editions published over several decades of 
the 19th century. 
The review of the books provided 14 different principles, 
methods, and disclosures used by the authors to explain how 
ship accounting was to be completed. Table 1 shows the distri-
bution by principles, books, and dates. The ship-accounting 
model provided by the book reviews gives an excellent picture 
of a "uniform system" of accounts for ships that was widely 
discussed by the accounting authors of the day and presumably 
represented actual practice. 
The groups of accounting principles derived from the 
books can be categorized into two sections — capital account-
ing and financial accounting. Outside of the double-entry re-
quirements, the principles outlined by the study were all spe-
cifically adapted to the shipping industry. They applied equally 
well to the three geographic areas sailed by the ships — the 
rivers, the lakes, and the oceans. The model that apparently 42
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developed for ship accounting in the 19th century suited its 
users well and was adapted to their special needs. The flexibil-
ity and adaptability of accounting development are clearly seen 
in this ship-accounting model. A third category of accounting 
principles will also be discussed, those comprising management 
accounting. The accounting procedures of the three ships will 
be compared and contrasted with this model as a base. 
Capital Accounting Principles: The accounting procedures dic-
tated by the "model" discussed above indicated that the physi-
cal vessel itself should be accounted for using the traditional 
agency model. This model takes the cost of the vessel, adds to it 
any revenues generated, and subtracts from it any expenses to 
arrive at an ending balance or value. An example of this prac-
tice (Exhibit 1) comes from Crittenden in his book, Book-keep-
ing by Single and Double Entry [1850, pp. 115-122]. This ex-
ample presents a fictitious purchase of the Ship Massachusetts 
for a voyage to Canton, China from 1849-1850. 
EXHIBIT 15 






To Thomas Harvey 
(Purchase) 
" Cash (Provisions) 
" Bills Payable 
(Insurance) 




























To Balance from 
Ledger A 
" Adventure to Canton 
" Cash (Crew's Wages) 
"Interes t 
" Profit & Loss 












By Cash (Freight 
Fees Home) 
" Sundries 
(Trading fees while 
in Orient) 






 The explanation of the account entries was added by the author of this 
paper. 44
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The system discussed by Crittenden was very similar to 
those highlighted by other accounting authors of the day. This 
system may have been introduced some 30 years earlier in 
Bennet's classic 1820 text, The American System of Practical 
Bookkeeping. In a footnote to his Ship Ocean example, Bennet 
wrote: 
The Dr. side shows the cost of the vessel and the 
charges attending her. The cr. what she produced by 
the freight or sale. If the ship is not sold, Cr. the ac-
count first By Balance for her present value or for the 
value of any share you have in her, and then To or By 
Profit and Loss on the account. If the ship is sold the 
account is to closed To or By Profit and Loss only 
[Bennet, 1842, p. 69]. 
As the exhibit shows, the owners of the ship took all the 
revenues and expenses directly against the value of the ship. 
The actual cost of the ship itself did not change but was "ad-
justed" for the value of the expenses or revenues related to the 
voyage or transaction. In fact, Crittenden actually used the 
terms "produced value" or "costs value" regarding money paid 
for or gained from the ship [Crittenden, 1850, p. 67].6 The own-
ers then closed the account to profit-or-loss after the ship re-
turned home. It must be noted here that the consignments of 
goods shipped on the Massachusetts were accounted for sepa-
rately from the ship and yielded a profit of $11,700. Finally, in 
this case, the ship was not sold at the end of the "Adventure to 
Canton," but was instead transferred to a new account so that it 
could be used to take advantage of another overseas adventure. 
It is interesting to observe, however, that when the ship was 
"transferred" to another account, it was done so at a value of 
$22,500, or $2,500 less than its purchase price. This reduction 
shows that the ship owners understood that the ship was depre-
ciating, but they did not set up accounts to match this process 
directly against the revenues produced. Dicksee [1976a, p. 90], 
about 40 years later, noted in his auditing book: 
SINGLE SHIP COMPANIES almost invariably make 
no provision for depreciation: the auditor need not 
waste his time upon any effort to convince his clients 
of the imprudence of this course, but he should not 
6The $1,438 "interest charge" to Ship Massachusetts was credited to an 
interest and discount account which was closed to profit and loss. This charge 
was for a loan on the purchase of the ship. 45
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forget to append the necessary qualification to his cer-
tificate. 
The Single Ship Company that Dicksee talked about is a 
legal device where a single ship was incorporated into its own 
company. A freight agent may incorporate several ships sepa-
rately during a shipping season. This multiple incorporation 
was done to limit his and his shareholders' liability against 
claims from ships that might be lost. The losses from one ship's 
voyage would not hurt the profits from another ship's voyage. 
To some extent, this process institutionalized the "voyage re-
port" form of ship accounting [Boyce, 1995, pp. 360-378]. 
Though the context of Dicksee's book defines a legal device 
called a Single Ship Company, its application can be trans-
ferred to small shipping firms rather than larger companies like 
the Goodrich Transportation Line or the C. Reisse Coal Com-
pany that had large modern fleets on the Great Lakes at this 
time. Although both the Neffs and Binghams owned more than 
one ship, their accounting methods mirrored those of Dicksee's 
Single Ship Company regarding depreciation. 
With the Neff records, capital accounting for their ships 
may have been dictated by Wisconsin state law that taxed ships 
as personal property based on size and age of the ship. The law 
read as follows: 
Chapter 48 Section 1042a of the Code of Wisconsin for 
1898 presented the following rates for determining the 
value of a wooden ship for property tax purposes based 
on the age of the ship. 
one to five years old $ 9 per net ton 
five to ten years old $ 7 per net ton 
ten to fifteen years old $ 6 per net ton 
fifteen years and upward old $ 4 per net ton 
Wooden Barge fifteen years or 
upward old $ 3 per net ton 
[Sanborn and Berryman, 1898] 
Though the shipping companies may not have been con-
cerned directly with depreciation, Wisconsin state law appeared 
to have allowed for the concept by reducing the value of the 
ship over time as its hull grew older and began deteriorating. 
The type of capital accounting outlined by the model could 
be identified in two out of three of the vessels used in this 
study. For the Adella Shores, the manner by which the Neffs 
accounted for her cost was unfortunately not found in her 
records; however, the capital accounting for the Shores' com-
46
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panion barge, the O. J.. Hale, was provided and is shown in 
Exhibit 2. This exhibit shows that the cost of the O. J. Hale was 
shown as a current expense rather than capitalized. This prac-
tice was probably due to the transient nature of ship ownership 
at the turn 20th century, and, as ship histories showed, the high 
probability of accidents. These arguments may have been the 
reason why none of the books reviewed for this study men-
tioned the concept of depreciation. 
It should be noted here that neither the Neff records nor 
the Runge Collection identified the reason for the $4,200 in 
repair charges. The charges could have resulted from either a 
recent accident involving the ship, or more likely, they repre-
sented the additional cost of placing the vessel into service, 
expenses such as dismantling the masts and refurbishing the 
hull to create a barge. In either case, modern accounting would 
have probably shown this adjustment as a capitalization rather 
than an expense. 
EXHIBIT 2 
Financial Statement of the Barge O. J. Hale 
November 1, 1900 
1900 NO. 1 STATEMENT 









LAY UP EXPENSE 




PURCHASE PRICE [OF O.J. HALE] 
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As the ship histories indicated, F. F. Bingham kept a ledger 
on the cost of the construction of the Richard A. Bingham. The 
cost of the Bingham ($7,355) was used as part of the general 
recapitulation of the A. R. Bingham Shipping Company. The 
entries were titled Resources and Liabilities in the ledger. The 
form of these nearly 50 entries was a standard "balance sheet" 
with some indication that expenses and revenues were part of 
the adjustments. The focus on this recapitulation appeared to 
track changes in the net worth of the company. The Richard A. 
Bingham acted as the ledger's primary "debit," or asset, and the 
purchases of lumber from Southern States Lumber represented 
its primary "credit," or liability. These "balance sheets" were 
compiled on an intermittent basis, ranging from weekly to 
every six months, although they loosely corresponded to the 
arrival of various ships owned by the company. 
The Betsy Ann also had a compilation account, which was 
more a current expense account that was closed periodically. 
Unlike the Bingham, it did not include the cost of the ship and 
the relevant net worth. There was not any indication of how the 
Betsy Ann herself was accounted for in the specific records re-
viewed for this study. 
Financial Accounting Principles: Francis Gedney Clarke [1837] 
in his book, Shipmaster Guide and Commercial Assistant, 
pointed out that it was the shipmaster's or captain's responsibil-
ity to keep account of both the ship and the shipment for the 
absentee owners. Often they gave him a cash advance with 
which to conduct business for the owners and pay sailors dur-
ing the voyage. His responsibility was to make an accounting of 
those revenues and related expenses. This type of arrangement 
was noted in the logs and ledgers of the Richard A. Bingham 
whose captain, Raymond Merritt, was obligated to deal the pine 
lumber he brought south in favor of the mahogany he was to 
bring back. Captain Merritt received part of the trip's profits, 
besides his salary of $65 per trip. 
Fleming [1846, p. 117] made it clear that the ship's person-
nel (especially the captains and bookkeepers) were surrogates 
for the owners and had the responsibility to account for and 
protect all of the goods consigned to the ship. Stone [1839, p . 
24], in his book on steamboat accounting, made stewardship of 
the customer's assets a foremost concern. He wrote as follows: 
In receipting for goods sent on board, great care 
should be given and exercised in examining their con-
48
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dition, the number of packages, and their shipping 
marks etc; for any error in this respect by receipting 
more than actually received or by acknowledging the 
packages in good order when in fact they are not so, so 
lays the boat and owner's liable to be sued for damages 
or deficiencies which do not in fact exist, but for which 
there may be no remedy. 
With the Betsy Ann and the Adella Shores, the owners of the 
ships acted as freight agents and received fares as such. In the 
case of all three ships, the type of business engaged in by the 
shipping company helped to dictate the type of accounting pro-
cedure used. 
The review of books summarized in Table 1 suggests that 
the ship-accounting process could range from a sophisticated 
ledger and journal system to a more basic, single-entry account-
ing system. All the books agreed that the central focus of the 
financial accounting system dealt with the individual trips or 
voyages of the ship. The primary document was the Voyage 
Report or Trip Report. There may also have been related docu-
ments that supported the Voyage Report and accounted for spe-
cific areas of the business, such as the crew's wages, cash dis-
bursements, commodities shipped, and fuel usage. Finally, a 
recapitulation that noted the profits or losses of the trip was 
prepared for the ship's owners. Dicksee [1876a, p. 90], ex-
plained the importance of this document as follows: 
The Auditor of Single Ship Companies must bear in 
mind that, as regards to fraud, there is no such thing as 
'safety in numbers ' here, for the accounts are usually 
all in one person's hands — let him, therefore, not omit 
to examine the Voyage Account Book in detail. 
The best example of this type of accounting comes from the 
flagship of the Neff fleet, the Adella Shores (Exhibit 3). The 
Shores' Trip Report was a wealth of information for the owners 
of the ship. It included a listing of revenues and expenses of the 
trip, a manifest of the cargo shipped, and a report of the fuel 
consumed by each ship. Unfortunately, this statement does not 
include the destination and purpose of the trip. According to 
the records of the O. J. Hale, that information was part of the 
ship's Captain's Log. The Improved Vessel Book [Anonymous, 
1881] contained a Voyage Report very similar to the one pre-
sented for the Adella Shores. 
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EXHIBIT 3 
Financial Statement of the Adella Shores June 1, 1900 


















Draft of Water 
Draft - lumber 
Draft - rock salt 
Tons of Coal 
Barrels of Salt 
Lumber - ft 
















































































As noted above, the vast majority of all of the books re-
quired a Voyage Report or Trip Report. However, the method 
and appearance of this accounting varied from book to book. 
For example, Fleming's Steamboat Book-keeper's Assistant 
[1846] required an actual ship's ledger. The Richard A. Bingham 
used a lengthy, double-entry ledger (Exhibit 4) similar to 
Fleming's requirements. In addition, the ledger of the Bingham 
acted as the Voyage Report and the Ship's Log to inform the 
owner of impor tant events. The account ing system of the 
Bingham included a separate ledger for the outbound trip from 
Pensacola and inbound return trip to Pensacola. A cash ledger 
to keep a record of the captain's spending on the trip was also 
included in an accounting format. 
The Bingham ledger highlights an accuracy shortfall in 
turn-of-the-century accounting. The credit column of this ex-
50
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hibit should have added up to $1,010.03, not $993.38. Correct 
addition would have made the profits of the voyage $490.64 
instead of the $502.69 actually reported. Such accuracy prob-
lems may have been the reason for Dicksee's admonition for the 
auditor to check the Voyage Reports for small shipping compa-
nies more closely. 
EXHIBIT 4 
American Schr. Richard A. Bingham 
Trip #1 Pensacola to Belize with Pine 











































R.L. Merrit- Profit 













































































The Trip Report of the Betsy Ann (Exhibit 5) was more 
detailed than the other ships and was completed on a series of 
preprinted forms by the packet's clerk, Charles Gordon. The 
system used by the packet company was very similar to the 
system that was outlined in George Soulé's New Science and 
Practice of Accounts [1976]. His book required separate pre-
printed sheets for the accounting of goods shipped, passengers, 
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expenses, cash, crew expenses, and fuel. Though the Natchez & 
Bayou Sara Packet Company combined several of these sheets 
into one, the system was essentially the same. Even with its 
sophistication, the basic plan of the accounting system still 
goes back to that outlined by Ely Stone in the late 1830s in his 
classic book, The Steamboat Clerk [1839]. 
EXHIBIT 5 
Statement of the Receipts and Expenditures 
STEAMER BETSY ANN 
For TRIP 467 and Week Ending July 20th , 1902 
RECEIPTS 
From 35 Cabin Passengers Down 
" 85 Cabin Passengers Down 
" 145 Cabin Passengers Down 
" 50 Cabin Passengers Down 
From Freight, Down 
" Freight, Up 
" Rent Bar 
















Rebates and Bills Returned 
Extra Labor 
Last Friday 























































Stone's book was a compilation of procedures used by 
steamboats on the Ohio River. These accounting procedures 
evolved from the first Fulton steamboats that sailed the Missis-
sippi-Ohio River system in the early 1800s. For example, 
records from the second steamboat on the river, the Vesuvius 
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(1814-1822)7, showed both trip and freight accounting in the 
only records left from the Natchez Steamship Company. Ac-
cording to Flesher and Soroosh [1987], the Betsy Ann repre-
sented an exception to this system of individual trip reports 
because her trips were so short (two to four days) that the 
accounting was performed weekly for all of the trips completed 
that week rather than on the traditional trip-by-trip basis. The 
Trip Reports of the Betsy Ann were then integrated into the 
general accounting system of the owners. 
The Voyage Reports were often summaries of other docu-
ments compiled by the ship's bookkeeper. For example, the 
Betsy Ann had a full range of supporting documents, including 
a crew's list and payroll, expense list, and cash receipts/cash 
disbursements book, all of which were then tied to the account-
ing system of the Learned Lumber Company. On the other 
hand, both the Adella Shores and the R. A. Bingham were 
limited in their supporting documents and seemed to put most 
information into one report. For the Bingham there was a 
captain's cash report but no general summary of all the voyages 
for a given year was recognized in the account books. The 
company's balance sheets that were discussed previously may 
have acted as a form of recapitulations of voyages with the 
purpose of finding the current net worth of the company rather 
than current income. 
The Adella Shores did not have the sophisticated accounting 
system of the Betsy Ann, but as Exhibit 4 above indicated, it 
was very comprehensive. The supporting documentation avail-
able in the library collection showed that the Neffs did have a 
cash disbursements journal as part of their ships' logs. The 
Adella Shores log has been lost but the one for her sister ship, 
the O. J. Hale (Exhibit 6), revealed that the captain was respon-
sible for the payment of all expenses on the voyage, ranging 
from groceries to crew wages. 
7
 The records of the Vesuvius are housed at the Mississippi Department of 
Archives and History and include a small leather-bound book which acted as a 
freight register. These records are among the oldest steamboat records in the 
U.S. 
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EXHIBIT 6 
Partial Log of the O. J. Hale 
Trip 12 Barge O. J. Hale. Loaded at Terkley & Douglass 
From: So Chicago To: 
H. J. Wilson, Master Seaman 
Sept. 11 to Sept. 18 
included 8 days at $ 70 per month 
— $18.64 
J. Johnson, Seaman 
Sept. 11 to Sept. 18 
included 8 days at $45 per month 
— $12.00 
Sept. 12 Left So. Chicago with Adella Shores 
13 Arrival Manistee 
14 Left Manistee 
15 arrives Ludington at Shelters 
17 left Ludington [with] Str Adella Shores 
18 arrive Chicago 
W. Marks, Cook 
Sept. 11 to Sept. 18 
Included 8 days at $45 per month 
— $12.00 
G. Claussen, Seaman 
Sept. 11 to Sept. 18 
Included 8 days at 45 per month 
— $12.00 
Wages of Master and Crew $54.64 
Sept. 11 To William Runsfle - Provisions $ 2.83 
" "11 To Petersons Bro. - Groceries $ 1.46 
" " 15 To A Prairies - Groceries $ 1.30 
(at Ludington) $ 5.59 
Whole Amount — $60.23 
Sept. 19 John Johnson, Seaman 1 day $1.50 per 1.50 
Sept. 19 G. Claussen, Seaman 1 day $1.50 per 1.50 
Whole Amount — $63.23 
Sept. 18 Payout from Capt. S. O. Neff By Cash $60.00 
Finally, the Neffs did compile reports of total income for all 
their ships and related general office expenses for each month 
(as shown in Exhibit 7) and for the entire year as well. Though 
Charles Neff may have used two columns to "balance out" his 
accounts at the end of the year, this exhibit, along with the 
previous Neff Voyage Report, shows that he used a very simple 




Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 26 [1999], Iss. 1, Art. 15
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol26/iss1/15
46 Accounting Historians Journal, June 1999 
EXHIBIT 7 
General Statement of Samuel Neff and Sons Shipping 
Company — October 1, 1900 
1900 General Statement Oct. 1st 1900 
Receipts 
Str Adella Shores 
Str. Minnie Kelton 
Str. Edwin S. Tice 
Str. Marion 
Gain 

















Management Accounting Principles : A modern textbook defined 
accounting as "the process of identifying, measuring, classify-
ing and accumulating, summarizing, and communicating infor-
mation about economic entities that is purely quantitative and 
is useful to decision makers" [King et al., 1997, p. 688]. The 
ship-accounting procedures discussed above did identify, meas-
ure, and, in a limited way, communicate economic information 
about the shipping business. However, evidence that shows that 
the owners used this information to control operations and 
make informed business decisions is sketchy at best. 
The ship-accounting model discussed in this paper did have 
several devices for control and analysis. First, the captain's con-
trol over all financial and nonfinancial activities during a voy-
age helped to give a sense of accountability to the absentee 
owners. Next, the Voyage Report or Trip Report could either be 
used as the accounting of one business transaction, as foreseen 
by Bennet [1976] and Crittenden [1850], or be used as a micro-
management tool for the control of the company's overall finan-
cial operating activities. For example, the records show that the 
owners of the ships tracked the profits of the individual trips as 
well as the combination of all trips. Finally, the nonfinancial 
measures listed in the records could be used for controlling and 
monitoring operations. 
Of the three ships, the Richard A. Bingham had the best 
example of a managerial accounting application. This sophisti-
cation can be seen in Exhibit 8, where the bookkeeper of A. R. 
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Bingham Shipping Company determined that it was important 
to show the cost and income per day of the voyage. 
EXHIBIT 8 


























Mr. Bingham's need for this type of information is difficult 
to surmise. One assumption is that he was viewing each voyage 
as a modern opportunity cost. Was he second-guessing himself 
about where he could have sent the ship for better profits? 
Could Bingham have made better profits elsewhere? The an-
swers to these questions are unknowable. In any case, the prac-
tice of pegging costs or revenues to a base was widespread at 
this time. For example, the ICC required railroads to track pas-
senger miles and loaded ton miles [ICC, 1907]. The concept of 
revenues or costs per passenger mile is still a mainstay for 
break-even analysis for modern airlines. 
The Adella Shores, in Exhibit 3 above, shows some evidence 
of the usage of nonfinancial, managerial accounting measures. 
The exhibit indicates record keeping for the fuel usage of the 
ship and the draft of water that the ship would draw in certain 
situations. The second set of information was important be-
cause each harbor was dredged at a different depth. The harbor 
pilot who guided the ship to the dock area needed to know the 
draft of the ship when it was empty and fully loaded to elimi-
nate the threat of grounding. The Betsy Ann showed no such 
managerial accounting methodology in its financial statements. 
However, all of the ships provided sufficient information to 
determine such information as a unit-cost per mile. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
As this paper shows, American ship owners developed and 
used a "standard model" of ship accounting during the 19th 
century. This system developed before the ICC began standard-
izing ship accounting in 1910. The ship-accounting model 56
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could be seen in the accounting textbooks and manuals pub-
lished during the 19th century. It was a system that was very 
utilitarian in nature and developed according to the needs of an 
ever-changing shipping industry. Though the ship accounting 
was widely standardized in procedures and nature, it was not 
necessarily standardized in presentation and style, with each of 
the three ships presenting its own version of a Ship or Voyage 
Report. Finally, as Table 2 below shows in summation, there 
was substantial usage of the 19th century ship-accounting 
model by the three ships reviewed for this study. The Richard A. 
Bingham most closely matched the procedures in the model. 
The other two ships, the Adella Shores and the Betsy Ann, 
showed substantial compliance with the model as well. 
TABLE 2 
A Review of Accounting Practices Noted 
in 19th Century Accounting Books 
ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLE 
Double-entry accounting 
Purchase of ship as an 
asset with a ledger account 
Shipments and profits 
accounted for against the 
purchase price of the ship 
Shipments, both revenues 
and expenses, are 
accounted for as individual 
voyages not in total 
Specific listing of expenses 
Captain made debtor of 
the voyage transactions 
The profits are closed to 
















Captain was owner 
of ship in this case 
UNKNOWN 
(No balance sheets 
found in records) 
NO 
YES 
YES (O.J. Hale) 
YES 
YES 
Crew listed with 
Cash Book 





























The ship was 
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TABLE 2 (Continued) 
A Review of Accounting Practices Noted 




Rating of comparison 
between ship practices 
and 19th century ship-
accounting model — bases 




























The actual presentation of accounting records by the ships 
may have been different from that presented in the textbooks. 
However, the accounting model used by them was the same 
basic model introduced by Bennet [1976] and Gibson [1827] 75 
years earlier. The same model was repeated and improved upon 
throughout the 19th century by authors such as Stone [1839], 
Duff [1846], and Soulé [1976]. Though some records of the 
three ships were incomplete, making a clear picture of the total 
accounting methodology by each ship impossible, the available 
records show that there was a "standard" ship-accounting sys-
tem that met the information needs for the owners of the Adella 
Shores, Betsy Ann, and Richard A. Bingham at the turn of the 
20th century. 
REFERENCES 
Anonymous (1881), Improved Vessel Book (Cleveland: Brooks and Co.). 
Anonymous (1891), Biographical and Historical Memoirs of Mississippi (Chi-
cago, The Goodspeed Publishing Company): 1108. 
Bennet, James (1976), The American System Of Practical Bookkeeping (New 
York: Collins Brothers, 1842), reprinted (New York: Arno Press). 
Bentley, Harry C. and Leonard, Ruth (1970), Bibliography of Works on Account-
ing by American Authors (Boston: Harry C. Bentley, 1934), repr inted 
(Augustus M. Kelley Publisher: New York). 
Bryant, H. B., Stratton, H. D., and Packard, S. S. (1860), Bryant and Stratton's 
National Bookkeeping (New York: Ivison, Blakeman, Taylor & Company). 
Boyce, Gordon (1995), "Accounting of Managerial Decision Making in British 
Shipping 1870 - 1918," Accounting Business and Financial History Vol. 5, 
No. 3 : 3 6 0 - 3 7 8 . 
Clarke, F. G., (1837), American Ship-master's Guide and Commercial Assistant 
Being an Enlargement of the Seaman's Manual (Boston: Allen & Co.). 
Clarke, F.G. (1841), A Synthetic and Inductive System of Book-keeping by 
Double Entry (Boston: B.B. Mussey). 58
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 26 [1999], Iss. 1, Art. 15
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol26/iss1/15
50 Accounting Historians Journal, June 1999 
Crittenden, S. W. (1850), Book-keeping by Single and Double Entry (Philadel-
phia: E. C. & J. Biddle & Co.). 
Colt J. C. (1838), The Science of Double Entry Book-keeping (Cincinnati: Bur-
gess & Co.). 
Dicksee, L. R. (1976a), Auditing: A Practical Manual for Auditors (London: Gee 
& Co., 1892), reprinted (New York: Arno Press). 
Dicksee, L. R. (1976b), Advanced Accounting (London: Gee & Co., 1903), re-
printed (New York: Arno Press). 
Duff, Peter (1846), The Western Steamboat Accountant (Pittsburgh: Anderson & 
Co.). 
F leming, J. (1846), The Steamboat Book-keepers Assistant (P i t t sburgh : 
McDonald & Elliot). 
Flesher, Dale and Soroosh, Jalal (1987), "Riverboat Profitability: The Betsy 
Ann," The Journal of Mississippi History, Vol. XLIX, No. 1: 23 - 34. 
Foster, B. F. (1836), A Concise Treatise on Commercial Book-keeping (Boston: 
Perkins & Co.). 
Gibson, J. ( 1827), A New and Improved System of Bookkeeping (Philadelphia: 
published by author) . 
Hemmeter's Improved Steamboat Book; Time and Wage Tables Comprising Ship-
ping Articles Cash Account, Disbursement Journal, Towing Journal (1888), 
(no publisher or copyright noted). 
Interstate Commerce Commission (1907), Classification of Locomotive Miles, 
Car Miles, and Train Miles (Washington: Government Printing Office). 
Interstate Commerce Commission (1910), Classification of Operating Expenses 
of Carriers by Water (Washington: Government Printing Office). 
Interstate Commerce Commission (1912), Form of Balance Sheet Statement for 
Carriers by Water (Washington: Government Printing Office). 
Jones, Thomas (1841), Principle and Practice of Bookkeeping (New York: Wiley 
& Putman). 
King, Thomas E., Lembke, Valdean C , and Smith, John H. (1997), Financial 
Accounting: A Decision-Making Approach (New York: John Wiley & Sons). 
Krepp, F. C. (1856), Statistical Book-keeping (London: Longman & Co.). 
Marsh C. C. (1831), The Science of Double Entry Book-keeping (Baltimore: 
McDowell & Co.). 
Mersevey, Atwood Bond (1875), Mersevey's Book-keeping, Double Entry (Bos-
ton: Thomas, Brown & Co.). 
Rucker, Brian R. and Woolsey, Nathan F. (eds.) (1991), Log of the Peep-o-Day: 
Summer Cruises in the West Florida Waters, 1912- 1915 (Baghdad, FL: 
Patagonia Press). 
Sanborn, Arthur and Berryman, John R. (1898), Wisconsin Statutes of 1898 
Volume I (Chicago: Callaghan & Co.). 
Soulé, George (1976), Soulé's New Science and Practice of Accounts, 7th ed. 
(New Orleans: G. Soulé), reprinted (New York: Arno Press). 
Stone, Ely (1839), The Steamboat Clerk ( Cincinnati: Lucas & Company ). 
Willets, Gilson (1903), Workers of the Nation: An Encyclopedia of the Occupa-
tions of the American People (New York: P. F. Collier and Son). 
59
et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 1999, Vol. 26, no. 1































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Heier: American Ship-Accounting Practices 51 
60
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 26 [1999], Iss. 1, Art. 15
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol26/iss1/15
52 Accounting Historians Journal, June 1999 
A c c o u n t i n g , A u d i t i n g & A c c o u n t a b i l i t y J o u r n a l 
V o l u m e 11 N u m b e r 5 1998 
E d i t o r s : J a m e s G u t h r i e a n d Lee P a r k e r 
Contents 
The introduction of accrual reporting policy in the Australian public 
sector: an agenda-setting explanation 
Christine Ryan 
An insight into accountability and politics in universities: a case study 
David Coy, Michael James Pratt 
Assessing the impact of "liberalisation" on auditor behaviour: ac-
counting research in politically charged contexts 
Constantinos Caramanis 
International accounting regulation by the United Nations: a power 
perspective 
Sheikh Rahman 
A longitudinal study of corporate social reporting in Singapore: the 
case of banking, food and beverages, and hotel industries 
Eric Tsang 
Literature and Insights 
Index to Volume 11 
Subscriptions to the 1999 volume 
US $1,139 North America/South America + Canada 
US $197.95 (individual subscription only) 
AUD $1,139 Australia 
AUD $249.95 (individual subscription only) 
STG £829 (plus £84.63 VAT if in the European Union) 
STG £119.95 (plus £3.50 VAT) (individual subscription only) 
All enquir ies to MCB U P Limited, 60/62 Toller Lane, 
BRADFORD, BD8 9BY, UK 
Or visit our website: http://www.mcb.co.uk 
61
et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 1999, Vol. 26, no. 1
Published by eGrove, 1999
Accounting Historians Journal 
Vol. 26, No. 1 
June 1999 
Dean Neu 
UNIVERSITY OF CALGARY 
"DISCOVERING" INDIGENOUS 
PEOPLES: ACCOUNTING AND THE 
MACHINERY OF EMPIRE 
Abstract: This study examines the historical usage of accounting as a 
technology of government within the domain of government-indig-
enous peoples relations in Canada. Our thesis is that accounting was 
salient within the chain of circumstances that influenced the discov-
ery/identification of indigenous peoples as a governable population. 
By the 1830s, accounting techniques had come to occupy a central 
place in the military machinery of empire. When the cost-cutting 
and reformist sentiments prevalent in Britain during the early 1800s 
encouraged the reconsideration of the military costs of empire, ac-
counting techniques were one of the methods used in the at tempt to 
interrogate military expenditures. Partially as a result of these inter-
rogations, indigenous peoples came to be identified as a site for cost 
cutting by British bureaucrats . However, it was at the level of the 
colonial administration in the Upper and Lower Canadas that the 
compe t ing d e m a n d s of "government" encouraged ind igenous 
peoples to be viewed as a potential site for government. And it was 
once this "discovery" was made that accounting and other tech-
niques were utilized in the attempt to turn indigenous peoples into a 
governable population. This study contributes to our understanding 
of accounting by documenting the ways in which techniques such as 
accounting were central to the military machinery of empire and 
British imperialism. The study also contributes to our understand-
ing of the historical antecedents that shape current-day usages of 
accounting as a technology of government within the domain of 
government-First Nations relations. 
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The sun never sets on the British Empire [source unknown]. 
INTRODUCTION 
The "discoveries" of America by Columbus in 1492, the 
province of Newfoundland by Cabot in 1497, and the province 
of Quebec by Carrier in 1534 [Wright, 1993, p . 122] marked the 
beginning of 250 years of struggle between the imperial powers 
of France and Britain for control of the territory we now call 
Canada and its inhabitants. Both France and Britain courted 
the indigenous peoples as important military allies in the peri-
odic skirmishes that occurred. When the British Empire ulti-
mately prevailed over France in 1760, it subsequently issued a 
Royal Proclamation in 1763 recognizing the rights of aboriginal 
peoples to unceded lands and stating that the negotiations be-
tween Britain and aboriginal peoples would be on a nation-to-
nation basis [Royal Proclamation, 1763]. In the subsequent war 
of independence with the United States, aboriginal peoples 
were encouraged to side with Britain in return for parcels of 
land in Upper Canada [Report on the Affairs of Indians in 
Canada, 1847, S3, p. 5.1].l 
In the 250 years since this Royal Proclamation, relations 
between the remnants of the British Empire and First Nations 
peoples have certainly changed. Nation-to-nation relations have 
been replaced by paternal relations in which the government of 
Canada has attempted , through coercive tutelage [Dyck, 1997], 
to "govern" [Foucault , 1991] the affairs of First Nat ions 
peoples. The recent Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples 
[1996], for example, documented the ways in which the Cana-
dian government has attempted to assimilate and otherwise 
manage the affairs of indigenous peoples [see particularly Vol-
ume 1, Chapters 8-10]. Through the bureaucratic mechanisms 
of the Department of Indian Affairs and the supporting "Indian 
Act," the state has attempted to exercise action at a distance 
over First Nations peoples. Within these attempts at govern-
ance, accounting techniques such as funding and taxation rela-
tions have been used to encourage/discourage certain behaviors 
[see also Reform Party, 1997]. 
In certain ways these shifts in relations parallel more gen-
eral shifts in the "art of government." Miller and Rose [1990, p . 
2] commented that the modern state has come to rely on tech-
1
 We subsequently refer to this Report as RAIC with Sections I and II being 
published in 1844 and Section III in 1847. 63
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nologies of government to align economic, political, and social 
objectives. Through "apparently humble and mundane mecha-
nisms" such as "techniques of notation, computation and calcu-
lation," along with professional expertises [Miller and Rose, 
1990, p. 8], government is exercised in the attempt to enable 
action at a distance — to incite, induce, and seduce populations 
to behave in certain ways [Foucault, 1984, p. 171]. Since the 
19th century, these techniques of rule have supplemented and 
mostly supplanted more direct forms of sovereign power in 
core countries [Foucault, 1991, p. 102]. However, as Fanon 
[1963] stated, within the colonial context force continues to 
form the backdrop for more subtle forms of governance. 
If, as we suggest, Canada's indigenous population has come 
to be viewed by the state as a population to be "governed," how 
did the slippage from a nation-to-nation relationship to a pater-
nal relationship occur and how did First Nations peoples come 
to be targeted as a site for government? Furthermore, when 
were accounting techniques introduced as a technology of gov-
ernment? In answering these questions, this study suggests that 
the following circumstances contributed to the "discovery" of 
indigenous peoples as a population to be governed. By the 
1830s, accounting techniques had come to occupy a central 
place in the military machinery of empire. When the cost-cut-
ting and reformist sentiments prevalent in Britain during the 
early 1800s encouraged the reconsideration of the military costs 
of empire, accounting techniques were one of the methods used 
in the attempt to interrogate military expenditures. Partially as 
a result of these interrogations, indigenous peoples came to be 
identified as a site for cost cutting by British bureaucrats. How-
ever, it was at the level of the colonial administration in the 
Upper and Lower Canadas that the competing demands of 
"government" encouraged indigenous peoples to be viewed as a 
potential site for government.2 It was once this "discovery" was 
made that accounting and other techniques were utilized in the 
attempt to turn indigenous peoples into a governable popula-
tion. 
This study contributes to our understanding of accounting 
in two ways. First, the study documents the ways in which 
techniques such as accounting were central to the military ma-
2
 Throughout this study we use the term Canadas as a short-form for the 
Maritimes, Upper Canada, and Lower Canada. Although similarities undoubt-
edly exist with the manner in which indigenous peoples were treated in the 
western territories, our analysis focuses on the aforementioned three regions. 64
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chinery of empire. Authors such as Headrick [1981] have ar-
gued that the "hardware of imperialism"— technical innova-
tions such as the Gatling gun, the steamboat, quinine, etc. — 
contributed to the success of European imperialism. More re-
cently it has been recognized that the "software of imperialism" 
— professional expertises such as geography, accounting, etc. 
— also played a role in imperialism [Said, 1993; Bell et al., 
1995; Neu, 1997]. The current study contributes to this line of 
inquiry by documenting the intertwining of accounting within 
the military machinery of empire. 
Second, the study locates the moment and manne r in 
which accounting techniques first came to be focused on 
Canada's indigenous population. Within the domain of present-
day, government-First Nations relations, government policy ap-
pears to be directed at encouraging action at a distance. But 
how did accounting techniques come to penetrate this domain? 
The analysis provided seeks to "identify the accidents, the 
minute deviations. . . . that gave birth to those things that con-
tinue to exist" [Foucault, 1984, p . 81]. This study contributes to 
our understanding of the historical antecedents that shape cur-
rent-day usages of accounting as a technology of government. 
In doing so, the study illustrates the persistence of accounting 
as a technology of government within the domain of govern-
ment-First Nations relations. 
GOVERNING THE EMPIRE 
Imperialism means thinking about, settling on, con-
trolling land that you do not possess, that is distant, 
that is lived on and owned by others [Said, 1993, p. 5]. 
By all accounts, the 19th century was the age of the British 
E m p i r e [cf H o b s o n , 1902; H e a d r i c k , 1981; Davis a n d 
Huttenback, 1986]. The amount of territory controlled by Brit-
ain and the population under its tutelage increased sevenfold 
and twentyfold respectively: 
The British Empire alone, already formidable in 1800 
with a land area of 1.5 million square miles and a 
population of twenty million, increased its land area 
sevenfold and its population twentyfold in the follow-
ing hundred years [Headrick, 1981, p. 3]. 
Although other European imperial powers were also expanding 
during this time period, between 1800 and 1914 the amount of 
the world's land surface controlled by Europeans increased 
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from 35 percent to 84 percent [Headrick, 1981, p. 3]. Britain 
was perhaps the most successful [Barclay, 1976, p. 1]. 
In a t t empt ing to explain the success of imper ia l i sm, 
Headrick [1981, p . 9] suggested that imperialism occurred 
when both adequate motives and means were present for impe-
rial expansion. Economic motives were assumed to be adequate 
motives for the expansion of the British Empire [Hobson, 1902, 
p. 59]; business interests at least benefitted from imperial ex-
pansion even if the British taxpayer ended up absorbing the 
costs of empire [Davis and Huttenback, 1986, p. 317]. Adequate 
means referred to the existence of technologies that supported 
imperial expansion and control [Headrick, 1981, 1988]. 
Headrick [1981] argued that the adoption of new technolo-
gies for military purposes provided the means for imperial ex-
pansion. For example, the development of steam gunboats 
aided in the colonization of India [pp. 17-42]; the identification 
of quinine as a protection against malaria along with steam 
gunboats assisted in the colonization of Africa [p. 73]; and the 
development of breech-loading and repeat-firing guns through-
out the colonies allowed for the subjugation of indigenous 
peoples [p. 115]. Additionally, technologies such as steamships, 
railways, and communication cables furthered both military 
and economic purposes. These technologies have been referred 
to as the "hardware of imperialism" [Bell et al., 1995]. 
Parallelling the development of such hardware was the de-
velopment of "softer" expertises and disciplines, what Bell et al. 
[1995, p. 2] referred to as the software of imperialism. Disci-
plinary knowledges such as geography, medicine, and account-
ing helped imperial powers come to "know" the territories and 
inhabitants under their control [Said, 1979, p. 84; Bell et al., 
1995, p. 4]. These techniques sorted, sifted, and classified, al-
lowing knowledges of "distant places...to be mobilized [and] 
brought home to centres of calculation in the form of maps, 
drawings, readings" [Miller and Rose, 1990, p. 9]. 
Miller and Rose [1990, p . 8] used the phrase "technologies 
of government" to denote the roles played by softer and indirect 
techniques such as accounting in the act of governing at "home 
and abroad:" 
We use the term technologies to suggest a particular 
approach to the analysis of the activity of ruling, one 
which pays great attention to the actual mechanisms 
through which authorities of various sorts have sought 
to shape, normalize and instrumentalize the conduct, 
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thought, decisions and aspirations of others in order to 
achieve the objectives they consider desirable. 
Miller and Rose [1990, p. 16] specifically mentioned techniques 
of accounting (i.e.; techniques of notation, computation, and 
calculation) and discussed the implementation of discounted 
cash flow analysis in Britain. Although the focus of Miller and 
Rose's [1990, p. 9] analysis was on the usage of technologies of 
government within imperial centers, they acknowledged the 
roles played by these technologies in the colonies. Likewise, 
Said [1979, p . 40] discussed the role of softer technologies 
within the processes of colonization, and Neu [1997] examined 
how accounting techniques in colonial Canada were used to 
control and contain indigenous peoples. These studies hinted at 
the ways in which technologies of government were intertwined 
with the hardware of imperialism. The current study builds on 
these insights in examining the intertwining of accounting with 
the military apparatuses of empire.3 
MILITARY MACHINERY AND ACCOUNTING CALCULATION 
Following the Napoleonic Wars in the early 1800s, eco-
nomic retrenchment became the principal objective of British 
government in the attempt to reduce the national debt [Spiers, 
1980, p . 74]. Not surprisingly, the military became a primary 
target for such reduction given that military expenditures were 
the main items of public expenditure. "Expenditure on the 
a r m y a n d o r d n a n c e fell f rom 43 ,256 ,260£ in 1815 to 
10,699,865£ in 1820; thereafter it slipped below 10£ million, 
plummeting to just under 8£ million in 1836" [Spiers, 1980, p . 
74]. Coinciding with this crisis of expenditure was an increase 
in anti-military sentiment at home and the emergence of a 
strong reform sentiment [Sweetman, 1984, pp. 15,17]. Together 
these sentiments encouraged a "deluge of official action," in-
cluding bills and the formation of select committees to examine 
various aspects of public policy and government administra-
tion. 
Colonial military operat ions were nei ther spared from 
these reform and cost-saving sentiments nor from official gov-
ernment actions. On February 18, 1834, the British House of 
Commons ordered "that a select Committee be appointed to 
3
 We treat the notion of governmentality and technologies of government 
as a "field of investigation" (Miller and Rose, 1995) and theorize these tech-
niques within the broader notion(s) of imperialism/colonialism. 67
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inquire into the Military Establishment and Expenditure in the 
Colonies and Dependencies of The Crown" [Report, 1834, Vol. 
1, p. 1]. The Committee gathered evidence, interviewed wit-
nesses, and presented the first volume of its report to the House 
of Commons in August 1834. The second volume was com-
pleted and presented to the House of Commons in 1835. In 
these reports, the Committee examined military establishments 
and expenditures in the colonies of Gibraltar, Malta, the Ionian 
Islands, the Western Coast of Africa, the Cape of Good Hope, 
and the Island of Ceylon [in Vol. 1] and New South Wales, Van 
Diemen's Land, and the North American Provinces [in Vol. 2]. 
The published report of the Select Committee contains the Se-
lect Committee's analysis and recommendations along with 
minutes of evidence from witnesses and supplementary appen-
dices.4 
The Report is an exceptional document produced at a spe-
cific juncture in time, partially in response to the demands for 
administrative reform and increased economy in the military. 
More specifically, the Report illustrates how, at least at this 
moment in time, the military machinery of empire relied on 
techniques such as accounting. In his examination of the ad-
ministration of the British military during this time period, 
Sweetman [1984, p. 3] made a similar point when he com-
mented that the "development of improved techniques of ac-
counting . . . created the impetus for efficiency which reflected 
throughout the [military] administrative system." 
The mandate of the Select Committee and the Reports 
themselves illustrate this intertwining of the hardware and soft-
ware of empire. The mandate of the Select Committee was to 
inquire into both the adequacy of military establishments and 
the cost of these establishments. Throughout the minutes of 
evidence, witnesses were repeatedly asked to juxtapose and bal-
ance these two goals. And in the final Report, the first two 
recommendations explicitly dealt with the adequacy of force 
and the cost of maintaining this force: 
Resolved, That it is not the Intention of this Committee 
. . . to relieve the Executive Government from the Duty 
which constitutionally belongs to it, of providing . . . A 
4
 In subsequent discussions we refer to the published output of the Select 
Committee as "The Report," which consists of the Select Committee's analysis 
and recommendations, along with the minutes of evidence and supplementary 
appendices. 
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force sufficient for the Security of His Majesty's Posses-
sions abroad [Report, Vol. 1., p. iii, emphases added]. 
and: 
Resolved, That the Committee are of the Opinion, That 
the strictest Economy should be observed in every 
branch of Military Expenditure of the Colonies; and 
that any surplus Revenue that may remain after defray-
ing their Civil Expenses. . . be applied to the payment 
of their Military Charges [Report, Vol. 1, p. iii, empha-
ses added]. 
Thus, the mandate of the Select Committee and the final Report 
itself set up as mutual goals the maintenance of effective and 
efficient military force in the colonies [cf. Report, Vol. 2, pp. 26, 
44]. 
It was these notions of efficiency and economy so prevalent 
in reformist discourses at this time [cf. Sweetman, 1984, p. 13] 
which provided the rhetorical space for accounting techniques. 
In attempting to assess the economy of military operations in 
distant places, the Committee turned not only to eyewitnesses 
but to accounting techniques and records. Consistent with the 
comments of Miller and Rose [1990, p . 8], [account ing records 
provided the Select Committee with a short-form representa-
tion of distant events. By providing this information to decision 
makers in the imperial center, accounting helped to render 
these distant locales "governable." 
Throughout the Report is the recognition that accounting 
is a "useful" technology with regards to governing military op-
erations. The Report contains an extended discussion of the 
accounting records for individual detachments and whether 
these records provide appropriate information [Report, Vol. 2, 
pp. 63-64, 83]. In keeping with the emphasis on economy, ques-
tions posed by the lawyer for the Select Committee to a bureau-
crat from the military asked whether accounting methods pro-
moted economy: 
Q. If those two are able to keep the accounts in the 
whole of Newfoundland for 276 rank and file, how 
is it that so large a staff is kept in those parts of 
Canada where detachments from only 10 to 50 
men exist? 
A. . . . The same description of accounts are neces-
sary for a detachment of 50 men as are necessary 
for a regiment of 800, provided the regiment of 
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800 is at one post; but if the regiment is scattered 
over different par t s of the country, then tha t 
would impose additional labour upon the commis-
sariat, because each detachment would require the 
same description of accounts to be rendered in 
duplicate, and the same description of vouchers 
[Report, Vol. 2, p. 63]. 
The notion of economy also motivated discussions regarding 
the prevention of fraud [Report, Vol. 2, pp. 57, 73] and discus-
sions regarding how often the accounts of different detach-
ments/regiments/commissariats were audited and by whom [p. 
65]. From these examples, it appears that accounting tech-
niques were viewed as an integral tool in the government of 
military operations. 
The Report itself not only discussed accounting techniques 
but used accounting numbers. [Accounting data were inter-
spersed throughout the Report, usually with the effect of mak-
ing visible certain aspects of military operations. For example, 
included in the appendices were tables listing the cost to Brit-
ain of military operations in different colonies. 
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FIGURE 1 
AN ACCOUNT of the AMOUNT paid by Great Britain 
for the MILITARY EXPENDITURE 
Source: Appendix to Report from Select Committee on Military Expenditure 
[1835] 
Other tables enumerated the number and distribution of effec-
tive forces, including a breakdown of officers, noncommis-
sioned officers, and soldiers in Canada [Report, Vol. 2, p. 96], 
whereas yet other tables summarized the "pay, allowances, 
emoluments, advantages and salaries" accruing to different 
military personnel in different locations [Report, Vol. 2, pp. 90-
95]. 71
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This cost information was then referred to in the questioning of 
witnesses regarding the appropriate military force at a particu-
lar location. 
In these ways, accounting information represented to the 
Select Committee the state of affairs in the colonies and thereby 
provided a starting point for examining issues of mili tary 
economy. This information also created the illusion that it was 
possible to compare the military efficiency of disparate locales. 
For example, a recurrent theme in the questioning of military 
officials by the Select Committee was the differential cost of 
military personnel in Nova Scotia vis-a-vis the rest of Canada: 
It appears by the Returns that the number of troops in 
Nova Scotia and in Canada are nearly equal; that there 
is not a difference of above 200 between the amount of 
troops in Canada and Nova Scotia: be kind enough to 
explain to the Committee why there is such a differ-
ence between the amount of the expense of the com-
missariat at Canada and Nova Scotia; and state why it 
should be three times the amount at the one place as it 
is at the other, for nearly the same number of troops 
[Report, Vol. 2, p. 55]? 
Although the locales under consideration were quite different, 
the Committee kept returning to the issue of cost differences, 
asking the witnesses to explain why two jurisdictions in the 
same general geographic area [i.e., North America] had such 
different costs [cf. Report, Vol. 2, pp. 53, 55, 72]. This reliance 
on accounting data to compare locations is not surprising 
since, as Miller and Rose [1990, p. 7] commented, programs of 
government depend on apparently "stable, mobile, combinable 
and comparable" data because such data render the domain 
under consideration "susceptible to evaluation, calculation and 
intervention." 
Accounting information not only provided a starting point 
for comparing the military efficiency of different locales as rep-
resented in numbers but also for interrogating the military 
judgments of the expert witnesses. For example, cost data per-
taining to the governor of Newfoundland's ship provided the 
starting point for the following line of questioning directed at 
the former governor of Newfoundland: 
Is there not a vessel or yacht for the governor's use at 
Newfoundland? Yes, there is . . . What is the amount of 
expense? The contract for the vessel is 2,300£ a year 
[pp. 32-33] . . . do you consider it absolutely necessary 
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that a yacht should be kept up, or so large a vessel as at 
present? I think that it is quite necessary that the vessel 
should be kept up. The size at present is not more than 
adequate for the purpose for which she is wanted. She 
is not wanted exclusively for the governor's use; she is 
requi red when necessary to send de tachmen t s of 
troops to different parts of the islands, and she should 
be able to carry them...and she has been sent to cruize 
when complaints have been made of the conduct of the 
French with respect to the fishery and to prevent smug-
gling and other duties [p. 40]. 
In this example, accounting data made visible certain aspects of 
military operations in the Canadian colony. Select Committee 
members focused their questions on these aspects, asking the 
military witnesses to justify in military terms the appropriate-
ness of these expenditures. 
In another instance, accounting data were used to frame 
the decision as to whether "regular forces" or the militia should 
be used to defend Canada. These kinds of questions were di-
rected toward a lieutenant colonel stationed in Nova Scotia: 
Q. Is the militia force a popular force in Nova Scotia? 
A. I should say it is certainly 
Q. How are the officers and men paid when embod-
ied? 
A. They are paid by a vote of the House of Assem-
b l y . . . 
Q. Is not the pay very inferior to that which they can 
obtain by labour or by any work as artisans or 
labourers? 
A. The pay is very inferior . . . 
Q. Then taking that into consideration, and taking 
into consideration the difficulty of finding employ-
ment for emigrants...do you think there would be 
any doubt of finding a sufficient number of men 
for the militia at as low a rate of pay as British 
soldiers? 
A. Emigrants without money would e n l i s t . . . 
Q. Supposing the experiment were tried . . . do you, 
in a military point of view see any objection to 
employing a proportion of that force, and releas-
ing an equivalent proportion of the regular force 
of the country? 
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A. If it were possible to have the militia as perfectly 
trained as our militia were during the late war, I 
should see no objection to a certain portion, but I 
doubt that being practicable [Report, Vol. 2, pp. 
28-29]. 
The above line of questioning illustrates the ways in which the 
Select Committee forced its military witnesses to justify their 
military judgments in terms of cost efficiency. The issue of cost 
as constructed through accounting reports continually framed 
and set the parameters for military judgments. 
As hinted in the above examples, accounting techniques 
and data provided a "map" of distant military operations, mak-
ing visible the military configurations of these distant locales. 
The maps formed by apparently stable, combinable, and com-
parable accounting data [Miller and Rose, 1990, pp. 7, 9] 
brought home to the "centers of calculation" information about 
colonial mi l i ta ry a r r angemen t s , thereby al lowing "local" 
knowledges to be mobilized by imperial powers [Said, 1979, p . 
44]. Accounting numbers helped operationalize the discourse of 
economy [cf. Power, 1992, p. 478; Neu and Taylor, 1996, p . 451] 
and thereby created a discursive framework in which military 
decisions were viewed and ultimately had to be justified. This 
same data also provided the Select Committee with a starting 
basis for questioning and interrogating the opinions and judg-
ments of military witnesses. By continually juxtaposing the 
"truths" as made visible by account ing numbers with the 
"truths" enunciated by military personnel, the Select Commit-
tee sought to understand the state of military operations in 
these distant colonies. 
The foregoing analysis illustrates the ways in which the 
military machinery of empire at this juncture relied on account-
ing techniques. Accounting techniques had penetrated the do-
main of military operations and appeared to function not only 
as the guidance system for the empire's military machinery but 
also as a useful technology for interrogating the military costs 
during this period of economic retrenchment. In the next sec-
tions, we analyze how indigenous peoples came to be viewed as 
a site for cost cutting and, subsequently, as a population to be 
governed. 
A SITE FOR COST CUTTING 
Relations between Canada's indigenous peoples and the 
British military date back to at least the 1600s. In 1670, Charles 
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II issued a code of instructions to the governors of the Cana-
dian colonies instructing the military to "at no time give any 
just provocation to any of the said Indians that are at peace 
with us" [RAIC, 1844, p. a.3]. Throughout the subsequent colo-
nial skirmishes, the British military sought to cultivate indig-
enous peoples as allies in their battles with the French and in 
the subsequent War of Independence. Following the capitula-
tion of the French in North America in 1760, Britain formally 
recognized the rights of indigenous peoples in the Royal Procla-
mation of 1763: 
And whereas it is just and reasonable and essential to 
our interest and the security of our Colonies, that the 
several natives or Tribes of Indians, with whom we are 
connected, and who live under our protection, should 
not be molested or disturbed in the possession of such 
part of our dominions and territories, as not having 
been ceded to us, are reserved to them, or any of them 
as their hunting grounds. 
Not only did the Proclamation recognize the rights of indig-
enous peoples to unceded land, it stated that negotiations be-
tween Britain and indigenous peoples would be on a nation-to-
nation basis [Milloy, 1983]. 
Even after the defeat of France, the British military contin-
ued to cultivate indigenous peoples as allies. The annual distri-
bution of "presents" to indigenous peoples was the primary 
method of maintaining this military support: 
From the earliest period of the connexion between the 
Indians and the British Government it has been cus-
tomary to distribute annually certain presents, consist-
ing chiefly of clothing and ammunition. . . . The objec-
tive at that period was doubtless in the first instance to 
conciliate the Indians, to ensure their services, and to 
supply their wants as warriors in the field; and after-
wards, in times of peace, to secure their allegiance to-
wards the British Crown, and their good will and 
peaceful behaviour towards the white settlers [RAIC, 
1844, p. 6]. 
The military connection between indigenous peoples and the 
British empire was formally recognized in 1816 with the trans-
fer of jurisdiction over Indian affairs to the Commander of the 
Forces. The Indian Department, as it came to be called, was 
responsible for the yearly distribution of presents and other 
matters pertaining to relations between the military and indig-
enous peoples: 76
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The system of dealing with them was essentially mili-
tary. For a long time they were under the head of the 
military department, and were considered and treated 
as military allies or stipendiaries [RAIC, 1844, p. 6] 
Therefore, relations between the military and indigenous 
peoples were not immune to the cost-cutting sentiments of the 
times. The cost-cutting sentiments prevalent in Britain encour-
aged the continual whittling away of the budget for the military 
[Sweetman, 1984, p. 17] which, in turn, impacted upon military 
operations in the Canadian provinces. As early as 1822, the 
Colonial Secretary for the Canadian provinces "contemplated a 
reduction of the Indian Department, with a view to its ultimate 
abolition" [RAIC, 1844, p. 7]. In 1829, the Lords of Treasury 
and the Secretary of State issued an order that "the whole ex-
pense of the [Indian] Department should not exceed 20,000£." 
In 1832, an accounting allocation change was recommended 
that the charges for the Indian Department be separated from 
other charges relating to colonial operations in Canada when 
being presented to Parliament for approval: 
Previously to this period the charges for the presents, 
including those given on account of the annuities pay-
able for lands surrendered, had been yearly granted by 
the British Parliament in a separate vote, while the 
salaries and pensions of the officers of the Indian De-
partment had been paid from the military chest. This 
course being considered irregular, Lord Goderich pro-
posed that for the future, the land-payments or annu-
ities payable for land surrendered, which were con-
fined to Upper Canada, should be charged on the 
Casual or Territorial Revenue of that Province, while 
the remaining charge, having been originally incurred 
with the view of securing the services of Indians in 
wars, for British, and not exclusively colonial interests, 
ought, according to His Lordship's view, to be provided 
by the Imperial Parliament [RAIC, 1844, p. 8]. 
This shift in policy, which was implemented in 1834, had the 
effect of making visible the costs of maintaining current rela-
tions with indigenous peoples. These cost-cutting sentiments 
and accounting policy changes would reemerge in the 1835 Se-
lect Committee Report, contributing to the Report's ultimate 
conclusion that the Indian Department should be abolished. 
During the inquiry phase of the Select Committee, the In-
dian Department was subjected to the same scrutiny as other 
military operations. For example, accounting data regarding 
77
et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 1999, Vol. 26, no. 1
Published by eGrove, 1999
Neu: Discovering Indigenous Peoples 69 
costs provided the starting point for asking a senior military 
official about the functions of the Indian Department vis-a-vis 
the commissariat: 
Q. It appears by the Returns that there are 40 men at 
Penetanguishene, and yet there are two deputy 
commissary-generals at an expense of 273£, and 
223£; there is an issuer and a labourer at 79£; 
making a total of 650£ for the mere commissariat: 
how can they be employed? 
A. Penetanguishene is now the great depot in Upper 
Canada, from whence presents are issued to the 
Indians; but that will not justify, in my opinion, 
keeping permanently there so great a commis-
sariat establishment [Report, Vol. 2, p. 52]. 
The answer to the above question suggested an overlap in the 
duties of the two departments. Following up on this suggestion, 
the Select Committee asked subsequent expert witnesses (e.g., 
deputy assistant commissary-general located in the Canadas) 
questions regarding the micro-details of present distribution 
and whether both departments were necessary: 
Q: Have you yourself attended any of those [present] 
distributions? . . . At what place? . . . How many 
Indians attended? . . . At what months in the year? 
. . . What were the articles distributed? . . . Did you 
take all those things up with you, or is there any 
depot kept there? . . . On your arrival there, what 
measures are taken, and how is the distribution 
regulated? . . . Do any observations occur to you, 
as to a better and cheaper mode of distribution 
than that which is now used [pp. 73-74]? 
and: 
Q: Can you give us any information as to the distribu-
tion of presents, and how far the duties now per-
formed by the commissariat may be performed by 
the Indian Department, or the duties of the Indian 
Department performed by the commissariat? 
A: I should think the commissariat would be quite 
competent to distribute the presents without any 
Indian Department, which is quite an expensive 
machine [p. 77]. 
As the above questions illustrate, once the Indian Department 
had been identified as a potential site for cost cutting, subse-
quent questions honed in on the actual duties performed by the 78
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department and the overlap with duties performed by the com-
missariat. 
Given the parameters of the Select Committee's mandate 
and the direction of the questions, the Report's final conclusion 
regarding the Indian Department is not surprising: 
Resolved: That the Committee are of the opinion from 
the Evidence taken, and to which they refer, that the 
Indian Department may be greatly reduced, if not en-
tirely abolished, and they therefore call attention of the 
House to the same; and also to the expenses of articles 
annually distributed to the Indians, and whether any 
arrangement may not be made to dispense with such 
distribution in future, or to commute the presents for 
money [Report, Vol. 2, p. iii]. 
The evidence indicated that the military support provided by 
indigenous peoples was less needed in the 1830s than in earlier 
periods. This diminished need, coupled with the discourse of 
economy and the emphasis throughout the Committee's process 
on cost cutting, made the final recommendation that the Indian 
Department be abolished quite predictable. 
The preceding analysis proposes that concerns regarding 
the costs of maintaining Britain's empire indirectly contributed 
to the identification of indigenous peoples in the Canadas as a 
site for cost cutting. Specifically, it was the interrogation of 
military costs in the colonies by the Select Committee that 
made visible the costs of the Indian Department. However, it is 
important to note that the identification of the Indian Depart-
ment as a site for cost cutting by British bureaucrats is not 
synonymous with indigenous peoples coming to be identified as 
a site for governance, notwithstanding that it contributed. As 
the next section proposes, it was colonial administrators with 
responsibilities for the Canadas who, in attempting to balance 
the competing demands of "government," encouraged this shift. 
DISCOVERING INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 
The recommendation of the Select Committee that the In-
dian Department be abolished was, perhaps, the most visible 
signal to colonial adminis t ra tors tha t the "economics" of 
Canada's indigenous peoples needed to be addressed. However, 
as we propose, it was the intersection of this funding issue, 
along with the other "problems of government" confronting co-
lonial administrators, that encouraged the discovery/identifica-
tion of indigenous peoples as a potential site of government. 
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At this juncture in time, the Canadas were undergoing sig-
nificant changes. Following the American Revolution, "thou-
sands of Loyalists poured into the Maritimes, sharply increas-
ing pressures on the Aboriginal land and resource base" [Royal 
Commission, 1996, p. 6]. Likewise, the early 1800s witnessed 
the influx of immigrants from Britain, Ireland, and Scotland as 
the British government and charitable organizations provided 
generous aid to would-be settlers [Francis et al., 1988, p. 215]. 
As the Colonial Magazine [1840, p. 305] noted, in Upper Canada 
"during a period of thirteen years from 1823 to 1836, the in-
crease of population was 200,000 alone, viz. from 150,000 to 
350,000." This influx of immigrants radically changed the rela-
tive numbers of settlers vis-a-vis indigenous peoples. By 1812, 
the nonaboriginal population in Upper Canada outnumbered 
the aboriginal population by 10:1, a ratio that increased further 
in the subsequent decades [Royal Commission, 1996, p. 6]. In 
turn, the activities of the settlers created problems of govern-
ment for colonial administrators. 
The increase in immigration led to increased pressure for 
land. In the Maritimes, "the landless new immigrants pursued 
agriculture and the export of timber, and although parcels of 
land had been set aside for the Indian peoples of the region, 
squatting and other incursions on the Aboriginal land base in-
evitably occurred" [Royal Commission, 1996, p. 6]. Changing 
economic activities, from the fur trade to agriculture, led to 
increasing incompatible pursuits of settlers and indigenous 
peoples, who were being marginalized from the development of 
agriculture [Royal Commission, 1996, p. 7]. As wheat farming 
and t imber became the backbone of the Upper Canadian 
economy during the 1815-1860 period [Francis et al., 1988, p. 
223], increased calls came for the discouragement of nomadic 
lifestyles and the containment of indigenous peoples on specific 
tracts of land. 
As Canada's population and economic activity were ex-
panding rapidly during this period, Britain was becoming in-
creasingly reluctant to bear the costs [cf. Cook and McNaught, 
1963, p. 316]. Thus colonial officials were faced with the prob-
lem of reconciling three interrelated but potentially conflicting 
policy objectives. First was the need for greater fiscal responsi-
bility. Second was the related issue of the need to control and 
contain indigenous peoples and to prevent their interference 
with settlement activities. Indigenous peoples were, by the 
terms of the Royal Proclamation, assuming rights of occupancy 
on land that colonial officials wished to sell to settlers [Royal 
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Commission, 1996]. Abolishing the Indian Department in the 
name of cost cutting, however, would be contrary to the in-
creased containment of indigenous peoples. The third objective 
was in response to reformist sentiments of the day, from a 
multitude of sources, that emphasized the need to "protect and 
civilize" indigenous peoples. 
Protestant sects which were in the throes of evangelical 
movements s t ressed the need to Chris t ianize ind igenous 
peoples [Milloy, 1983, p. 56; Tobias, 1983, p. 40]: 
Many of these sects established missions among the 
Indians, similar to those the Jesuits and other Catholic 
orders had been carrying on for generations. Such Mis-
sions were intended not only to teach the Indian a new 
religion, but also to encourage him to adopt European 
or American values [Tobias, 1983, p. 41]. 
In Britain, the Humanitarians argued for the protection and 
civilization of the Indian as did romantic writers on both sides 
of the Atlantic [Tobias, 1983, p. 41]. These sentiments tempered 
the economic solutions being contemplated by colonial admin-
istrators. As we argue below, it was by attempting to reconcile 
these diverse objectives that indigenous peoples came to be 
identified as a site for governance. 
In responding to the specific recommendations of the Se-
lect Committee and these more general problems of govern-
ment, Lord Glenelg, Secretary of State for the Colonies, stated 
that the recommendation to eliminate the distribution of pre-
sents was inappropriate at the current time (1835): 
I feel bound, after much consideration, to express my 
opinion, that the time has not yet arrived at which it 
would be possible, consistently with good faith, alto-
gether to discontinue the annual presents to the Indi-
ans [RAIC, 1844, p . 9]. 
The rationale for this opinion was the belief that such a deci-
sion would be "impolitic" and that elimination of presents 
would hinder efforts to "civilize" indigenous peoples (i.e., would 
be contrary to other government objectives). However, the an-
nual distribution of presents could be modified to help accom-
plish this goal with the aim of eventually "diminishing their 
amount, with a view to the ultimate abrogation of the existing 
custom" [RAIC, 1844, p. 9]. Toward this end, Glenelg directed 
the governors of the Canadian colonies to examine ways of 
modifying the type of presents distributed with the aim of en-
couraging both "civilization" and self-sufficiency: 81
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Looking, however, to the moral and religious improve-
ment of the Indians, and their instruction in the arts of 
civilized life, as the principal object to be kept in view 
in our intercourse with these tribes, I am anxious that 
your enquiries should be specifically directed to the 
practicability of effecting a commutation of the pre-
sents for some object of permanent benefit to the par-
ties now receiving them. 
Although Glenelg did not specifically mention the objective of 
control l ing/containing indigenous peoples, the m a n n e r in 
which the distribution of presents was subsequently modified 
had this effect [Neu, 1997]. 
The solution to the dilemmas of government proposed by 
Glenelg articulated a changed view of indigenous peoples. By 
voicing the sentiment that the type of presents distributed could 
be manipulated to encourage the "civilization" of indigenous 
peoples, while at the same time satisfying the demands of set-
tlers that indigenous peoples be contained, Lord Glenelg simul-
taneously constructed indigenous peoples as a population to be 
governed and proposed the appropriate technology for govern-
ment funding relations. Although isolated attempts at govern-
ance via the manipulation of presents had occurred prior to this 
[cf. Neu, 1997, p. 22], Glenelg's statement defined and fore-
shadowed Br i t i sh gove rnmen t policy toward ind igenous 
peoples for the next 20 years. 
It is important to note that the proposed solution indirectly 
addressed the three competing dilemmas of government. The 
specific costs associated with the Indian Department would be 
reduced over time and, if successful, indigenous peoples would 
both be contained and civilized. Furthermore, over the longer 
term, this strategy of containment would make it easier for 
colonial officials to buy and resell the land previously occupied 
by indigenous peoples since this land was no longer central to 
their subsistence. Thus, the proposed solution partially recon-
ciled the competing demands facing officials at this juncture. 
Throughout the chain of events leading to the discovery/ 
identification of indigenous peoples as a potential site for gov-
ernance, accounting techniques were salient. Accounting tech-
niques were implicated in the Select Committee process and in 
the ultimate recommendation that the Indian Department be 
abolished. Glenelg's solution also proposed the manipulation of 
funding relations as a method of reconciling the competing 
policy objectives. As we will see in the next section, accounting 
techniques also assisted in the translation of this generalized 
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plan into practice. Throughout this chain of events, accounting 
techniques and numbers appear to have functioned as an "ideo-
logical circle" [Smith, 1990] in that accounting calculations 
both framed the problem and suggested a potential solution 
that was consistent with the original framing [cf. Neu and Tay-
lor, 1996, p . 452]. 
To state that accounting was salient to the process of dis-
covering indigenous peoples as a potential site of governance is 
neither to suggest that discovery occurred at a single moment 
in time [cf. Foucault, 1984, p. 80] nor to assert a form of ac-
counting-centrism whereby it is presumed that accounting is 
unilaterally responsible for this shift. The preceding analysis 
highlighted the idiosyncratic chain of events and circumstances 
which encouraged Glenelg's articulation. Undoubtedly Glenelg's 
construction of indigenous peoples as a potentially governable 
population echoed and harmonized [cf. Lehman and Tinker, 
1987, p. 509] with other dominant constructions of the times 
[cf. Royal Commission, 1996] and thus should be viewed as, in 
part, an explicit (albeit "official") statement of the Zeitgeist of 
the times. However this being said, it seems safe to assert that it 
was dur ing this general junc ture in t ime tha t indigenous 
peoples came to be viewed as a potentially governable popula-
tion. As the preceding analysis documents, accounting was in-
tertwined with this chain of events and, thus, salient to the 
discovery. 
IMPOSING GOVERNMENTALITY 
While Lord Glenelg's s ta tements identified indigenous 
peoples as a potential site for governance, other government 
bureaucrats soon realized that to govern a population, one had 
to first "know" that population. Said [1979, p. 36] nicely cap-
tured this dialectic between knowledge and colonial govern-
ment when he noted that: 
Knowledge of subject races . . . is what makes their 
management easy and profitable; knowledge gives 
power, more power requires more knowledge, and so 
on in an increasingly profitable dialectic of informa-
tion and control. 
Said's comments point to the ways in which knowledge of in-
digenous peoples is a prerequisite for effective and efficient 
colonial government. 
Apparently one of the first steps in obtaining the knowledge 
necessary for effective government of indigenous peoples was 
to request a census of indigenous peoples: 83
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In the spring of 1837, the Lords of the Treasury, with 
the view to enable His Majesty's Government to deter-
mine what ulterior arrangements it might be expedient 
to adopt for the purpose of encouraging the Indians to 
adopt agricul tural pursui ts , and acquire habi ts of 
settled industry . . . issued the following set of queries, 
which were transmitted to the Governor of either Prov-
ince, and answered in considerable detail [RAIC, 1844, 
p. 11]. 
1st. The number of tribes and of Indians resident 
within the British Territory 
2nd. The pursuits of each tribe, with the number of 
fixed locations occupied by the Indians 
3rd. The situation of the locations of the settled parties 
or of hunting grounds occupied by the other Indians 
4th. The extent of lands set apart at the different loca-
tions, for the use of the Indians, or of the hunting 
ranges 
5th. The persons employed in the superintendence of 
the settled Indians, or of the other Tribes, with the 
designations and salaries, and a summary of the duties 
they have to perform 
6th. The number and description of the Clergy or 
teachers attached to each tribe or party 
7th. Whether the expenses of the tribe or party are 
defrayed by the Parliamentary grant or from the land 
payments, out of the Territorial Revenue of the Crown. 
As the above questions indicate, this census sought to represent 
the population of indigenous peoples with an emphasis on how 
large the population was, where they resided, how they lived, 
and, perhaps most importantly, how expensive they were to the 
Crown. 
This usage of a census was the first systematic attempt to 
gather information on indigenous peoples; however, this tech-
nique had been used previously in Britain. The period 1801-
1831 marked the introduction of the population census in Brit-
ain [Lawton, 1978, p. 12]. Cullen [1975, p. 13] argued that the 
introduction of a population census was intended to provide 
rhetorical support for Britain's military endeavors: 
More accurate information would enable the govern-
ment to form more effective policies, particularly with 
regard to the recruitment of the armed forces. The cen-
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sus . . . would show a substantial population increase, 
thus demonstrat ing the nation's growing prosperity 
and allaying domestic discontent. 
In the three decades following the introduction of a population 
census, this technique of government was a favored starting 
point for addressing issues of the day: 
The many environmental, social and economic prob-
lems of the nineteenth century — health and disease, 
housing and sanitation, employment and unemploy-
ment, deprivation and poverty — gave rise to an abun-
dance of Royal Commissions and Committees of En-
qu i ry a n d loca l g o v e r n m e n t i n v e s t i g a t i o n s a n d 
committee reports. But, in these and related matters, 
the census of population must often be the starting 
point of investigation [Lawton, 1978, p. 21]. 
The census was applied to various populations within society — 
national crime statistics began to be published in 1810, educa-
tion statistics in 1818, and the health of factory children in 
1816 [Cullen, 1975, pp. 13-16]. In this regard, the transference 
of this technique to indigenous peoples can be seen as an out-
growth of this trend within Britain itself. 
The history of the population census within Britain implies 
that the notion of a census was a popular solution to "problems 
of government" at this juncture. Starting from its deployment 
as a technique to justify the viability of the military, the census 
came to be viewed as a prerequisite for other government ac-
tion. In terms of indigenous peoples, this was also the case. The 
1844 Royal Commission Report on the Affairs of the Indians in 
Canada contains the results of the 1837 census of indigenous 
peoples and frames the recommendations in light of the census 
results. This [ac]counting of indigenous peoples, we propose, 
can be read as an attempt to produce a map of the indigenous 
population, to generate a certain type of knowledge which al-
lowed Britain to govern indigenous peoples effectively [Said, 
1979, p. 36]. Although this form of accounting differs from the 
type of accounts generated by commercial enterprises, the func-
tion is similar to gather and represent information at a point-
in-time in order to exercise control (whether we refer to this 
control as governmentality or stewardship). Interestingly, the 
usage of techniques of census on indigenous peoples presup-
poses a subject population and assumes a paternal relationship 
whereby the colonial government has the right to attempt to 
govern indigenous peoples. As mentioned previously, this repre-
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sents a change from the nation-to-nation relationship enunci-
ated in the 1763 Royal Proclamation. 
While the transfer of the [ac] counting techniques of census 
to indigenous peoples can be traced to techniques of govern-
ment used in Britain at this juncture, we are unsure whether 
the suggestion by Lord Glenelg to use funding relations as a 
technology of government was a transfer of an existing tech-
nique or a "made in the colonies" solution. Issues of lineage 
aside, following Lord Glenelg's letter to the governors in 1835, 
accounting techniques of governance were applied to the indig-
enous population. 
The areas of agriculture and education were the initial sites 
in which the Crown attempted to change behavior via the ma-
nipulation of presents. For example, in an 1836 letter to the 
governors of the Canadian provinces, Lord Glenelg [1836, p. 
433] recommended shifting a portion of the funds spent on 
presents to the area of education: 
[His Majesty's Government] are prepared, should you 
think such a measure practicable, and if the consent of 
the Indians can be obtained to it, to sanction the appli-
cation of at least a portion of the sums now expended 
in the purchase of stores and presents, to the erection 
of school houses, the purchase of elementary books, 
and the payment of resident schoolmasters, for the 
benefit of Indian tribes. 
Likewise in a subsequent letter, Lord Glenelg suggested that 
with the view of encouraging indigenous peoples to abandon a 
wandering lifestyle that agricultural implements be substituted 
for other presents "giving [indigenous peoples] agricultural 
implements, but no other Description of Presents" [Glenelg, 
1838, p. 235]. The policy direction provided by Glenelg was 
consistent with the interests of settlers that indigenous peoples 
be "encouraged" to abandon traditional pursuits which con-
flicted with settlement. 
These policies regarding the manipulation of presents were 
reiterated and reaffirmed in the 1844 Report on the Affairs of 
the Indians in Canada. This Repor t r ecommended major 
changes to the Indian Department and an increased emphasis 
on agriculture and education, with the manipulation of pre-
sents being the primary method of encouraging these changes. 
Subsequent to this Report, the annual issue of gunpowder was 
withheld: 
On the 30th of January, 1849, the Earl of Elgin re- 86
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ported the arrangement made by Lord Metcalf in 1845, 
with most of the settled Tribes, where by the annual 
issue of gunpowder was withheld on the understanding 
that the sum saved would be applied to promoting edu-
cation among them [Report of the Special Commis-
sioners, 1858, p. 2]. 
Such manipulations continued until 1858 when the British Par-
liament recommended that the annual issue of presents be dis-
continued. These examples strongly suggest that presents dis-
t r i bu t ed to ind igenous peoples were used as a specific 
technology of government in an attempt to encourage certain 
types of behavior, notably the pursuit of a "settled" and "civi-
l ized" l i fes tyle . I n t e r e s t i n g l y , F o u c a u l t ' s d i s c u s s i o n of 
governmentality seems to envision this very type of manipula-
tion in that he states that it is often "customs" (i.e., a wandering 
lifestyle) that techniques of government are directed at chang-
ing. "The things with which government is to be concerned with 
are in fact men, but men in their relation to that other kind of 
thing, customs, habits, ways of acting and thinking" [Foucault, 
1991, p. 93]. It was through the usage of accounting techniques 
of governance that Britain attempted to satisfy the competing 
demands for the minimization of costs, the civilization and pro-
tection of indigenous peoples, and their control and contain-
ment on segregated reserves. 
Although the preceding analysis has focused on the use of 
accounting techniques to accomplish governmentality, other 
techniques of government were also deployed. For example, the 
appointment of Indian agents responsible for the affairs of spe-
cific tribes was used to implement government policy, helping 
to accomplish the goals of containment and civilization [Milloy, 
1983, pp. 59-60]. Likewise the establishment of the first resi-
dential schools during the 1840s, with their explicit objectives 
of "weaning [indigenous peoples] from the habits and feelings 
of their ancestors..." [Grant, 1996, p. 59] and the increasing 
involvement of missionaries in the administration of the affairs 
of indigenous peoples [cf. York and Pindera, 1992, pp. 88-89], 
complemented the aforementioned accounting techniques in 
achieving governmentality. Consistent with Miller and Rose's 
[1990, p. 97] observation that governmentality is accomplished 
via heterogenous technologies operating in heterogenous sites, 
governmentality was accomplished in the case of indigenous 
peoples by a variety of mechanisms, including accounting, op-
erating in different locales. 
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CONCLUSION 
Explanations of the success of British imperialism during 
the 1800s often emphasize the importance of technology [cf. 
Headrick, 1981, 1988], political values [cf. Lloyd, 1996] or eco-
nomic motivat ions [cf. Hobson, 1902]. The cur rent s tudy 
supplements these explanations by documenting the role(s) 
played by accounting techniques within the military machinery 
of empire. Our thesis is that accounting techniques, at least in 
the early 1800s, were firmly embedded within the military ma-
chinery of empire and served to frame the military decisions of 
the day. Drawing upon the theoretical work of Foucault [1991], 
Miller and Rose [1990, 1995], Said [1979, 1993], and others, we 
theorize accounting as a technology of government that helped 
to facilitate action at a distance. More specifically, we propose 
that accounting contributed to British imperialism by returning 
to the centers of calculation information that rendered distant 
territories and their occupants governable. 
In the context of Canada's indigenous peoples, the current 
study sought to analyze the moment(s) at which indigenous 
peoples came to be viewed as a governable population rather 
than as a distinct nation and when/how accounting techniques 
came to penetrate this domain. Our analysis suggested that the 
c o m p e t i n g p r e s su re s of f inancia l r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n in the 
Canadas, the demands from settlers that indigenous peoples be 
contained, and reformist discourses emphasizing the impor-
tance of civilizing indigenous peoples encouraged the identifi-
cation of indigenous peoples as a governable population. In 
response to these pressures, Lord Glenelg proposed the ma-
nipulation of funding relations (i.e., the annual distribution of 
presents) as a method of accomplishing these disparate objec-
tives. This public statement by the Secretary of the Colonies 
simultaneously constructed indigenous peoples as a governable 
population and proposed the technology of government that 
would encourage the desired behavior. Subsequent to this pro-
nouncement, the [ac]counting techniques of census were trans-
ferred from the imperial center in the at tempt to come to 
"know" indigenous peoples, and funding relations were system-
atically manipulated in the attempt to satisfy the competing 
policy objectives. Thus, as a consequence of this chain of 
events, we see in the 1830-1858 period the slippage from a 
nation-to-nation relationship between Britain and indigenous 
peoples to a paternal relationship. Intertwined with this slip-
page was the identification/construction of indigenous peoples 
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as a governable population, and the penetration of this domain 
by accounting (and other techniques) functioning as technolo-
gies of government. 
The study resonates with the current day in that it makes 
visible the lineage of paternal views regarding indigenous 
peoples and the persistence of accounting technologies of gov-
ernance within this domain. However, while the current study 
is suggestive of parallels between the 1830s and the 1990s, more 
research is needed to understand how accounting techniques of 
governance have changed/evolved over this time period. Fou-
cault [1991] and Said [1979], for example, implied that tech-
niques of regulation/government may become more precise 
over time as the knowledge gained from previous at tempts 
helps to refine the technologies. Yet Miller and Rose [1990, p. 
10] provided the caution that "whilst 'governmentality' is eter-
nally optimistic, 'government' is a congenitally failing opera-
tion." Consequently, more research is needed to understand 
how the accounting technologies of government directed at in-
digenous peoples have changed since the 1830s, whether these 
technologies have become more precise in terms of the effects 
they are intended to induce, and the manner in which these 
technologies are resisted by those targeted by them. 
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Abstract: The article reviews recent developments in accounting his-
toriography in relation to the underlying positioning of the partici-
pants. It finds that accounting history has located itself within the 
tradition of social science, which subsumes events into generaliza-
tions and generalizations into theory. It reviews the efficacy of 
causal theories of human behavior and proposes an alternative non-
theoretical approach. 
INTRODUCTION 
In a thought-provoking, short article, Slocum [1995, p. 21] 
suggested that the phenomenon of history repeating itself oc-
curs when the need for survival, coupled to the desire to take 
the easiest course, determines the path that is chosen. The im-
plication is that there is a pattern to human activity, and that it 
is possible to theorize causal relationships. This chain of rea-
soning underlies the various accounting historiographical para-
digms which seek to explain accounting activities and account-
ing change in terms of the pursuit of wealth through rational 
decision making (economic rationalist), the subjection of the 
forces of production through capitalism (Marxist), or the exer-
cise of power through knowledge and symbolic representation 
(Foucauldian). The resultant causal structures are not the same. 
Authors maintain that the economic-rationalist paradigm tends 
towards a mechanistic view of cause and effect, whereas the 
other schools are more dynamic in that they focus on the proc-
esses of change by which new situations and practices are 
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brought into being [Hopwood, 1981, p. 294; Mouck, 1995, pp. 
74-78]. The Foucauldian emphasis on discontinuity [Fleisch-
man and Tyson, 1997, pp. 92-97], that it is anachronistic to 
interpret the past as an extension of the present, in no way 
prevents the "dynamics that come to drive the power-knowl-
edge interaction" [Hoskin et al., 1997, p. 3] from being theo-
rized. Rather, the question becomes, when did conditions exist 
for them to operate? When did the modern world begin [Hoskin 
et al., 1997, p. 2]? These three models are merely illustrative 
rather than representative of the full genre of theoretical stud-
ies, which is extremely diverse. Young [1995], for example, 
adopted the theoretical concept of "regulatory space," Walker 
[1995] that of "critical-conflict," and Walker and Shackleton 
[1995] "British corporatism" to explain historical events within 
a single volume of Accounting, Organizations and Society. 
The purpose of this article is to highlight the limitations of 
a theoretical approach to accounting history. It is therefore 
unashamedly reactionary, as theoretical history has gained 
ground in recent years [Fleischman and Tyson, 1997, p. 97]. 
Undoubtedly, the discipline of accounting history has been 
stimulated as a result, although some "traditional" accounting 
historians have felt that they are being "goaded and ridiculed" 
by the "energetic proponents of the new" [Funnell, 1998, p. 
142]. The article commences by reviewing trends in accounting 
historiography over the last 25 years, before moving on to con-
sider the nature and limitations of causal theories of account-
ing behavior. It argues that (1) the terminology that has been 
applied to research directions in accounting history is confused; 
that (2) accounting historiography has become more theoretical 
under the stimulus of "critical" scholarship; that (3) causal 
theories are undermined by the volatile elements of accident 
and personality which are not susceptible to prediction; and 
that (4) the present emphasis on theorizing causation is a re-
flection of the accounting discipline's own search for identity, 
coupled to the anthropic fallacy of historical reasoning, which 
places the historian at the center of the historical universe and 
uses the past to justify his/her view of the present. 
HISTORIOGRAPHY 
In recent years, accounting history has moved closer to the 
center of accounting research, and the nature and aims of the 
discipline have come under increasing scrutiny. Table 1 illus-
trates the range of classifications that have been applied to 
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accounting history over the last 25 years, as scholars have at-
tempted to rationalize accounting history's place in accounting 
research. These classifications and their linkages are useful be-
cause they illumine the underlying historiographical trends. 
TABLE 1 
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TABLE 1 (Continued) 






















































































































Different layers of meaning can be deduced from the table. 
First, as new research methodologies have manifested them-
selves, the exponents of the "new" have been keen to draw a 
distinction between their brand of history and what has gone 
before, the "traditional." However, the nature of this dichotomy 
is confused, which the table's linkages clearly show. For in-
stance, the Foucauldian and Marxist worldviews have been 95
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characterized as "critical" because they try to render the famil-
iar economic-rationalist view unfamiliar, by focusing on the 
hidden, unarticulated aspects of the accounting discipline [Me-
rino and Mayper, 1993, pp. 238-239]. Thus, the economic 
rationalist viewpoint has been said to constitute "traditional" 
history, although the term also applies to studies which are 
descriptive in nature rather then interpretive [Fleischman et al., 
1996b, p. 66], and which chart the technical development of 
accounting practice without contextualizing it [Hopwood, 1981, 
p. 295]. In this scheme, the discovery of technical data by "tra-
ditionalists" is still regarded as useful, albeit at the least pub-
lishable level of historical activity [Flesher and Samson, 1990, 
p. 3], because it provides fodder for the "contextualisers" to 
theorize [Napier, 1989, p. 250]. But, this implies a lack of inter-
est on the part of traditional historians in causal relationships, 
which is quite inconsistent with the notion that they are also 
economic rationalists. Carnegie and Napier [1996, p. 14] ac-
knowledged this situation by linking critical and economic-
rationalist studies together as both encouraging par t icular 
modes of explanation. Furthermore, "traditional" accounting 
histories have also been critiqued as those which follow an evo-
lutionary or Darwinian model of accounting improvement from 
a less perfect past to a more perfect present [Hopwood, 1987, 
pp. 209-210; Napier, 1989, p. 244], a view also known as the 
"Whig interpretation of history" [Butterfield, 1973, p. 9], imply-
ing a causal model based on the natural selection of accounting 
techniques in which the "strongest" survive. It follows that 
there is some confusion in the terms that have been applied to 
accounting history over the last 25 years, which have multiplied 
as researchers have attempted to resolve disagreements over 
research aims and to rationalize the place of history in main-
stream accounting research. 
Second, Table 1 illustrates the extent to which research 
directions in accounting history have become an issue in the 
1990s. This paradigmatic diversity is both a reflection of its 
increasing maturity as a discipline and the continuing rise in 
numbers of new entrants, since 1980, who come from different 
backgrounds, replete with their own baggage and agendas. 
Miller et al. [1991, p. 396] cited anthropology, economics, his-
tory of science, organization theory, and sociology as providing 
examples. Parker's [1980, pp. 26-28; 1988, pp. 76-81] account-
ing history bibliographies give some indication of scale. In the 
nine years to 1977, he cited about 170 authors, compared to 
about 510 in the seven years to 1987. Cooper and Puxty [1996, 
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p. 306] referred to the "proliferation" in the number of histo-
ries, historians, and ideological frameworks. In any discipline, 
new knowledge is largely incremental to the knowledge base 
and beliefs of the researcher. Looking at causation, interpreting 
the evidence will usually take place against a model that is 
dependent upon the researcher's objectives and background. 
Diversity in accounting history is therefore inevitable, and it is 
fruitless for individual schools to claim preeminence for their 
own point-of-view. Moreover, the large cluster of articles in the 
1990s reflects the increased opportunities for publication aris-
ing through diversity. From a pragmatic viewpoint, it is not in 
the interests of accounting academics to close down particular 
lines of inquiry. Indeed, conflicting worldviews allow account-
ing historians to examine or reexamine issues from different 
angles and to draw contrasts, either in partnership or in opposi-
tion [e.g., Tyson, 1992; Fleischman et al., 1995; Hoskin and 
Macve, 1996]. 
Third, research directions in accounting history, as re-
flected by Table 1, are not divorced from trends in accounting 
theory. The idea of accounting progressing through time to-
wards an ideal state is consistent with a normative-deductive 
approach to accounting theory. If Mouck [1995, pp. 55, 60] is 
correct that this type of study peaked in the 1960s and early 
1970s as a result of the "unprecedented concern" in U.S. busi-
ness schools at the time over the lack of scientific theory in 
management education, its subsequent decline has coincided 
with the overt rejection of the Darwinian model by most ac-
counting historians. In 1975, Johnson [1975, p. 449] wrote 
about the "evolution of accounting procedures in large corpora-
tions" as an impetus to national economic growth, whereas by 
1986, he was referring to the possibilities offered by the "new" 
accounting history that was by then challenging the evolution-
ary view [Johnson, 1986, pp. 74-75]. In 1981, Parker [p. 281] 
defended the notion of evolution on the grounds that "no ac-
counting historian has discerned revolutions in accounting 
practice," but all subsequent entries in Table 1 tend to regard 
that idea as passe. This is not to say that the evolutionary model 
in accounting history is as defunct as the table suggests since 
the Foucauldian focus on discontinuities in management ac-
counting history has been paralleled by a search for continu-
ities between the modern world and the past by their critics 
[e.g.; Edwards et al., 1995, pp. 34-35]. Moreover, discontinuity 
and evolution need not preclude each other. In a true Darwin-
ian sense, evolution does not imply progressive improvement, 
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but the adaptation of species to suit their environment best. 
There will be extinctions and new starts along the way as the 
environment changes, as well as continuity and development. 
The main evolutionary question in accounting, then, concerns 
the way accounting has interacted with the environment (i.e.; 
social, political, economic, calculable, etc. contexts) in which it 
has operated at particular points in time and space, which is 
relevant to Marxists, economic rationalists, and Foucauldians 
alike. Has the interaction between accounting and its contexts 
been dysfunctional, congruous, or synergetic? Evidence of con-
gruity/synergy would support the idea that accounting evolves. 
An example might be the growth of power systems in U.S. soci-
ety from around 1800 in response to "the rise and rise of sus-
tained cognitive growth" as the use of writing, examination, 
and numerical grading spread [Hoskin et al., 1997, p. 3]. 
Returning to the theme that developments in accounting 
theory and historiography are linked, the best example is shown 
by the post-1980 references in Table 1 to "critical" accounting 
history, which reflect the current vogue in "critical" or social-
based accounting research. As Funnell [1996, p. 38] observed: 
Central to much of the critical accounting research 
which has sought to question the legitimacy of existing 
institutions, distributions of power and the role of ac-
counting in sustaining and perpetuat ing dominant 
capitalist forms of discourse has been an emphasis on 
history. 
The number of references to critical studies in the table is a 
measure of the impetus that critical accounting research has 
given to accounting history in recent years. 
Finally, Table 1 shows that the debate over research aims 
has moved from looking at what we do and why we do it, to 
what we ought to be doing. Accounting historiography has be-
come more schematic in the process. The early articles cited in 
the table followed in the wake of the American Accounting 
Association's (AAA) [1970] report on accounting history by de-
fining the scope and utility of the discipline. Goldberg [1974] 
developed the AAA Committee's arguments concerning the ben-
efits to be derived from accounting history [pp. 406-408] and 
suggested the interrelationship between accounting practice 
and thought as a worthwhile field of study [pp. 409-410]. 
Johnson [1975, p. 444] supported the AAA's contention that 
accounting history would lead to a better understanding of eco-
nomic history, focusing on the contribution that accountants 
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could make by studying the development of organizational 
methods in large corporations. By 1977, however, Baladouni 
[1977, pp. 59-67] was developing more sophisticated cultural, 
technological, and social frameworks, which he hoped would 
provide a "methodological backbone" to facilitate empirical and 
theoretical research in accounting history. The range of classifi-
cations in the table shows that from then on methodological 
issues have assumed a greater significance as the hi therto 
dominant "rule of economics" [Funnell, 1996, p. 39] has come 
under increasing challenge from social theorists. The econo-
mists have responded by defending their position. By question-
ing the nature of accounting history under the stimulus of 
"critical" scholarship, there has been a tendency to theorize it, 
which has culminated in the paradigmization of cause and ef-
fect along fairly rigid lines of demarcation. 
Most of the authors cited in Table 1 are active historians at 
a field-level, and there is no reason to suppose that the field-
work of authors in general has not been affected either offen-
sively or defensively by these historiographical trends. Witness 
the call in Fleischman et al. [1996a, p. 332] for an eclecticism 
that has been backed by collaborative ventures or Tyson's 
[1998, p. 224] rebuttal of Foucauldian terminology. Proof, how-
ever, would entail reviewing all the accounting history studies 
now being published over a series of years. Anderson [1998] 
cited some 280 for 1995-1996 alone. It would be insufficient 
just to review the articles appearing in the mainstream account-
ing history journals, as these are now in a minority. Out of the 
total of 280, only about 60 were published in Accounting Histo-
rians Journal; Accounting, Business and Financial History; and 
Accounting History. Furthermore, to concentrate on a narrow 
band of articles would be especially futile if journal titles act as 
"Baudrillardian signs," possessing value and meaning in them-
selves [Cooper and Puxty, 1996, p. 292], and by implication, 
tend to attract articles of the same type. 
CAUSALITY 
Whitley [1988] examined the role of scientific models in 
accounting theory and drew a distinction between those derived 
from natural sciences and those based on the social, both of 
which he found present. The essence of a good, natural-scien-
tific theory is that it both accurately describes a large class of 
observations on the basis of a model containing only a few 
arbitrary elements, and that it makes definite predictions about 
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the results of future observations [Hawking, 1988, p. 9]. This 
type of model has been used by positivist accounting research-
ers to explain and predict the workings of financial markets, 
and has been extended into the behavioral field by "positive 
accounting theory" [Whitley, 1988, pp. 632-634]. Essentially 
economic-based, such studies derive from the same natural-
scientific root that underp inned the "normative apriorist" 
movement of the 1960s and early 1970s [Whitley, 1986, pp. 171-
172; Mouck, 1995, p. 64]. Social models, on the other hand, are 
more value-laden because of their need for descriptions and 
terms that have "positive or negative connotations, both in the 
scientists' own culture and in the one being analyzed," and are 
of more limited applicability because of variations in cultural 
norms [Whitley, 1988, pp. 637-638]. However, this difference 
has not prevented social researchers from sharing the natural 
scientist's aim of using events to establish causal relations that 
can be generalized [McClelland, 1975, p. 86; Fleischman et al., 
1996b, p. 63]. Haddock [1980, p. 150] described how "the claim 
that history should approximate a social science adhering 
closely to the methods of the natural sciences" first "attained 
the status of an orthodoxy" in the mid-19th century, and how it 
has continued to be "a central and contentious issue." Accord-
ing to Stone [1981], "the climatic years of the conversion of 
historians to an interest in the social sciences" were the late 
1960s [p. 15], although he warned of the "growing mood of 
skepticism abroad about the value to historians of much of the 
newest and most extreme social science methodology" [p. 43]. 
The increased theoretical bent of accounting history since the 
1980s grounds it firmly in that tradition. 
The focus of the social sc ien t i s t is on the p r e s e n t 
[Fleischman et al., 1996b, p. 63]. Knowledge of the past is not 
relevant for its own sake, but because it helps to illuminate the 
present and feeds into current issues. Such an opinion would 
be shared by many general historians [Evans, 1997, p. 61], but 
with accounting historians there is also the need to justify one-
self in the accounting discipline where historical perspectives 
do not have a mature tradition. Indeed, the need for validity 
could explain the current emphasis on theoretical studies, as 
the term "atheoretical" has tended to become derisory in ac-
counting history literature. Arguably, the postmodernist view 
that the past is essentially unknowable will never gain serious 
ground in accounting history, as this would render the disci-
pline redundant to accounting researchers. For the same rea-
son, historical studies which view the past as an object in itself 
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tend to be dismissed as "antiquarianism." Accounting practice 
is regarded as a dynamic process, devised in historical situa-
tions. A study of the practice in relation to the situations en-
ables one to question the manner in which the circumstances 
have changed and to assess the implications for modern prac-
tice [Whitley, 1988, p. 640; Edwards, 1989, p. 5]. Proponents of 
this view argue that we can learn from the past and see history 
as being capable of supporting contemporary research into 
policy making and standard setting, for example [Previts et al., 
1990, p . 3]. 
Some accounting historians go one step further and would 
like to be able to predict the future. Evans [1997, pp. 53-62] 
traced this idea back to the 1860s, but expressed severe misgiv-
ings about history's predictive ability. Not many accounting his-
torians have attempted to predict the future [Parker, 1981, p. 
284], but various statements of intent by journal editors have 
suggested it as a desirable goal. Flesher and Samson [1990, p . 
3] wrote that those studies which offered "the possibility for 
predicting or influencing future events" would be the ones that 
stood the best chances of publication. Whilst stopping short of 
advocating "predictions," Carnegie [1996, p. 5] did refer to the 
"considerable potential" that critical and interpretive research 
has for providing "insights into accounting's present and fu-
ture." The stated objectives of papers that are published in Ac-
counting, Business and Financial History include helping to pre-
dict poss ible future deve lopments . Are such p red ic t ions 
possible? Goldberg [1974, pp. 408-409] and Baxter [1981, p. 5] 
argued they are not. Other writers have sounded a cautionary 
note [Edwards, 1989, p. 6]. Perhaps the answer depends on 
whether one takes a typical historical or typical social-scientific 
perspective, the latter being the more deterministic of the two 
[Mills, 1993, p. 802; Fleischman et al., 1996b, p. 64]. Theoretical 
histories derive useful insights by making predictions about 
past relationships, and it will be interesting to see whether the 
current trend towards theoretical history results in more pre-
dictions of future ones. 
One of the main difficulties of causal theories of human 
behavior is that they do not acknowledge freewill or personality 
as a potential source of forecast error. This charge has been 
countered on the grounds that causal theories predict only the 
choices dictated by human dispositions rather than the result-
ant outcomes [McClelland, 1975, p. 71]. The distinction is a fine 
one, however, as such theories tend to assume a reduction in 
the number of acceptable choices, given similar dispositions 
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exposed to similar stimuli [McClelland, 1975, p. 86]. Thus, 
"counterfactual" analysis changes the stimuli to predict what 
would have happened if historical circumstances had been dif-
ferent [McCloskey, 1987, p. 16]. Accident is another source of 
forecast error not recognized by historical predictions. Evans 
[1997, pp. 129-138] identified accident as a key factor in "the 
study of causes." Wars provide many examples where accident 
and personality have rendered the course of events unpredict-
able. For instance, the Battle of Britain was lost by Germany as 
a result of the accidental bombing of civilians in London on 
August 23, 1940, which prompted retaliatory raids on Berlin, 
and diverted the war away from British airfields towards Brit-
ish cities [Shirer, 1964, pp. 931-934]. Accounting itself is not 
immune from these unpredictable catalysts, witness the lasting 
impact of Nazi economic planning on French financial report-
ing [Standish, 1990, p. 350]. Walton [1995, p. 8] commented on 
the important part that wars have played in generating account-
ing change, and Nobes and Parker [1995, pp. 19-20] listed acci-
dent as one of seven key determinants of the nature of account-
ing in any particular country. What would have been the effects 
on future accounting practice had the Battle of Britain resulted 
in the German occupation of Great Britain? What shape would 
accounting have taken had not the Moslem advance into west-
ern Europe been halted at Tours in 732, given the importance 
of both Frankish rulers and the Roman Christian Church to its 
subsequent development [Oldroyd, 1997, pp. 18-22]? What ef-
fect did the unexpected collapse of Polly Peck International plc 
have on the regulation of U.K. financial reporting in the 1990s? 
Arguably, it led to more restrictive practice by U.K. standard 
setters in an attempt to restore confidence in the accounting 
profession [Oldroyd, 1994, p. 37]. What has been the influence 
of particular individuals on the development of a new profes-
sion/theoretical discipline? The current interest in biographical 
studies in accounting history literature suggests that it has been 
great. The "crucial discontinuity" in Hoskin and Macve's [1988, 
p. 46] Foucauldian thesis concerning the development of mod-
ern "managerialism" in the U.S. depended on the meticulous 
nature of Sylvanus Thayer. 
Accident and personality impact primarily on events rather 
than systems. Accounting has been described as a social system 
[Lee, 1990, p. 75]. Such a view underplays the significance of 
particular happenings. Eventually one ends up at the same 
place through deterministic forces which govern the interaction 
of humani ty with itself and the environment. Hoskin and 
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Macve [1988, p. 66] spoke of the demise of the "memorable 
man" under the welling-up of disciplinary knowledge within 
society. However, any systematic view of the world of account-
ing must take inertia into account. Lee [1990, p. 97] described 
inertia as "the self-referential and recursive nature of account-
ing," an important characteristic that can be overcome by 
events which are not always susceptible to prediction. Account-
ing inertia is both the reluctance to adopt new practices and 
ideas and the corresponding hesitancy to discard old ones. The 
inclination to follow what has been done before imbues past 
practice with its own momentum. Fligstein [1990, p. 9] ob-
served the same phenomenon in relation to business organiza-
tions. He found that organizations tend not to change until they 
are faced with a crisis. Arguably, inertia in accounting has in-
creased as accounting has become embedded in the institu-
tional, legal, and regulatory framework. Examples of inertia 
might include the delay in the adoption of double-entry book-
keeping in industrial accounting or the persistence of Victorian 
corporate style reporting to shareholders. Accounting legisla-
tion drafted by the European Community has displayed a ten-
dency to adapt old rules. The same has been apparent in East-
ern Europe following the demise of the U.S.S.R [Walton, 1995, 
p. 3]. In short, there are many models that are possible to ex-
plain accounting activities beyond those that have been articu-
lated already. By focusing on the resistors/catalysts of change, 
inertia could provide as complete a model as any other except 
that predictions would be tenable only in the indeterminate 
short-term where the level of forecast error is reduced. Ac-
counting history would assume a central importance as a cata-
lyst of change through its role in questioning the appropriate-
ness today of "time-honoured concepts and ideas" [Edwards, 
1989, p. 6]. 
POSITIONING 
Causal theories of accounting behavior suffer from the 
anthropic fallacy of historical reasoning, which uses the past to 
justify the historian's view of the present, thereby placing him/ 
her at the center of the historical universe. The anthropic prin-
ciple in physics states that we see the universe the way it is 
because if it were different, we would not be here to see it 
[Hawking, 1988, p . 183]. At one level, any theory of the universe 
must include the evidence of humanity's existence. At another, 
humanity is placed at the center of the universe because the 
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nature of the cosmos is contingent on our ability to witness it. 
There may be other universes or regions of the same universe 
obeying different laws, but if there are no observable conse-
quences, they can afford to be ignored [Hawking, 1988, p. 125]. 
From an historical perspective, our understanding of the past is 
contingent on our location in the present, and history is useful 
to us because it helps identify and explain who we are. The 
tendency to place ourselves at the center of history accounts for 
the disparate nature of the historical universe. Children are 
taught their own history at school. The recent debate over the 
es tabl ishment of a nat ional history cur r icu lum in Brit ish 
schools emphasized the keen interest of government that Brit-
ish children should learn the important "landmarks" in British 
history. Protestant schools in Northern Ireland learn British 
history and Catholic schools Irish. Ultimately, accounting his-
tory exists as a distinct region of the historical universe because 
of the existence of the accounting profession. As Funnell [1996, 
p. 39] observed, the problem is that the academic community is 
uncertain whereabouts in the present accounting is located, at 
the heart of economic or social and political theory, and so the 
past is being used by accounting researchers to jostle for posi-
tion and to justify their own perceptions of where we stand 
(Figure 1). Accounting history is useful to researchers as a me-
dium for obtaining evidence to support particular worldviews. 
FIGURE 1 
The Anthropic Fallacy 
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If history in general is prone to the fallacy of taking one's 
present position back into the past in order to find material to 
justify it, the flaw is accentuated in theoretical histories. This 
was observed by Merino and Mayper [1993, p. 245], who said 
that the danger of imposing current beliefs on the past "in-
creases exponentially when researchers use a theoretical frame-
work." The efficacy of causal theories depends on their ability 
to predict the results of future observations. The theoretical 
historian, therefore, comes to a problem having already pre-
dicted what the outcome will be (in this respect history be-
comes intrinsically uncritical) and looks for supporting evi-
dence. Bryer [1987, p. 3] unwittingly summarized this view. 
Reviewing a paper on what he described as "the final stages of 
the transition from feudalism to investor capital," he wrote: 
If we can agree this [that there is a fundamental differ-
ence between the feudal and capitalist modes of pro-
duction], then we have a conceptual and an historical 
basis for understanding the lords' 'ways of thinking', 
their 'aristocratic attitudes' (and platitudes), the over-
lap and contradiction of these notions of surplus in the 
aristocratic mind. 
Marxism shows us how to interpret historical evidence before 
we have started to look. There is no suggestion of deliberate 
deception or that theoretical historians ignore available data or 
data sources. But, given the incompleteness of the historical 
record, together with the difficulties in accurately interpreting 
historical data, it is often possible to find evidence to support 
whatever claim. Maximizing wealth, commodifying labor, and 
regularizing relationships within the organization are not, after 
all, incompatible. In reality, there may be several reasons for a 
particular action, or what applies in one situation may not be 
valid in another, or the weighting of factors may vary between 
situations. An alternative, nontheoretical view of the accounting 
universe is that it is composed of interlocking causal relation-
ships, which cannot necessarily be subsumed within unifying 
theories (Figure 2). 
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FIGURE 2 
Interlocking View of Causation 
The best that can be achieved in history is an hypothesis rather 
than a causal theory. The task of the historian is to select the 
hypothesis which best fits the available evidence, given or con-
structed, neutral or biased [Hammond and Sikka, 1996, p. 79], 
while recognizing its intrinsic limitations together with his/her 
own. 
CONCLUSION 
The article has reviewed recent developments in accounting 
historiography in relation to the underlying positioning of the 
participants. Accounting history has become more schematic 
under the impetus of "critical" studies. It has located itself 
within the tradition of social science, which subsumes events 106
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 26 [1999], Iss. 1, Art. 15
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol26/iss1/15
98 Accounting Historians Journal, June 1999 
into generalizations and generalizations into theory. Causal 
theories are undermined by the unpredictable catalysts of acci-
dent and personality which impinge on accounting inertia. It 
follows that predictions can only be tenable in the indetermi-
nate short-term where the level of forecast error is reduced. 
Furthermore, causal theories surfer from the anthropic fallacy 
of historical reasoning, which uses the past to justify the 
historian's view of the present, thereby placing him/her at the 
center of the historical universe. The difficulty with accounting 
is that it is uncertain whether it is located at the center of 
economic or social and political theory, and so accounting 
theorists are using the past to jostle for position. An alternative, 
nontheoretical view has been proposed in which it is accepted 
that the best that can be achieved in history are hypotheses 
whose intrinsic limitations are recognized. 
Are there any implications for future research? First, theo-
retical history is fine and can yield useful insights, providing its 
limitations are recognized. Essentially, the article is a plea for 
more modest claims to be made on behalf of theoretical history. 
History is a multicellular creature, and the essence of historical 
inquiry lies is recognizing there are other points of view. It is 
not suggested that all views "are equally valid," or that it is 
impossible to resolve differences through "diligent search of the 
available evidence" [Fleischman and Parker, 1997, p. 218]. But 
uncertainty will remain. Second, the limitations of causal theo-
ries reinforce the need for more empirical studies to get as close 
as possible to the individual circumstances in which accounts 
were produced, the uses to which they were put, and the full 
range of participants involved. Despite the increased risks of 
belief transference, many theoretical historians use archival 
data to test their predictions. There are also those archivists, 
however, who through attempting "to stand apart from the 
paradigmatic debates" are in danger of becoming marginalized 
[Fleischman and Tyson, 1997, p. 102], and it is their work par-
ticularly that the article supports. Finally, using the past to 
cross-reference our position in the present fulfills a psychologi-
cal need, which explains why all societies produce histories, 
either in written form or oral tradition. The great science fic-
tion writer, Isaac Asimov [1986, p. 59] wrote: 
There never can be a man so lost as one who is lost in 
the vast and intricate corridors of his own lonely mind. 
. . . There never was a man so helpless as one who 
cannot remember. 
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The relevance of accounting history goes deeper than the utili-
tarian view which measures it in terms of in-feeds to modern 
practice. If this were all there is, the past would become less 
useful to us the further it were removed from the present, and 
one could agree with Stevelinck [1985, p. 1] that "there is little 
of interest to the present-day accountant in the study of primi-
tive and obsolete accounting practices" of the ancient world. 
However, this view runs contrary to the historical imperative of 
going as far back in time as possible in the search for roots. 
Witness the genealogies of King David in the Bible going back 
to Adam and Eve or the genealogies of Anglo-Saxon kings going 
back to the Norse gods. Accounting history helps us to know 
who we are, where we came from, and how we got here 
[Baladouni, 1977, p. 54]. One should be careful in dismissing 
any historical study as antiquarianism. Furthermore, if, as this 
need for identity suggests, the raison d'être of accounting his-
tory is the existence of accountants, its future existence as an 
academic discipline ultimately depends on the future success of 
the accounting profession. If the profession were to decline, 
accounting historians would be returned to other types of histo-
rians, those who would remain interested in history, but only in 
so far as it impacted on their own place in the historical uni-
verse and their own fields of vision. 
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Abstract: A consumption-based tax system has attracted a variety of 
supporters, including proponents of tax simplification and policy 
makers in search of more or alternative revenue sources. Such a 
system could involve the use of a value-added tax (VAT) or a sales 
tax. Policy makers and legislators should consider the history of the 
background of the VAT. A cursory review of the development of 
sales taxes is presented as a background for the problems that might 
be encountered in adopting the VAT. This review of the historical 
development shows that there are numerous and complex issues 
requiring careful study. 
INTRODUCTION 
When thousands of hard pressed taxpayers and others 
have reached the stage of desperation, when they are 
willing to try anything — any patent medicine or pana-
cea — then they are in a mood which makes them easy 
victims not only of their own self deceptions but also of 
the alluring promises of others always anxious to find 
opportunities to shove their tax burdens off their own 
shoulders regardless of where they fall. In such times 
the majority of the people are not inclined to weigh 
alternatives carefully and may accept very questionable 
measures [Blakey, 1935, p. 70]. 
Legislators and policy makers are considering a number of 
alternative tax system proposals, including a flat-rate income 
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tax, a national sales tax, a value-added tax (VAT), and other 
consumption-based systems. A consumption-based tax system 
has attracted a variety of supporters, including proponents of 
tax simplification and policy makers in search of more or alter-
native revenue sources [Anderson, 1994, p. 77]. Such a system 
could involve the use of a VAT or a sales tax. Blakey issued the 
above warning in 1935, alarmed over the rapid spread of sales 
taxes in the U.S. He would surely have cautioned us to study 
past experiences when considering alternatives. 
Policy makers and legislators should consider the history of 
consumption taxes. The primary focus of this paper is on the 
background of the VAT. A cursory review of the development of 
sales taxes in the U.S. is presented as background for the prob-
lems that might be encountered in adopting a VAT. No other 
study could be found that examined the history and past experi-
ences with VAT and sales taxes in the U.S. and other countries. 
This analysis is particularly important in light of the sweeping 
tax reforms that are being discussed in Congress. The question 
addressed in this paper is, what can be learned from the Euro-
pean and American experiences with consumption taxes? Spe-
cifically, what events trigger the passage of a consumption tax? 
VAT DEFINED 
Trebby [1990, p. 8] defined a VAT as "a tax on the value 
added by a firm during the production and distribution process 
to the goods and services that it purchases from other firms." 
Aaron [1981, p. 2] defined "value added" as "the difference be-
tween the value of a firm's sales and the value of the purchased 
material inputs used in producing goods sold." He continued by 
stating that value added is the sum of a firm's wages and sala-
ries, interest payments, and before-tax profits. 
A comparison of a VAT and a retail sales tax reveals that 
"the VAT is a multistage tax; the retail sales tax is a single-stage 
tax" [Price and Porcano, 1992, p. 45]. Table 1 provides a com-
parison of a VAT and a retail sales tax using hypothetical data 
relating to the production and sale of an oak basket. 
Assume a tree farmer cuts down an oak tree (at no cost to 
the farmer). He sells enough of the wood to make one oak 
basket to a sawmill owner for $8.00. The sawmill owner cuts 
the wood into oak strips and sells them to a basket weaver for 
$12.00. The basket weaver weaves the strips into a basket and 
sells it to a craft-shop owner for $20.00. The craft-shop owner 
sells the oak basket to a customer for $30.00. 
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TABLE 1 
































The total VAT paid is $1.50 or 5% of the sum of the values 
added at each stage. Note that the VAT generates the same 
amount of tax revenue as a retail sales tax of equal percentage. 
The major difference is that the VAT is assessed at the various 
intermediate stages of production whereas the retail sales tax is 
assessed only at the point of sale to the final consumer. 
BACKGROUND OF THE PROBLEM 
Many states face budget deficits and financial problems 
[Barney et al., 1992, p. 61]. Factors contributing to these crises 
include the obsolescence of state tax structures [Bucks, 1992, p. 
557], the instability of tax revenues [Gold, 1991, p. 277], and 
the inability of state revenue growth to keep pace with the 
growth of the general economy [Kirchheimer, 1992, p. 79]. 
States are also facing the possibility that the federal govern-
ment, in an attempt to reduce the federal budget deficit, will 
shift responsibility for many social services to state govern-
ments. 
Policy makers are considering alternatives for fundamental 
state tax reform. A national task force composed of several state 
government organizations examined various reform options. 
The organizations represented on the task force include the 
National Governors' Association, the Multistate Tax Commis-
sion, the Federation of Tax Administrators, and the National 
Association of State Budget Officers. Task-force members view 
the VAT as a viable option for restructuring state tax systems 
[Hoerner, 1992, p. 698]. Bucks [1992, pp. 557, 560-561] sug-
gested that the obsolete elements of state tax systems relate to 
economic activity flowing across state lines. He proposed a 
common system of taxation of interstate and international com-
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merce — a National Enterprise Tax. One basis for this common 
system of taxation is the VAT. 
Some states have conducted studies of their own tax struc-
ture and looked at the VAT as an option for tax reform. The 
KPMG Peat Marwick Policy Economics Group [1992, pp. 527-
530], conducting a study of the New Hampshire state and local 
revenue structure, concluded that the VAT was an effective tax 
reform strategy for both the short-run and long-run problems 
of that state. According to the Texas Deputy Controller of Pub-
lic Accounts, efforts to balance the state's budget over the next 
decade will possibly include a new tax source such as the VAT 
[Hubbard, 1992, p. 645]. The Florida Taxation and Budget Re-
form Commission commissioned a study in which the Price 
Waterhouse Business Tax Model simulated two options, one of 
which replaced the corporate income tax with a VAT.1 
Advocates of tax reform and simplification are promoting 
new tax structures. They note that the present tax structure is 
too complex, is inefficient, imposes a heavy compliance burden, 
and does not encourage savings [Nellen, 1995, p. 44]. Four ma-
jor reform proposals recently suggested are the VAT, a national 
retail sales tax, a flat tax, and the USA Tax Act of 1995. The VAT 
is supported by House Ways and Means Chairman Bill Archer 
of Texas as a means to encourage savings by taxing consump-
tion. The national retail sales tax is proposed by Senator Rich-
ard Lugar of Indiana. Bills calling for a flat tax, generally a 
system with a single tax rate, have been introduced by Senator 
Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania and House Majority Leader Dick 
Armey of Texas. The USA Tax Act of 1995, introduced by Sena-
tors Sam Nunn of Georgia, Pete Domenici of New Mexico, and 
Bob Kerrey of Nebraska, replaces the current income tax with 
an individual income tax that allows a deduction for net new 
savings and adds the VAT as a business tax [Willens and 
Phillips, 1995, pp. 39-41]. While not supporting any of the cur-
rent tax reform proposals, a recent report of the National Com-
mission on Economic Growth and Tax Reform, chaired by Re-
publican Jack Kemp, pointed out faults of the current tax 
structure and called for a single tax rate with many deductions 
[AICPA, 1996, p, 27]. In addition to these proposals for tax 
reform, the National Commission on Restructuring the Internal 
1
 The other option made two additions to the existing corporate tax struc-
ture. It added a minimum tax based on the size of the business and also 
provided for subchapter S treatment for qualifying corporations [see Price 
Waterhouse, 1991, pp. 273-274]. 
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Revenue Service (IRS) has published a study calling for signifi-
cant changes in the way the IRS is structured and governed 
[AICPA, 1997a, p. 21]. 
State governments are looking for a tax structure that will 
enable their tax revenues to keep pace with economic growth. 
Most states have balanced-budget constraints that increase the 
importance of volatility of tax revenues as a consideration in 
restructuring state tax systems. Policy makers are considering 
the VAT as a viable option. A review of the literature reveals a 
thorough examination of many issues related to the VAT. One 
area of interest not widely addressed in the literature is the 
historical development of the VAT and the debate over a na-
tional sales tax. 
VAT BACKGROUND 
Popularity of the VAT: Tait [1988, p. 3] called the rise of the VAT 
an unparalleled fiscal phenomenon. In describing how the VAT 
has swept the world, he used the simile, "VAT may be thought 
of as the Mata Hari of the tax world — many are tempted, many 
succumb, some tremble on the brink, while others leave only to 
return, eventually the attraction appears irresistible." The VAT 
is no longer a tax associated only with European countries; it 
has spread to every continent [Tait, 1988, p. 3; Trebby, 1990, 
pp. 6-18]. Each year brings new adopters. Canada has imple-
mented a Goods and Services Tax (GST) which is a VAT similar 
to that used in most European countries [Payne, 1991, pp. 25-
26]. 
The VAT is truly an international phenomenon. The VAT 
is the standard form of sales tax throughout most of the world. 
Nineteen of the 23 countries comprising the Organization for 
E c o n o m i c Coord ina t ion and Deve lopment (OECD) have 
adopted some type of VAT. Japan (in 1989) and Canada (in 
1990) were the latest OECD countries to jump on the band-
wagon. The VAT is also used in most Latin American countries, 
several southeast Asian countries, Korea, many African coun-
tries, the Caribbean, and New Zealand. It is a revenue generator 
for governments worldwide [Due, 1990, p. 383, 1991, p. 269; 
Price and Porcano, 1992, p. 45]. 
The attractiveness of the VAT has not gone unnoticed in 
the U.S. It has attracted considerable attention at the national 
level. Chambliss [1989, p. 24] wrote: "Next to nuclear disarma-
ment, no topic has taken up more seminar time at Washington 
think tanks and policy boutiques than the VAT." 
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The VAT has also received much notice at the state level. 
State legislatures, facing severe budget deficits and financial 
problems, look to VAT as a potential new revenue source. Two 
states, Louisiana and Michigan, have adopted a form of VAT. 
Other states have considered adoption (Texas, Florida, and the 
Territory of Guam) [Reinstein et al., 1990, p. 589; Due, 1991, p. 
272;Ebel, 1991, p. 305]. 
Judicial, Legislative, and Political Considerations: In Trinova 
Corporation v. Michigan Department of Treasury [1991], the 
U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the states have the authority to 
adopt a VAT and that such a tax does not interfere with inter-
state commerce. This decision held that a VAT imposed on a 
taxpayer doing business within and without the State of Michi-
gan did not violate either the due process clause or the com-
merce clause of the U.S. Constitution [1991, p. 836]. In discus-
sing the ramifications of this decision, Weindruch and Repp 
[1991, p. 22] concluded that "more states may be willing to 
adopt a form of a VAT in lieu of a corporate income tax as a 
means of generating a greater and more stable source of rev-
enues." 
The adoption of a national VAT is viewed as an intrusion 
into an area of taxation historically reserved for the states. The 
General Accounting Office (GAO) [1989, p. 45] reported that 45 
states have a broad-based consumption tax that generates a 
significant portion of their total tax revenues. State government 
officials fear that the adoption of a national VAT would make it 
difficult to increase state sales tax revenues. They also fear that 
a federal VAT would increase the pressure on states to conform 
with the federal tax base. Brown [1991, p. 6] pointed out that 
state government officials oppose a federal VAT because it 
could inhibit or interfere with state use of this tax base in the 
future. Bucks [1992, p. 561] proposed that the states jointly 
establish a common system of taxation using the VAT to safe-
guard state powers by slowing or blocking federal entry into 
consumption-based taxes. 
The VAT Compared to the Sales Tax: Pechman [1987, pp. 204, 
206] compared the VAT to the retail sales tax. While pointing 
out that the two taxes are similar on both economic and equity 
grounds, he concluded that the retail sales tax presents fewer 
administrative problems because it involves fewer taxpayers 
and less complicated calculations to determine tax liability. Al-
though the administrative costs of the VAT are much higher 
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than those of the retail sales tax, any efficiency advantages of 
the retail sales tax may be offset by resulting inequities. The 
administrative burden of collecting, accounting for, and remit-
ting the sales tax rests on a small segment of society — the 
retail sellers. While the VAT is similar to the retail sales tax, it is 
collected differently, applies more broadly, and may provide 
rebates to consumers not residing in the taxing district [Utz, 
1993, pp. 142, 144]. 
From an economic theory viewpoint, the VAT is viewed as 
very similar to a retail sales tax. The VAT may be inferior to the 
retail sales tax on efficiency grounds because of its higher ad-
ministrative and compliance costs, but political considerations 
may favor the VAT because it is less visible to the ultimate 
consumer [Break, 1985, p. 154; Holcombe, 1988, pp. 214, 216-
217]. 
The primary differences between a sales tax and a VAT are 
the taxpayers (suppliers or demanders) and the timing of rev-
enue flows to the government [Holcombe, 1988, p. 214]. There 
are different collection points for the respective tax liabilities. 
The retail sales tax is collected by the retail seller on a destina-
tion basis while the tax liability is based on the retail selling 
price. The VAT is levied at each stage of production and distri-
bution. It is paid directly, rather than indirectly, by all firms 
involved in the production and distribution process and is col-
lected on a source basis [Brown, 1991, p. 3]. These consider-
ations suggest that the retail sales tax and the VAT could differ 
in terms of volatility because of differences in collection points 
and the timing of revenue flows to the government. 
SALES TAX HISTORY 
Origin of the Sales Tax: The origin of the sales tax is "shrouded 
in the dimness of ancient times and it or some variant has been 
present in certain forms in all or nearly all systems of public 
finance of which we have detailed knowledge" [Blakey, 1935, p. 
64]. Many of the ancient types were more like selective sales 
taxes or excise taxes than general sales taxes. There has been 
much confusion over the distinction between sales and excise 
taxes [Blakey, 1935, pp. 63-64, fn.. 3]. Sales taxes existed in 
ancient Egypt [Adams, 1982, p. 17]. The early Roman Republic 
assessed a sales tax on the sale of slaves at auction [Adams, 
1982, p. 57]. Caesar Augustus used the sales tax as a supple-
ment to an inheritance tax. In 40 A.D., Caligula abolished the 
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sales tax altogether with a flourish of trumpets [Adams, 1982, 
pp. 76-77]. 
The revival of the use of general sales taxes "is generally 
dated from the adoption of the war and post war emergency 
general turnover taxes of Germany (July, 1918) and France 
(June, 1920) and the manufacturers ' sales tax of Canada (May, 
1920)" [Blakey, 1935, p. 64]. Similar taxes have been considered 
by Congress, but a general sales tax has never been adopted at 
the national level in the U.S. Thirty or more foreign countries 
adopted sales taxes in the 1930s [Blakey, 1935, p. 64]. Sales 
taxes were "confined almost wholly to foreign countries until 
1930, one might almost say until 1933, but the cumulative pres-
sures of the [Great Depression] forced the acceptance of such 
taxes by numerous American commonwealths" [Blakey, 1935, 
p. 63]. 
Implementation of State Sales Taxes: The sales tax became the 
major revenue source for states in the 1930s [Pechman, 1987, p. 
259]. It continues to be one of the largest sources today as the 
general sales tax and the personal income tax each provide 
more than 30% of total state tax revenues [Gold, 1994, p. 703]. 
According to a recent report, general sales taxes generated 
$132.7 billion for the states in 1995, the individual income tax 
$126.3 billion, and all other taxes $142.5 billion [AICPA, 1997b, 
p. 23). In 1902, almost half of state revenue was derived from 
property taxes and the remainder from excise taxes [Pechman, 
1987, p. 259]. "The rapid development of general sales taxes is 
one of the most striking of post war [World War I] phenomena" 
[Blakey, 1935, p. 63]. The revival of the sales tax was almost 
completely confined to foreign countries until the depression of 
the 1930s forced its adoption by a number of states. During this 
time, many were hailing the sales tax as the savior of our public 
finances [Blakey, 1935, p. 63]. Opposition to the sales tax was 
countered with the claim that it was an emergency measure 
and, hence, only temporary. However, critics of the time were 
skeptical given past experiences with taxes. One opponent 
noted that efforts were underway to make the sales tax perma-
nent in states where it had been limited and to increase the 
rates in several states [Bloomfield, 1935, p. 593]. 
Blakey cited a number of reasons for the rapid spread of 
sales taxes but in general it was the inability to balance budgets 
[Blakey, 1935, p. 64]. He argued that there were better major 
sources of revenue than sales taxes for federal and state govern-
ments. However, if sales taxes were to be used, the Federal 119
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government could administer the system more uniformly and 
efficiently. Blakey [1935, p. 69] was amazed at how rapidly the 
sales tax movement was spreading to state and local govern-
ments. He asked these questions: 
Are we to believe that this tax is the panacea for our 
financial ills? Or if not panacea, is it the best available 
fiscal measure to pull us through the present emer-
gency? Moreover, does it have features of permanent 
value for Federal, state or local purposes? In particular 
what have been the experiences of those governments 
which have adopted the sales tax? 
These are the same questions policy makers and the public 
should be considering in the current debates. 
Discussions about National Sales Tax: Just as state governments 
were looking to the sales tax as the remedy for balancing bud-
gets, the Hoover administration and Treasury Secretary Ogden 
Mills proposed in 1932 a national sales tax, euphemistically 
called a manufacturers ' excise tax. This proposal encountered 
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opposition from Congress because of the tax's regressive na-
ture. Bipartisan opposition, as reflected in this 1933 cartoon, 
led to the defeat of the proposal [Kennon and Rogers, 1989, p. 
265]. 
Again in 1942, Treasury Secretary Morgenthau proposed a 
sales tax to the Senate Finance Committee, but it was flatly 
rejected. Several groups testified before the House Ways and 
Means Committee in support of a national sales tax, including 
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. The Committee was flooded 
with postcards from consumers in opposition. Although some 
Republicans favored the sales tax, it was not included in the 
Committee bill [Kennon and Rogers, 1989, pp. 301-302]. A na-
tional sales tax was thought to be a way to meet the high costs 
of World War II as Uncle Sam points out to the Ways and 
Means chairman in the following cartoon [Kennon and Rogers, 
1989, p. 299]. A 5% "Victory Tax" on income over $624 was 
apparently seen as more palatable. 
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Curiously, business and labor groups have not shown a 
consistent or uniform position toward sales taxes. Supporters 
hoped to shift tax burdens from property, incomes, inherit-
ances, or business. Public employees saw the tax as a way to 
protect their jobs. Major opposition came from associations of 
retail merchants, who were sometimes joined by wholesalers 
and manufacturers, labor, and agricultural organizations. How-
ever, this opposition was often disjointed. Several agricultural 
groups testified against a national sales tax in 1932 but advo-
cated state sales taxes in hopes of decreasing or eliminating real 
estate taxes [Blakey, 1935, p. 65]. 
Again in 1951, when Congress was desperately looking for 
revenues to counter an anticipated deficit and increased de-
fense spending, the Ways and Means Committee rejected a pro-
posal for a sales tax. Some form of sales tax had been advocated 
by business groups as an alternative to increased corporate 
taxes [Kennon and Rogers, 1989, pp. 310-311]. 
One of the four major tax reform proposals currently being 
considered is a national retail sales tax. Senator Lugar proposes 
a 17% national sales tax on the retail price of taxable goods and 
services [Willens and Phillips, 1995, p. 40]. 
A study by the AICPA pointed out that state governments 
using a retail sales tax exempt many types of goods and serv-
ices. These exemptions include necessities, such as food, cloth-
ing, and housing; certain types of services, such as financial 
services and governmental services; and goods and services pro-
vided by charities. They increase administrative burdens, esca-
late compliance costs, and impede economic efficiency. Retail 
businesses must decide which items are exempt and then dis-
tinguish taxable from nontaxable sales. In addition, most states 
provide preferential treatment in the form of tax relief for cer-
tain sectors. This complexity results from political consider-
ations. The AICPA study concluded that "there is nothing in the 
history of the Federal tax legislative process to suggest that a 
Federal consumption tax would be untainted by special interest 
provisions" [Sullivan, 1995, p. 13] 
VAT HISTORY 
Origin of the VAT: Concerning the origin of the VAT, Lindholm 
[1980, p. 24] wrote, "the roots of the value-added tax are em-
bedded in U.S. economic theory and data." The U.S. has im-
ported most of its taxes. For example, the income tax was im-
ported from England, the inheritance tax from France, the sales 
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tax from Spain and Holland, and the property tax from China 
and Europe. However, if adopted in the U.S., the VAT would 
not be an imported tax [Lindholm, 1984, pp. 119-120]. The idea 
goes back to the 1920s when gross national product (GNP) data 
was first gathered. U.S. economists proposed the VAT out of a 
desire for a neutral tax that would generate substantial rev-
enues without seriously distorting the resource allocation func-
tion of the free market system. The VAT is conceptually a tax on 
GNP, the market value of all final products produced in the 
economy. When U.S. economists provided the statistics making 
it possible to calculate GNP and measure current production 
activity, the VAT became the next logical step [Lindholm, 1980, 
p. 25]. 
Crum [1982, pp. 25-42] agreed that the VAT did conceptu-
ally and theoretically originate in the U.S. He contended, how-
ever, that the VAT emerged much earlier than the 1920s and 
provided evidence to support his contention. He argued that the 
individual elements of the VAT are traceable to colonial times. 
The most active research and discussion on the VAT oc-
curred in the U.S. and, to a lesser degree, in Germany. T.S. 
Adams, the father of the 1913 income tax legislation, created 
the early climate favorable to the reception of the VAT. His 
writings provided strong support for the VAT as the best ap-
proach to the taxation of businesses [Lindholm, 1980; Crum, 
1984, p. 5]. Adams described the VAT as the most appropriate 
tax on business activity and advocated its adoption in 1922 
[Trebby, 1990, p. 7]. 
Adams was not alone in creating a favorable climate for the 
VAT. In 1934, Gerhard Colm, a leading U.S. government tax 
expert, published an article in Social Research explaining and 
recommending the VAT. He also cited the works of Paul 
Studensky, a U.S. tax researcher, as providing an ethical and 
philosophical foundation for the VAT. This favorable reception 
led to the introduction of Senate Bill 3560 on March 11, 1940 
by Senator C. Joseph O'Mahoney of Wyoming. This legislative 
proposal, although unsuccessful, called for the enactment of a 
VAT by the federal government [Lindholm, 1984, p. 121]. 
History of VAT in Europe: Although the U.S. and Germany were 
most active in researching and discussing the VAT as a national 
tax, France was the first country to adopt and implement it 
[Lindholm, 1984, p. 121]. While Japan passed legislation in 
1950 to establish a national VAT, the legislation was repealed 
before it became effective [Crum, 1984, p. 5]. France officially 
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adopted the VAT on April 10, 1954 to allocate a part of the 
business sector's productivity to the public sector [Lindholm, 
1980, p. 25]. However, the tax was not truly a VAT because it 
extended only through the wholesale level. Denmark adopted 
Europe's first true general VAT in July 1967 [McLure, 1972, p . 
60]. 
The VAT then began to sweep throughout the continent. 
The rapid adoption of the VAT by European countries was an 
important factor in the economic integration process of West-
ern Europe. This process began with the establishment of the 
European Economic Community (EC) following the Treaty of 
Rome in March 1957. The abolition of all customs duties and 
quotas in trade between EC members was an important step 
toward a common market. However, the most essential step 
was the development of a common system of taxes to replace 
the various taxes utilized by EC members. The various taxes 
were the source of distortion in competitive economic condi-
tions among the member countries [Schiff, 1973, p. 5]. 
The Commission of the EC established the Fiscal and Fi-
nancial Committee (FFC), chaired by Professor Fritz Neumark. 
The FFC, in the Neumark Report, recommended that all EC 
members replace their various taxes with a VAT that was identi-
cal in structure, rates, exemptions, and other details to every 
degree possible [Schiff, 1973, pp. 5-6]. 
All members of the EC agreed with the recommendation. 
January 1, 1970 was established as the target date for VAT 
adoption by all members of the EC [Crum, 1984, p. 5]. Table 2 
reports the VAT adoption date by selected European countries. 
Some member countries adopted the tax before the target date. 
The final column in Table 2 is the 1996 standard VAT rate. Note 
that all countries have increased their rates, some substantially. 
The provision in the Neumark Report calling for uniform 
tax rates was considered an infringement of national sover-
eignty, and the establishment of the tax rates was therefore left 
to the individual countries. This resulted in varying rate struc-
tures among them both at the point of adoption and subse-
quently [Schiff, 1973, pp. 6-7]. 
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TABLE 2 
VAT Rates and Dates of Adoption 






































Sources: Tait, 1988, p. 40 and Ernst & Young 
http://www.taxcast.com, 1996. 
As to why the FFC in its Neumark Report recommended 
the VAT as the common tax system, Tait [1974, p. 6] concluded 
that "it evolved through successive attempts to reduce the ineq-
uities of the cascade turnover tax which was the sales tax com-
monly used by the countries now forming the EEC." A "cascade 
tax," like the VAT, is a consumption-based tax. It is levied when 
a sale is made, but it does not allow any deduction or credit for 
taxes previously paid. Its effect is cumulative and provides ad-
vantages to large integrated business enterprises [Economist, 
1968, p. 58]. 
While many European countries did have substantial cas-
cade taxes prior to the adoption of the VAT and while most of 
the significant problems and defects with the cascade taxes 
were in fact overcome with the new VAT, it is possible that the 
decision to adopt the VAT was not reached primarily on the 
basis that it would pose fewer problems than the unsatisfactory 
cascade tax. Another contention is that the decision to adopt 
the VAT in Europe was made because of the its universality and 
general uniformity, its ability to raise substantial amounts of 
revenue, and its efficiency in terms of dealing with exports and 
imports [Cohen, 1971, pp. 399-400]. 
As the VAT swept across Europe, it became a fashionable 
European tax and accounted for an important share of total tax 
revenues [Tait, 1988, p. 24]. Table 3 provides information on 
the VAT's contributions to total tax revenues for selected Euro-
pean countries from 1970 to 1990. In five of the seven selected 125
et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 1999, Vol. 26, no. 1
Published by eGrove, 1999
Wells and Flesher: Consumption Taxes 117 
countries, VAT revenues, as a percentage of total tax revenues, 
remained constant or increased over the period. In France and 
Norway, however, VAT revenues fell as a percentage of total tax 
revenues. 
TABLE 3 
VAT as Percentage of Total Tax Revenue 
1970-1990 

















































Source: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
1996, p. 88. 
Member countries of the OECD were increasing the reli-
ance on direct taxes from 1965 to 1975 [Tait, 1988, p. 22] Direct 
taxes are assessed according to certain taxpayer characteristics. 
Taxes based on income levels (e.g., individual income, corpo-
rate income, and payroll taxes) are direct taxes. Indirect taxes 
are those taxes assessed according to the characteristics of 
transactions (e.g.; sales taxes, the VAT, and excise taxes) [Utz, 
1993, p. 31]. 
There was dissatisfaction with this trend of increasing reli-
ance on direct taxes. The VAT, an indirect tax, was proposed 
and adopted partially as a means of halting the increase in 
direct taxes. France and Norway were less successful in con-
taining the growth in direct taxes [Tait, 1988, p. 22]. In France, 
for example, social security taxes on employees and employers, 
as a percentage of total tax revenues, increased from 34.2%. to 
44.2%. Income taxes increased from 15.8% to 17.3%. In Nor-
way, social security taxes on employees and employers, as a 
percentage of total tax revenues, increased from 11.9% in 1969 
to 26.2% in 1990 [OECD, 1992, pp. 109, 135]. 
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History of VAT in the U.S. at the Federal Level: Following the 
recommendation of the Neumark Commission concerning the 
adoption of the VAT by the EC, interest in the tax again sur-
faced in the U.S. The Research and Policy Committee of the 
Committee for Economic Development, a nonprofit organiza-
tion of leaders in business and education, studied the VAT in 
1966. The committee proposed that the VAT replace the corpo-
rate income tax, but the proposal was shelved following much 
debate over tax incidence. There was general agreement that 
the burden of the VAT would fall on consumers, but the theo-
retical and empirical uncertainty as to the incidence of the cor-
porate income tax seriously hampered the debate [McLure, 
1984, p. 185]. 
In 1970, Pres ident Nixon suggested tha t the VAT be 
adopted to replace local property taxes used primarily to fi-
nance public education. He appointed a task force on business 
taxation to study the VAT [McLure, 1984, p. 186]. The task 
force members rejected the immediate adoption of the VAT by 
a vote of 13 to 2. However, they also voted that future revenue 
needs be met by adopting VAT rather than by increasing corpo-
rate and personal income taxes [Lindholm, 1984, p. 121]. Again, 
there was debate about tax incidence, but in this case, the de-
bate was over the incidence of the property tax. The proposal 
suffered in part due to the administration's diminishing interest 
in the VAT as the events of Watergate unfolded [McLure, 1984, 
pp. 185-186]. 
In 1973, the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental 
Relations studied the VAT and concluded that its disadvantages 
outweighed its advantages. In 1975, the AICPA issued a report 
on a study concerning the VAT. The report cited the necessity 
for increased tax revenues but recommended less reliance on 
traditional income and payroll taxes. To raise the additional 
revenues, the report called for the adoption of a national sales 
tax in lieu of a VAT [Trebby, 1990, p. 7]. 
In 1979, Representative Al Ullman, former chairman of the 
House Ways and Means Committee, introduced House Resolu-
tion 5665 calling for the adoption of a VAT with a tax rate of 
10% [Lindholm, 1984, p. 121]. Ullman supported the VAT as a 
means of reducing the federal deficit and as a way of eliminat-
ing the corporate income tax [Ullman, 1984, pp. 226-227]. Con-
gressman Ullman's defeat in the 1980 congressional elections 
could be interpreted as an indication of the VAT's lack of popu-
larity among the electorate [McLure, 1984, p. 186; Trebby, 
1990, p. 7]. 
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In 1988, Senator Hollings proposed a 5% VAT. The pro-
posal provided that half of the VAT revenues would be used to 
reduce the national debt. Food, housing, and health care were 
to be excluded from the tax base [Chiu and Siegel, 1989, p. 3]. 
In September 1989, the GAO issued a briefing report on VAT 
policy issues to the U.S. Congressional Joint Committee on 
Taxation. The report pointed out arguments in favor of and 
against VAT but contained no recommendations [GAO, 1989]. 
Interest continues in the VAT at the federal level. The VAT 
was suggested as a method of financing the health care reform 
proposals of the Clinton Administration. Although the VAT idea 
was temporarily abandoned, it has resurfaced as reform meas-
ures are being discussed in Congress. House Ways and Means 
Committee Chairman Archer supports the VAT as a means of 
encouraging savings and investment [Willens and Phillips, 
1995, p. 39]. A VAT could also generate significant revenues to 
reduce the budget deficit [Norton, 1993, p. 77]. A recent study 
issued by the AICPA reviewed a number of current proposals 
regarding flat taxes and consumption taxes, providing informa-
tion about how each of the different approaches operates 
[Sullivan, 1995, pp. 1-10]. 
History of VAT in the U. S. at the State Level: There has also been 
cons iderab le in teres t in the VAT at the s ta te level. The 
Brookings Institution recommended the adoption of the VAT in 
Alabama in 1932 and in Iowa in 1933. Although neither state 
adopted it, interest continued at the state level [Lindholm, 
1980]. Hawaii used a VAT-type business excise tax in the 1930s 
[Ebel, 1991, p. 305]. 
In 1953, Michigan became the first state to use the VAT 
when it adopted the business activities tax (BAT), a "subtrac-
tion" type VAT. The value of each business enterprise's contri-
bution to the total output of economic goods and services was 
the conceptual base for the tax [Papke, 1960, pp. 350-351]. The 
BAT was levied on the business enterprise's adjusted gross re-
ceipts in excess of $12,500. The tax rate was 0.775%. For a 
"subtraction type" VAT, the base for taxation is calculated by 
subtracting the amounts paid to suppliers from gross receipts 
[Reinstein et al., 1990, pp. 589-590]. 
After seven years of experience, the BAT was deemed suc-
cessful from an administrative viewpoint and as a revenue pro-
vider. However, the tax was viewed as unnecessarily limited in 
scope and somewhat inequitable due to its various exemption 
provisions. It was also argued that the $12,500 exemption did 128
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not provide adequate relief for small business and resulted in 
an unfair burden on that sector [Papke, 1960, p. 358]. 
The Michigan legislature repealed the BAT in 1967 and 
replaced it with a corporate income tax. The corporate income 
tax was replaced in 1975 with the single business tax (SBT), an 
"addition type" of VAT. The SBT was enacted to reduce fluctua-
tions in tax revenues and to provide a more stable basis for 
taxation [Reinstein et al., 1990, pp. 589 591]. 
Officials believe that Michigan's VAT is achieving its in-
tended purpose. David Kirvan of Michigan's Department of the 
Treasury reported that the VAT has been very successful in 
increasing revenue stability [Hanlon, 1993, p. 307]. Jay Wortley, 
senior economist with Michigan's Senate Fiscal Agency, agreed 
that the VAT was much more stable than the corporate income 
tax [Davenport, 1993, p. 310]. 
A legislative committee formed to conduct a comprehensive 
study of Michigan's VAT found that representatives of smaller 
businesses were opposed to it. The central complaint was that 
the VAT placed a heavy burden on labor-intensive businesses. 
This discouraged employment and disproportionally favored in-
vestments in capital. Other complaints centered around high 
compliance costs and complexity. Representatives from bank-
ing, automotive companies, and other larger businesses sup-
ported continuation of the VAT. They contended that the VAT is 
a stable source of revenue, adds stability to the tax structure, 
and is more equitable than the taxes it replaced [Nowak and 
Engerer, 1993, pp. 564-565]. The legislature, with support from 
business groups including large and smaller businesses, re-
sponded by lowering the rate to 2.3% and raising the filing 
threshold to $250,000 [Kleine and Cummings, 1994, p. 17]. 
In 1965, Louisiana incorporated a value-added tax element 
in its tax structure [Due, 1991, p. 272]. Manufacturers, whole-
salers, jobbers, suppliers, and brokers of tangible personal 
property receive advance payments of sales tax on sales to re-
tailers [Chiu and Siegel, 1989, p. 4]. The retailers then receive 
credit for the amount of the advance payment against the sales 
tax liability based on retail sales. Several states have adopted a 
value-added element in the tax structure for contractors [Due, 
1991, p. 272]. 
Other states have seriously considered the VAT. The West 
Virginia legislature adopted the VAT in 1970, but the governor 
vetoed the enacting legislation [Lindholm, 1980]. The governor 
of Nevada proposed a modified VAT as a business activity tax 
as part of his budget for the 1991-1993 biennium, but the legis-
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lature voted it down [Brown, 1991, p. 1]. The Texas State Con-
troller proposed a Texas Business Tax, similar to Michigan's 
SBT, which would repeal the state franchise tax and replace it 
with the VAT [Brown, 1991, p. 8]. The Constitutional Drafting 
Committee of the Florida Tax and Budget Reform Commission 
proposed a constitutional amendment to replace the corporate 
income tax and other taxes with a VAT [Townsend and 
Ferguson, 1992a, p. 461]. The governor of Florida prepared 
draft legislation to impose a VAT for tax years beginning after 
July 1, 1993 [Townsend and Ferguson, 1992b, p. 222], but the 
Florida legislature failed to enact the governor 's proposal 
[Townsend and Greene, 1993, p. 890]. 
Lessons from European Experiences with the VAT: A Brookings 
Institution study indicated that European countries have suc-
cessfully utilized different rates for different classes of goods 
and services and zero rating and exemptions to convert a tax 
that in its simplest form is regressive with respect to income 
into a tax that is slightly progressive [Aaron, 1981, pp. 7-9]. The 
study also indicated that the switch to the VAT was less costly 
for both business firms and tax agencies because most Euro-
pean countries had an existing sales tax and a collection struc-
ture already in place [Aaron, 1981, viii]. Since most states have 
an existing sales tax, the adoption of a national VAT could pig-
gyback the states' collection efforts and reduce collection costs 
than otherwise would be the case. Bannock's [1990] study of 
the administrative cost in Europe pointed out that smaller busi-
nesses will bear a relatively heavier burden than larger ones. 
Problem areas encountered by European countr ies in 
adopting a VAT included agricultural products, nonprofit or-
ganizations, sales of secondhand goods, and financial institu-
tions. Most European countries have either exempted these 
problem areas or have provided lower rates [Aaron, 1981, pp. 9-
12]. 
In looking at the question of increased public spending, the 
European experience was examined by a recent study presented 
at the 1996 North American Tax Policy Conference. This study 
indicated that the VAT did not become a money machine and 
that, while the overall tax burden increased somewhat from 
1970-1990 for the European countries, the increase was due to 
i n c r e a s e d c o r p o r a t e i n c o m e taxes a n d no t to the VAT 
[McGowan and Billings, 1996]. 
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SUMMARY 
State governments and the federal government are facing 
severe budget and fiscal problems. Policy makers examining 
alternatives for tax reform view the VAT as an attractive option 
for restructuring tax systems. 
Although the VAT conceptually originated in the U.S. 
where it was first proposed as a national tax, France and Den-
mark were the first countries actually to adopt and implement 
the VAT. 
A European commission recommended the adoption of the 
VAT by all EC members starting in 1970. Since that date, the 
VAT has spread across the European continent and is spreading 
all over the world. There are many lessons to be learned from 
the extensive European experience. Transition to a new tax sys-
tem is difficult. Exemptions and multiple rates are necessary to 
combat regressivity, but they complicate administration and 
compliance. VAT rates in Europe have all increased, some sub-
stantially. As usual, once a new tax is enacted, the rates will be 
increased over time. The political costs of increasing a con-
sumption tax, which can be passed on to others and is more 
hidden, are not very high. 
Following the commission's recommendation of the VAT 
for EC members, interest in the VAT was rekindled in the U.S. 
It was recently mentioned as a revenue source to finance the 
health-care proposal of the Clinton Administration or as a way 
to reduce the deficit. Congressman Archer of Texas proposed 
the VAT as a means of encouraging savings by taxing consump-
tion. 
Past experiences suggest that the best chance to pass a VAT 
tax at the national level is to replace or reduce an existing tax or 
to meet a temporary emergency. The public will have to be 
persuaded by these arguments. 
The federal income tax and the IRS are currently very un-
popular in the U.S. Politicians are focusing on this unpopular-
ity. Reported horror stories from irate taxpayers have generated 
considerable public debate and caught the politicians' atten-
tion. Restructuring of the IRS now has the support of the 
Clinton Administration. Several measures providing an IRS 
oversight board have been introduced in Congress. Perhaps the 
purpose of the IRS-bashing is to make it more politically expe-
dient to replace an unpopular income tax with a more hidden 
consumption tax. Blakey's warning should be heeded. 
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The background provided in this study could provide in-
sight into the problems that have occurred in the development 
of the VAT. Policy makers, having such knowledge when con-
sidering VAT as a possible revenue source, could make more 
informed decisions in comparing VAT with a sales tax. This 
review of the historical development shows that there are nu-
merous and complex issues requiring careful study. 
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USING DISTRIBUTION COSTS IN 
DECISION MAKING AT THE DENNISON 
MANUFACTURING COMPANY, 
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Abstract: Early in the 20th century, predating most academic and 
practitioner literature, Dennison Manufacturing's top management 
recognized that certain kinds of distribution costs, normally treated 
as part of general overhead and allocated based on prime costs, 
were highly relevant for product-costing and pricing decisions. They 
pulled as many identifiable direct costs of distribution as possible 
out of the general overhead pool and assigned them to the appropri-
ate product lines as extra information for the managers of those 
lines. However, these off-book assignments of costs were not fully 
understood and caused misunderstandings for many years. New ar-
chival evidence allows us to see the frustrations of managers who 
wanted to understand and use this information and how they at-
tempted to solve these problems. 
Dennison Manufacturing Company, now a subsidiary of 
Avery-Dennison, was founded in the mid-19th century. During 
the first half of the 20th century, the period of this study, 
Dennison manufactured a range of paper products including 
tags, boxes, holiday goods, crepe paper, and seals and labels. 
Dennison produced some five or six thousand items within 
those product lines, half of them special orders and half 
throughput, for a varied customer base. Vollmers [1993] dis-
cussed the company's treatment of distribution costs (both or-
der-filling and order-getting costs) based on published articles 
by Dennison's statistician, E.S. Freeman [1929, 1933]. The 
company's efforts within the area of distribution costing ap-
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peared to be on the cutting edge of this type of cost analysis. 
The subsequent discovery of materials from the company's 
archive relating to order-filling costs, dating from as early as 
1909, enriches that previous research and is the focus of this 
work. Order-getting costs, such as advertising and sales ex-
penses, were handled quite differently by the company because 
of their speculative nature and are therefore not considered in 
this paper. 
First called "supplementary" and later "secondary" costs by 
company managers, order-filling costs arose from the clerical, 
warehousing, filling, packing, shipping, and collection activities 
on customer orders — costs incurred both prior and subse-
quent to the manufacturing process. Some of these costs, man-
agers discovered, were material in size and could be directly 
traced or were reasonably allocable to commodity (product) 
lines. Accordingly, Dennison's statistical and accounting depart-
ments put an immense effort, in terms of personnel and time, 
into tracing, analyzing, and distributing these costs to achieve a 
better understanding of both how they were driven and to 
which commodities they were attributable. The purpose of this 
research is to describe the evolution of this work at Dennison 
and to highlight the problems the firm faced. The work begins 
with a brief description of the Dennison archive, followed by a 
literature review, the Dennison story, and a conclusion. 
THE DENNISON ARCHIVE 
The archive of Dennison Manufactur ing is located in 
Framingham, Massachusetts, in a storage room in the adminis-
tration building of the company. Where once the company em-
ployed professional historians to maintain and develop the 
company's archive, it has now sunk to quite a low state. The 
room is filthy, doubtlessly accelerating the deterioration of the 
delicate onionskin paper used for correspondence. The docu-
ments are probably only being preserved because nobody is 
interested enough to discard them. There is no general indexing 
system for the collection as a whole. Files, however, are in file 
cabinets; some are even organized alphabetically. The materials 
used in this study were found in manila file folders entitled 
"Secondary Costs," "Costs," "Costing Conference," and "Ac-
counting Committee Minutes." The contents of these files over-
lap considerably. The researcher cannot depend upon all refer-
ences to a desired topic being contained in any one folder. 
Other file drawers are dedicated to "Factory Cost Reports" or 
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"Treasurer's Reports," organized by date. There are no ledgers 
or journals. There are decades of correspondence, annual re-
ports of the company's governing committees, special studies 
(e.g., histories of products, a study of business cycles) coordi-
nated and/or collated by the historians, etc. For a detailed de-
scription of the archive, see Vollmers [1998]. Copies of the 
memos and reports used in this research are available from the 
author. 
Archival research is difficult, costly, time consuming, and 
subject to substantial biases. There is the bias of preservation 
(what was saved and why), the bias of choice (what was found 
and chosen by the researcher), and finally the bias of interpret-
ing history from one's own perspective. Is it possible to under-
stand the past? Is objectivity possible? The bias of subjectivity 
has been the subject of considerable debate in the academy. 
Some believe the data will speak for themselves. Others find 
this view hopelessly naive and argue that there is no possibility 
of recons t ruc t ing an objective his tory [see, for example , 
Fleischman et al., 1996]. Nevertheless, despite these problems, 
archival research is the only method available for approaching 
an understanding of how accounting was used, was integrated 
into the decision-making process, and was adapted to problems 
that surfaced in its environment. 
I believe, despite possibilities of error in evidence and error 
in interpretation, that the archival journey is filled with fascina-
tion and meaningful information. One finds perceptions of the 
world and areas of familiarity that differ from one's own. The 
researcher discovers surprising techniques and processes. Then 
one can ask why. Why did new techniques occur? Why did the 
methods change or disappear? Or what was it about a process 
that allowed it to survive? Even if one's interpretation is misin-
formed to some degree, it may be that the information found 
will shed light on the present. If, as this research shows, activ-
ity-based costing was being used, what conditions were present 
that led to its adoption? Why did it not spread to other firms? 
Will the activity-based systems now in use disappear as did 
those of this earlier period or have technological advancements 
solved some of the problems that earlier complex systems 
faced? Finally, of course, archival research can be fun. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Although Dennison Manufacturing's managers were surely 
not the first to turn their attention to distribution costs, their 
138
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 26 [1999], Iss. 1, Art. 15
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol26/iss1/15
130 Accounting Historians Journal, June 1999 
interest appears to have arisen spontaneously. If it were com-
mon or noteworthy for any company, practitioner, or academic 
to examine or discuss them, it was not reflected in contempo-
rary l i tera ture (1900-1920). Chatfield and Vangermeersch 
[1996, p. 210] reported that only two articles on distribution 
cost and selling expense appear in the Accountant's Index from 
1910-1919 and, indeed, that seems to be the case. If there are 
more articles on the topic, they are not indexed in such a way 
that they can be easily identified. One of the two, Frazer's 1912 
article in the Journal of Accountancy, not only appears to be 
unique, but the literature did not build on this topic until the 
1920s. Frazer [1912, p. 26] said that distribution costs are usu-
ally ignored, combined with other expenses, because they are 
indirect, "personal and psychological in their character and do 
not admit of standardization." Asserting that this t reatment was 
an error, he categorized distribution costs into the broad head-
ings of "cost of selling," the "cost of storing, packing and deliv-
ery," the "cost of collection," and "general indirect expense." He 
discussed various methods for allocating these costs to sales 
orders and the pros and cons of each. For example, the direct 
costs of a sales order, including the materials and labor in-
curred in packing and shipping, should be assigned to the or-
der, with other costs allocated using a rational method "indica-
tive of the expenditures in the department concerned" [Frazer, 
1912, p. 43]. Other literature from the period contains a fair 
number of articles on keeping sales records of various types 
(sales by salesmen, by territories, by customer, etc.) for analysis 
purposes, but product or other costing issues are not addressed 
[see, for example, Lewis, 1917]. The Accountant (British) com-
mitted but one article during the two decades to distribution 
costs, s tat ing tha t "few manufac turers have a t t empted to 
analyse selling costs on a scientific basis, and very few retailers 
know anything at all about their true expense of conducting 
business" [Allen, 1919, p. 58]. 
Henry Dennison, Dennison's long-time president, joined 
the Taylor Society in May 1917 and became its president in 
December 1919. Since the Accountant's Index did not include 
the Bulletin of the Taylor Society, would this journal be the 
source for contemporary thinking about distribution costs? It 
was not. The Society's Bulletin, first published in December 
1914, did not contain any discussions of product costs or allo-
cations of any kind, at least during its first decade. Members 
focused on various issues of efficiency but did not discuss how 
to measure it, apart from time-and-motion studies, or how cost 
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accounting could contribute to an understanding of this elusive 
concept. They may well have considered costing issues among 
themselves, but if so, such deliberations did not make their way 
into the Bulletin. 
In contrast to the silence of the previous two decades, dis-
tribution costing literature exploded in the 1920s and the 1930s. 
At least 30 related articles appear in the National Association of 
Cost Accountants Bulletin (NACA Bulletin), the journal of the 
National Association of Cost Accountants, founded in 1919. 
Also, beginning around 1925, virtually all cost textbooks came 
to include some coverage of the topic, ranging from a few pages 
to several chapters [Vollmers, 1993, 1997]. Much of this litera-
ture recommended analyzing these costs by customer, channel 
of distribution, or territory [see, for example, Van Sickle, 1938]. 
This seemingly sudden fascination with distribution costs 
arose for a variety of reasons. The severe recession of 1920-1921 
spurred a general impulse to identify and control costs. Secre-
tary of Commerce Herbert Hoover requested a study of waste, 
and the resulting Report on Waste in Industry, released by a 
committee of the Federated American Engineering Societies in 
1921, found, among many other things, a correlation between 
the large increases in distribution costs and increasing product 
variety. Hoover later directed the Domestic Commerce Division 
of the Chamber of Commerce to study distribution costs in 
various industries. Its series of census results, published in 
1929, 1933, and 1935, confirmed the linkage between product 
differentiation and a spiraling increase in distribution costs 
[Stewart et al., 1939]. Others also recognized that distribution 
costs were increasing rapidly relative to other company costs 
[Castenholz, 1930; Longman, 1941]. Nevertheless, despite the 
advice of government and the apparent response of practition-
ers contributing to the NACA Bulletin, there is little evidence 
that many companies attempted to tackle these rather slippery, 
illusive, but expensive costs. In fact, in the introductory notes to 
Freeman's [1929] article, the editors of the NACA Bulletin noted 
that, to their knowledge, very few efforts in the distribution 
area were forthcoming. 
An exception was Dennison Manufacturing. E.S. Freeman 
[1929, 1933], Dennison's chief statistician, reported in the 
NACA Bulletin that, by analyzing cost statistics the company 
had retained for years, causes of cost variation could be identi-
fied and used to determine more accurate costs and profits by 
product line. These efforts clearly presaged activity-based cost-
ing. The cost drivers, including weight of the product, number 
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of orders, and number of items in an order, were used to dis-
tribute variable order-filling costs to commodity lines. It is diffi-
cult to know whether these distributions actually entered the 
accounting records. Freeman's comments suggest true book al-
locations, but one cannot be sure. Earlier, as this research will 
show, the distr ibutions were definitely off-book and were 
meant to provide chairmen with additional information regard-
ing the costs of their product lines. The company's understand-
ing and use of these costs evolved over time. The effort was 
substantial, but the results were often unclear and misunder-
stood. 
We will see that it was Henry Dennison who maintained 
the momentum behind the company's interest in distribution 
costs. What brought his attention to this area so early? I believe 
the answer lies in his commitment to learning. He was a mem-
ber of and a contributor to many organizations, including the 
aforementioned Taylor Society, the American Economic Asso-
ciation, the Boston Chamber of Commerce, and the Association 
for Labor Legislation [Dennison, 1955]. In 1922, always inter-
ested in management methods, he formed the Manufacturers 
Research Association, a consortium of companies that contrib-
uted personnel and financial resources to maintain a research 
staff for studying and sharing information about management 
methods. He was also a trustee of the research organization, 
the Twentieth Century Fund, from 1926 until his death and was 
vice chairman of the International Management Institute of 
Geneva, Switzerland from 1927-1933. Henry Dennison's busi-
ness and political views, as well as the company's efforts in 
many areas, were frequently published and presented to inter-
ested groups. Early on, his progressive opinions on profit shar-
ing, put into practice at his company, found their way into 
publication [Dewhurst, 1915; Dennison, 1918]. The company's 
unemployment insurance program, begun in 1916, was the first 
in the U.S. His opinions that good management was only pos-
sible when the manager was on-site and that financial or absen-
tee management was bad, almost by definition, were well-
known [Forester, 1912; Dennison, 1915]. His theories and 
efforts to smooth out business cycles were widely published 
[Dennison, 1922a, 1922b; Feldman, 1922]. 
Dennison and other company executives frequently con-
tributed to the NACA Bulletin. The reader should note that ar-
ticles included in the NACA Bulletin and the Bulletin of the Tay-
lor Society were typically t ranscr ip t s of p resen ta t ions at 
meetings. Managers and others interested in cost accounting 
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issues or in solving other business problems attended these 
meetings to learn from one another. This commitment to con-
tributing to and learning from peers is undoubtedly the source 
of Dennison's examination of cost behavior in his own firm and 
the reason why he continually tried to put that understanding 
to use. The unique problems of distribution costs were very 
likely discussed informally at these meetings of managers and 
cost accountants, despite the absence of written evidence. 
Modern literature on distribution costing has been rela-
tively sparse. Anderson [1979], in an historical piece, reported 
on some of the methods of distribution analysis favored by 
early writers. Lambert and Armitage [1979] criticized the acad-
emy for not teaching distribution costing, handicapping practi-
tioners by leaving them oblivious to a major area of costing 
difficulties. Rarely do cost or management textbooks more than 
mention the topic. Miller and Vollman [1985] drew attention to 
the explosion of overhead costs supporting factory operations. 
These costs are caused or driven by structural activities, not by 
output. Continuing to accumulate and allocate these costs using 
direct labor hides them and allows them to increase. Bridging 
the academic and the practical is an excellent research study by 
Schiff and Schiff [1994]. Their literature review, which ignored 
the rich literature of the pre-1950 period, showed that distribu-
tion costing was very topical in the 1950s and 1960s but disap-
peared from the literature in the 1970s and 1980s. It has re-
emerged in the 1990s in a small number of articles which use 
activity-based costing as a framework for analysis. They have 
also included case studies of three firms that attend closely to 
their marketing costs [Schiff and Schiff, 1994, pp. 9-19]. Foster 
et al. [1996] recognized that profitability depends not only on 
the unit factory cost of a product but also on the marketing, 
distribution, and customer services required. Hence, they rec-
ommended an activity-based costing approach to these other 
areas using drivers such as purchase orders, number of ship-
ments, and number of invoices. Very recently, a series of short 
features by Cooper and Slagmulder [1998a, 1998b] have en-
couraged cost management beyond the factory walls and be-
yond the firm; that is, looking at costs and drivers that include, 
but are not limited to, both the order-filling and order-getting 
components of distribution costs. These feature articles are 
theoretical in nature and do not explain how the ideas might be 
put into practice. 
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A HISTORY OF SECONDARY COSTS 
AT DENNISON MANUFACTURING 
The Dennison archive contains a number of memos and 
reports on the topic of secondary costs spanning many years. 
Their existence shows that managerial recognition of these 
costing problems occurred very early, predating known publica-
tions in journals and textbooks. The effort to manage and un-
derstand these costs continued for many years but, contrary to 
Freeman's matter-of-fact presentation in his 1929 and 1933 ar-
ticles, the in-house treatment of the costs confused many of the 
company managers for whom it was intended. Dennison's expe-
rience contributes to our understanding of why it appears that 
few companies tackled their distribution costs or, perhaps, why 
some of those that did failed to maintain interest after an initial 
effort. The clerical and analytical commitment was huge and 
the results ambiguous. 
The earliest applicable company records are two virtually 
identical 1909 memos from the company's Commit tee on 
Records and Accounting — Dennison Manufacturing was man-
aged largely by committees — to two executives referencing 
order-filling and other overhead costs. It reported that the cur-
rent overhead allocation policy of distributing all general ex-
penses aside from factory overhead using percentages based on 
prime cost was misleading. "This condition of things...is very 
undesirable as it consistently makes our best quality goods ap-
pear to cost more and our cheaper quality of goods less than 
they actually do cost."1 Since the company relied heavily on 
special, customized orders (about 50% of its total production), 
it was enormously important that managers be able to estimate 
costs well so that they could establish competitive and realistic 
bids. They proposed to mitigate the problem by changing the 
method of overhead allocation. They said that while productive 
labor hours seemed the most theoretically appropriate method 
of allocation, those statistics were not readily available. The 
next best choice, they decided, was an allocation based on pro-
ductive labor dollars. Labor rates, unlike the costs of materials, 
did not differ significantly among products; therefore, the dis-
tribution would be more equitable. The Committee proposed 
that the new method of allocation be adopted in February 1910. 
1
 Compare Johnson and Kaplan [1987, p. 22]: "Costs get distributed by 
simplistic measures . . . and . . . systematically bias and distort product costs at 
the individual product level." 
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Although there was no attempt to differentiate between 
costs with different behavioral characteristics or, using modern 
terminology, different cost drivers, the Committee did under-
stand the problems that arose from the choice of allocation 
base. Soon they were to begin looking even more closely at 
costs. 
In January 1916, accounting manager A.B. Rich wrote to 
Freeman that Henry Dennison (then treasurer and director of 
works) wanted a report that separately stated the cost of pack-
ing cases in calculating the profit on product lines. Packing-
case cost had been part of factory overhead, but Dennison rec-
ognized that it was largely a direct cost, not one evenly incurred 
over all products, and deserving of separate treatment. But how 
could these costs be distributed realistically to a vast array of 
products? Rich said the firm had on hand the cubic contents of 
various case sizes that could be used as standard for different 
products. Management might be able to distribute the cost of 
cases based on size, specifically cubic inches.2 Though packing-
case costs were direct costs, the logistics of assigning them to 
actual products or orders was assumed to be impossible; in 
fact, it was never mentioned. Hence, the Rich proposal that 
standard costs be adopted for a variety of case sizes was justi-
fied. Undoubtedly the cost of tracking all actual costs to prod-
ucts would outweigh the benefit of increased accuracy. 
A.B. Rich forwarded a memo later in the year from the 
Records and Accounts Committee to Henry Dennison for com-
ment, demonstrating the concepts of responsibility accounting 
and cost drivers. Rich was concerned about both: 
The warehous ing and shipping which is done at 
Framingham does not seem to be a production ex-
pense, and consequently it should be included in the 
general selling expenses and not in factory cost. The 
more one considers the matter, the more it seems to be 
an item the control of which is in the hands of the 
selling organization and not the factory management. I 
am speaking of those causes of expenditure which de-
pend on the kind of goods sold — the quantities of 
goods sold — the method of selling, whether or not 
through rehandling — and all the different methods of 
selling policies. 
2
 This memo was stapled to another piece of paper on which Freeman had 
written (probably in 1917) that Henry Dennison wanted more rather than less 
expense allocated to products. He wanted to reduce general overhead. 144
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If some attempt were made to include the extra cost of 
warehousing and shipping seasonal goods in the indi-
vidual costs of the line, I believe truer returns would be 
made of the ultimate profit accruing from such items. 
Small quantities, if they prevailed exclusively, would 
cost more for equal value than large, as the element of 
labor employing handling, checking, billing to trans-
portation companies, etc., is far greater than for a few 
large shipments. 
Dennison's immediate response was mixed, judging from hand-
written remarks appearing on the memo. In reference to pulling 
warehousing and shipping out of production cost, he wrote: "I 
would object on the whole for it would mean one more item 
removed from basic cost and responsibility left in the air more 
or less." He was not opposed to reclassifying costs; on the con-
trary, he wanted as many costs assigned to products as pos-
sible, but he was concerned that reclassifying these particular 
costs might remove them from anyone's direct responsibility. 
Rich continued to work on this project and, though we never 
discover who bore ultimate responsibility for the costs, in a 
later memo to E.S. Freeman, he wrote that: 
He [Dennison] favors our applying [warehousing and 
shipping] these items and any others of similar nature 
on the basis of the quantities as revealed by the quar-
terly statistics, thousands of tags etc. . . . and including 
with them such items as cost of cases and anything else 
that will be more accurately applied in this manner 
than it is at present. 
Rich and Dennison had determined that some of these over-
head items could be allocated effectively without losing respon-
sibility. The costs were not hopelessly joint in nature and could 
be reasonably assigned to particular product lines. They were 
also material enough to warrant pulling them out of the general 
allocation pool. However, in order to make this assignment, 
neither the factory overhead pool (now allocated using direct 
labor cost) nor the selling expense pool (allocated on the basis 
of total manufacturing cost) could be used. Another method of 
allocation was needed and a third class of costs: 
This third group . . . may include . . . warehousing and 
shipping distributed on a quantity basis and then also 
Order Department on the basis of the number of orders 
and Tracing on the same basis. Possibly . . . Estimat-
ing, per estimate, Billing, per order, etc, and all of 
these various items might total up to enough to make a 
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charge per order or per unit that could be added to 
either our Estimated costs or to our regular costs . . . 
but would not be added to factory cost as such. 
The company accountants began to work on this category 
of costs, calling them "supplementary costs." Neither produc-
tion volume nor sales volume drove these costs but rather, cu-
bic inches, number of estimates, and number of orders. Soon 
the accountants, with the help of company statisticians, had 
pooled this third class of costs, allocated them to product lines, 
and sent the commodity chairmen (managers of product lines) 
off-book information on the supplementary costs of the product 
lines for which they were responsible. 
Unfortunately, the information was based on averages, so 
that although commodity lines (e.g., tags, boxes, and crepe) 
were distinguished as were components of lines (e.g., marking 
tags and shipping tags), the various sizes and shapes of mark-
ing and shipping tags were not differentiated. Because there 
was considerable variety within lines, possibly hundreds of tag 
varieties, the supplementary information was not of direct help 
in estimating or pricing individual orders. This situation led to 
a considerable amount of documented confusion that lasted for 
years. Despite the best intentions and explanations issuing from 
accounting and statistics, some chairmen did not understand 
what they were supposed to do with this information and 
merely added the supplementary costs to factory costs when 
making pricing decisions. Freeman first referred to the problem 
in a 1918 memo to A.B. Rich. He had discovered that some 
chairmen were adding the supplementary cost they had re-
ceived from his department to all orders, regardless of the size 
of the order. For example, a dollar of supplementary cost was 
being added across the board to orders ranging from ten cents 
to five dollars: 
When these [supplementary costs] were made up the 
idea was that they should be used by the chairmen, as 
a very rough indication of the additional cost appli-
cable. Accordingly very broad averages were used. As a 
matter of fact, when the chairman goes to the cost 
sheet showing both factory and supplementary costs, 
he merely adds the two together and uses the total . . . 
one being given equal weight with the other. They tell 
me that they are held to a profit not over the factory 
cost but over the complete cost. If so much weight is to 
be given to these they will evidently require a much 
more profound study. 
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A.B. Rich wrote to J.P. Wills, sending h im a copy of 
Freeman's memo and suggesting that they simply stop sending 
the information routinely to chairmen and refer to supplemen-
tary costs only when determining policies or when deciding 
whether to accept a special order with a very narrow profit 
margin. Wills responded that not all chairmen were making this 
error and that he was making sure that the others were in-
formed. He wished to continue to receive the information. 
In a lengthy 1918 statement, Freeman discussed innumer-
able supplementary costs and how they varied (cost drivers). 
The excerpt that follows is one of nine parts referencing clerical 
expense alone: 
Costs varying as per item on sales orders: 
Scrutinizing the orders when they come in by order 
clerk and censor. 
Pricing, with selling price and cost (less extra ex-
pense on specials). 
Typewriting invoices and typewriter supplies used 
thereby. 
Checking invoices. 
Punching commodity statistical cards and the cost 
of cards used. 
Pricing cost on store bills and inter-district orders. 
The excerpt identified the item on the order as what today 
would be labeled the cost driver. Other drivers mentioned else-
where include the number of estimates, the volume of business, 
and the number of customer accounts. Freeman then proposed 
reasonable methods of allocation, discussing the difficulties of 
each method and the softness of these data. For example, refer-
ring to the distribution of shipping labor and overhead costs on 
the basis of cubic inches, he said: "The difficulty . . . is the 
dispute as to what the real unit is, and the difficulty where the 
unit varies within a commodity statistics group. Should the 
carton or the box within the carton be the unit when it is quite 
customary to split the carton?" 
Later, in 1920, Freeman told Dennison that though they 
could trace supplementary costs to product lines fairly well, 
when the totals were "reduced to averages according to com-
modity classifications [e.g., tags] and then multiplied by the 
quantity shipped it is doubtful if the result is any nearer to the 
truth than a percentage on cost." Dennison responded by reiter-
ating the purpose behind the supplementary cost idea: 
I believe we can more and more pull out of that great 
pool of selling expense items which can be directly al-
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located in one way or another, perhaps a half dozen 
ways. We should then ask in our prices that they cover 
factory cost, the specific selling costs and a further per-
centage to cover unallocated costs and our profit. 
He wanted to find how costs varied to improve his understand-
ing of product costs and to maximize the reasonableness of the 
company's pricing policies. 
The only early quantitative data retained from the archive 
are contained in a report from the first six months of 1920, 
reproduced as Appendix A. It shows that of the $420,420 of 
secondary costs, $274,300 was allocated to the five broad lines 
or commodity categories.3 Why $146,120 of the total was called 
a "loss" is unclear. The bulk of the secondary costs (63%) is 
attributable to warehousing and shipping and the remainder to 
various general office expenses. This appor t ionment repre-
sented an additional 7.7% over manufacturing costs (materials, 
labor, and factory overhead — called "primary" in the table). 
The total amount of secondary costs added another 11.7% 
above manufacturing costs. The allocations to the five lines 
ranged from 5 to 10% of primary costs, evidence that costs had 
been allocated differentially. The report also shows, on the sec-
ond page of Appendix A, how general office expense, which 
appears aggregated at the bottom of the first page of Appendix 
A, was distributed to stock orders, box orders, and special (cus-
tom) orders per sales order and per item in total and per unit. 
The total costs of the Credit Department are not shown, but 
company accountants assigned $5,250 of those costs to Stock 
Orders, $1,620 to Special Orders, Except Box Orders, and $417 
to Box Orders. Considerable effort was put into pulling costs 
out of general overhead and placing them into the secondary 
cost pool. This practice supports Freeman's 1929 and 1933 pre-
sentation of how the company handled those types of order-
filling costs. 
Further confirmation that these costs were used appeared 
in a 1922 report, "Method of Distributing and Figuring Over-
head Expenses," by A.L. Hawes of the Cost Accounting Depart-
ment. The report stated that secondary costs were to be divided 
among four factors: 1) stock goods (throughput, not special 
orders); 2) Box Division Special Orders; 3) three categories of 
other special orders (simple, plain orders; ordinary special 
3
 At some time prior to this report, the term "secondary" had replaced 
"supplementary." 148
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printed orders; complex or complicated orders); and 4) cubical 
inch basis. The first three factors included costs that varied by 
item in an order or by work order. The fourth factor included 
the cost of packing cases, wrapping material, and some labor 
and expense of the warehousing and shipping room which var-
ied with the size of the goods handled. This report listed over-
head expenses, categorized as "Secondary Costs," and described 
how they were distributed. For example: 
The sum of all costs applicable to stock goods [not 
customized] is divided by the total of all items of this 
class shipped, which gives the cost per item. The num-
ber of items is based upon the average quantity order 
at one time which are obtained from the commodity 
statistics report [a report generated by Freeman's de-
partment] . 
and ; 
The cost of packing cases, wrapping material and cer-
tain handling labor and expense in the warehousing 
and shipping rooms which varies with the size of the 
goods handled on the basis of 1000 cubic inches. Total 
expense is divided by the total number of thousand 
cubic inches shipped to obtain the cost per 1000 cubic 
inches. 
Hawes said that these costs are used to help set selling prices 
and, in the commodity statistics reports, to determine the per-
centages of profit made on various items. 
The purpose of these secondary costs continued to be mis-
unders tood. In a 1923 memo, E. S. Freeman asked T. G. 
Portmore, chairman of the Merchandising Committee, to con-
vene a costing and pricing conference to discuss this topic. De-
spite years of explanations, many people were still mistaking 
secondary costs for actual charges to orders rather than as ad-
ditional information. "It is apparent that at least some . . . have 
had the impression that secondary costs were in fact charged to 
the orders, and as a consequence it appears that special prices 
on non-estimated jobs have been set lower than they would 
have been had these people had the correct understanding." 
Freeman's frustration is audible: 
The widest possible publicity has always been given to 
the fact that secondary costs were not entered on the 
order. The minutes of the Merchandise Committee 
meeting of November 18, 1920, state this fact very defi-
nitely. During the year which followed the adoption of 
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secondary costs, Mr. C. F. Buckley had charge of Fac-
tory Billing Department as well as Sales Billing. That 
he must have known the secondary costs were not put 
on the order is self-evident from the fact that all the 
work of both departments was carried on under his 
direction. Furthermore, the fact that 1) Pricing and 
Billing were using and understanding secondary cost, 
and 2) Pricing and Billing were under the same chief 
clerk, seemed sufficient reason to assume that his suc-
cessor understood. Factory Billing Department has 
long been turning over to the Pricing Department for 
investigation all orders priced by Sales Billing which 
showed less than 40 percent. This 40 percent was set 
by Mr. Howell in a letter to me last May in which the 
percentage was specified as 'primary revenue or gross 
profit,' which means over factory cost and not over 
factory plus secondary. A copy of this was given to 
Pricing Department. 
It is not difficult to reconstruct the chain of events. The 
chairman of the Tag Division would receive the commodity sta-
tistics report for his operation. On it would appear a secondary 
cost of perhaps 6% on primary costs, an average across that 
commodity class. He was expected to adjust that percentage for 
types of tags and orders based on his knowledge of the good 
and his experience with the sales market. The customized tag 
orders clearly demanded more secondary costs on a percentage 
basis than did stock orders. However, because he believed that 
the secondary costs were charged uniformly to all orders, he set 
prices just above factory costs plus secondary cost (1.06 times 
factory cost). Hence, on orders requiring special care and han-
dling, price estimates were set too low. 
The minutes [1924] of the Committee on Accounting con-
tained a familiar refrain: "Our secondary costs have never been 
properly understood and probably interferes with more than 
they aid proper judgement as to what selling prices should be." 
In view of long, troubled experience with them, Freeman and 
two other committee members recommended they be discon-
tinued. At the conclusion of a lengthy 1925 report distributed to 
committee members prior to a "Special Costing Conference," 
E.S. Freeman reiterated that recommendation — abandon sec-
ondary costs. 
Henry Dennison blocked this recommendation. Although 
no memo to this effect exists, circumstantial evidence abounds. 
These costs continued to be calculated and used by the com-
pany for many years. Freeman's 1929 article showed that the 
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company not only was still using secondary costs but had by 
then standardized them. The standards were used for budgetary 
control, for performance evaluation, and for informational pur-
poses on gross profit by merchandise line (a synonym for com-
modity line). Freeman said that the costs of assembly, packing, 
and loading were directly assigned to products. These expense 
items were standardized based on a cost per unit varying by 
size. Other costs, aggregated, standardized, and called "cost per 
item on an order," included those arising from pricing and in-
voicing, the costs of the factory accounting department, etc. 
These costs per item were multiplied by the total items ordered 
in a month. The sum of both of these totals, total cost per item 
and the total per unit, were added to factory costs to determine 
the gross profit per merchandise (commodity) line. 
Freeman compiled a report ("Box Line Profit and Loss," 
1928) analyzing the probable effect on income over a number 
of years of dropping all or a part of the box commodity line. 
This keep-or-drop analysis included the differential effects of 
secondary costs. They were material in size, representing al-
most 25% of total costs. "The order-filling costs are estimated 
with a fair degree of accuracy. The gross profits or losses after 
deducting order-filling costs, can, therefore, be considered as 
fairly significant." Though but a single piece of evidence, it 
appears that managers used secondary costs in more than one 
way. 
The last archival reference to secondary cost is a lengthy 
report written in 1949 by James Dennison, Henry Dennison's 
son, entitled "Interpretation of Secondary Costs for Factory and 
Merchandising Personnel." At the outset , James Dennison 
stated that he had been asked to write the report to explain to 
nonaccountants what secondary costs were, their purpose, how 
they were calculated, and how they were allocated. He reported 
that 38% of warehouse costs, 27% of product ion-planning 
costs, 13% of treasurer's costs, 13% of service costs (corre-
spondence, etc.), 6% of the Box Division's costs (its own ship-
ping and warehousing departments), and 1% of Printing's costs 
became Dennison's secondary costs, amounting to $1,220,000 
(Appendix B). 
The first table of Appendix B, "Distribution by Commod-
ity," shows the assignment of the costs accrued in the support 
departments deemed to be secondary. For example, 21.2% of 
Outside Warehousing expenses were directly assigned to the 
Shipping and Marking Tag Line. Although many of the second-
ary expenses were to be divided equally among all lines, certain 
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lines pulled heavily on the support departments, particularly 
the Box Line, the Holiday Line, and the Shipping and Marking 
Tag Line. The second table, "Breakdown by Unit of Measure," 
shows how those same dollar amounts varied. Thus, Stock 
Costing expenses were driven 90% by the number of items in an 
order and 10% by the number of orders. The costs of Outside 
Warehousing were driven 63.5% by bulk (cubic inches) and the 
remainder by the order. He summarized thusly: 
What does all this give us? In the first place, we have 
an accurate and fair way of allocating the $1,220,000 
expense to the cost of our products. We know how 
much it costs us to handle orders for each commodity. 
By adding that handling cost to the primary and trans-
portation costs, we know the total cost of making, stor-
ing and shipping every Dennison item. Subtracting the 
total costs from the selling price leaves a balance which 
indicates whether or not the item is profitable. This in 
itself is justification enough for all the work going into 
the preparation of Secondary Costs. 
CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this research was to add some rare archival 
evidence to the limited literature on distribution costs. The 
many pertinent internal memos at Dennison Manufacturing 
show that distribution costs commanded the interest of man-
agement for many years. Considerable support was forthcom-
ing to foster understanding and to maintain control over them. 
Calculated at least through 1949, statistical records of costs and 
qualitative data were retained and analyzed for years. Without 
computers, calculators, or easy-to-use adding machines, this 
undertaking was a considerable project. 
Secondary cost information was to be used primarily for 
preparing estimates and making pricing decisions, but at least 
one extant report shows that they were also integrated into 
differential analysis and later standardized and used for budget-
ing and performance evaluation. It is strikingly familiar to read 
that managers responded to the numbers given to them while 
ignoring explanations of how numbers were to be used. This 
pattern adds to our growing knowledge about the effect statis-
tics and accounting measurements have on behavior and on the 
tendency to privilege numbers over words. The continual diffi-
culties that Dennison's management had with distribution cost-
ing, despite strong top management support, partially explains 
the rarity with which this type of analysis was applied in other 152
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firms, at least in so far as is indicated by the literature. 
Managers knew that these costs were driven by factors out-
side of production or sales volume. They also realized that no 
one cost and driver were perfectly or even closely correlated. 
Thus, although they decided to distribute certain costs on a 
cubic-inch basis, there is ample recognition in the memos that 
this approach was not the perfect answer, only that it was supe-
rior to their former method of allocating by a percentage of 
cost. For example, a large order of the same product certainly 
cost less to handle than an order of the same size packed with a 
variety of products. Nevertheless, managers thought it was bet-
ter that the cost assignments be more nearly correct rather than 
completely wrong. It is difficult to assess whether Dennison's 
handling of these costs greatly improved by 1949 when the last 
reference to them appeared and impossible to de te rmine 
whether their efforts paid off on the bottom line. Clearly, how-
ever, the project was still in place, suggesting either substantial 
inertia or a strong belief that expanding costing parameters had 
benefitted the firm. 
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APPENDIX A - CONTINUED 
Composition of Secondary Costs: Stock Orders 
Credit Dept. 
Pricing and Estimating 
Planning and Tracing 
Billing 
Cashier, Ledger & Index 
Costing and Tabulating 
Filing and Mail 
Correspondence 
Sales Div. Stationery 
Sales Div. Postage 
Misc. Expense 
Cost for 6 months 

























































Composition of Secondary Costs: Special Orders, Except Box Orders 
Credit Dept. 
Pricing and Estimating 
Planning and Tracing 
Billing 
Cashier, Ledger & Index 
Costing and Tabulating 
Filing and Mail 
Correspondence 
Sales Div. Stationery 
Sales Div. Postage 
Misc. Expense 
Cost for 6 months 

























































Composition of Secondary Costs: Box Orders 
Credit Dept. 
Pricing and Estimating 
Planning and Tracing 
Billing 
Cashier, Ledger & Index 
Costing and Tabulating 
Filing and Mail 
Correspondence 
Sales Div. Stationery 
Sales Div. Postage 
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History 
CALL FOR PAPERS 
Accounting in Crises 
The contemporary purpose, character and perceptions of a particular craft are 
often illuminated and elucidated when its pursuit is implicated in a crisis. 
Social scientists have often considered that the functioning of a technique 
together with the values and relationships which surround its practice, are 
most observable when its deficiencies are located as the source of a calamitous 
event. Discourses also surface when practices are impacted upon by exogenous 
adversities. Accounting historians have recognised that change in accounting 
practice and regulation has often been instigated by high profile failures, 
frauds and ensuing litigation. The role of accounting has also been made vis-
ible when the discipline and its practitioners have been perceived as reposito-
ries of possible solutions to problems which have emerged during periods of 
severe economic and military crisis. Total war, for example, has been a catalyst 
for considerable change in the accounting profession and cost accounting. 
These changes, in turn, have had consequences for wider organisational and 
social functioning. The inter-war depression saw accounting feature in the 
search for solutions to a crisis of capitalism. The nature of accounting and the 
vocation has also been laid bare at times of crisis within the discipline itself. 
The object of this special issue of Accounting History is to focus on crisis and 
change and on crisis and making accounting visible in contemporary contexts. 
Submissions are sought which explore themes such as: 
• The impact of particular crises on accounting development and its 
practitioners 
• Crisis, identity and legitimacy in accounting 
• Crisis and causality in accounting history 
• Crisis and continuity in accounting history 
• Crisis and opportunity in accounting 
• Crisis and revelations of the functioning of accounting 
• The profession and the management crises. 
The above list is not intended to be exhaustive and contributions are encour-
aged which examine accounting in crises in a variety of times and locales. This 
special issue will appear in November 2000. Submitted papers will be refereed 
in the usual way. 
Submissions (three copies) should be forwarded by 1 February 2000 to: 
Stephen P. Walker 
Department of Accounting and Business Method 
University of Edinburgh 
50 George Square 
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ACCOUNTING HALL OF FAME 
1998 INDUCTION 
August 17, 1998 
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Donald E. Kieso 
Northern Illinois University 
I have had many fortuitous events in my life. But one of the 
most fortuitous was the day I walked into Professor Arthur 
Wyatt's graduate accounting theory class. It was September 
1958 (almost 40 years ago), and it was my second day on the 
campus at the University of Illinois. 
I'll never forget Art's first words to me. When he came to 
my name, as he called the class role, I was surprised to hear, 
"Mr. Kieso, I'll take West Aurora and 7 points." Although Art 
and I were complete strangers, I shortly learned that we were 
from the same home town, Aurora, Illinois, albiet from compet-
ing high schools. I also learned that we both caddied at the 
same country club; that I had played fast-pitch softball for 
nearly a decade with his younger brother; and that my mother-
in-law was his mother's childhood friend and neighbor, both 
graduating together from East Aurora, my high school. But, up 
until that wager, which Art won on Thanksgiving Day when 
West High beat East High, we had never met or known of each 
other. 
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It was Art who persuaded me to apply for a teaching assist-
antship upon entering the graduate program. He even split his 
honors class of James Scholars with me so that I had someone 
to teach. Between my masters and doctoral programs, Art per-
suaded me to apply for a research associate position in New 
York with the AICPA where I was promptly assigned to work on 
Art's business combination research study project. During my 
doctoral program, Art served as my dissertation adviser, and 
two years after finishing my Ph.D. program, we coauthored a 
book on mergers and acquisitions, which was my introduction 
to book writing. He has supported me throughout my career as 
a role model, mentor, and friend—as he has done for numerous 
others—including some in this audience. 
Art's service to the profession is well recognized and his 
articles and editorials have been widely read. I wish, however, 
to salute him for excelling as a master teacher and as an identi-
fier and mentor of promising students. I have always felt that 
his t ransi t ion from academe to public accounting, though 
smooth and extremely successful, was p remature . He had 
cloned himself hundreds of times in the too few years he was a 
professor. Not to diminish what he accomplished in public ac-
counting, but had he remained in academe, he would have en-
hanced the profession with thousands of additional Wyatt dis-
ciples. 
I am thankful for the opportunity to have studied under 
and worked my entire career with a person of such intellect and 
sound judgment, such devotion to his students and his profes-
sion, and such extraordinary integrity. 
We have played many games of golf, but I have never beat 
or tied him. I cannot resist concluding: "Mr. Wyatt, I'll take my 
home course and 18 strokes." 
REMARKS 
by 
Jerry J. Weygandt 
University of Wisconsin 
I have known Art for close to 35 years. I have read most of 
his written work, be it articles or textbooks. I have listened to a 
number of his speeches, served on committees with him at the 
AAA and the AICPA, and socialized with him on many occa-
sions at conventions, conferences, dinners, my home, and, of 
course, the golf course. Like Don Kieso, I am one of Art's many 
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students. He has been my mentor, and everything that Don said 
about Art goes double for me. 
I believe we would all agree that Art is a remarkable indi-
vidual. He is a leader; he has vision; he has character; he is 
persuasive; he is intelligent; he is articulate; he is good-hu-
mored; and, as a result, he is just great to be around. My wife 
calls him the Renaissance man because he can discuss intelli-
gently so many different subjects. As they would say in the 
sports world, which Art knows quite well, Art is a superstar. 
And his record of professional accomplishments shows that: 
numerous articles, presentations, textbooks, superb classroom 
teacher, leader of Arthur Andersen's accounting principles 
group, chair of AcSEC, chair of IASC, president of the AAA, and 
board member of the FASB. And that, in my view, is why he 
belongs in the Accounting Hall of Fame. 
But Art is better than a superstar in my book. He possesses 
a unique set of qualities: a sense of commitment, a sense of 
responsibility, a sense of caring about the institutions he serves 
and the people involved in these institutions. Art participates, 
Art gets involved, Art makes things happen. 
For example, he loves the University of Illinois. If there is a 
more loyal alumnus of the U. of I. and the Department of Ac-
countancy, it would be a shock to me. What a wonderful good-
will ambassador for the University. He supports it generously 
with his time, expertise, and financial resources. His recent ef-
forts to help secure the funding for the new Arthur Andersen 
building on campus is a wonderful illustration of his dedication 
to the University. 
Art views his responsibilities as a teacher to go beyond just 
presenting content. Art cares about his students. He tries to 
help them. Don is a case in point, and I am another. One of the 
luckiest days of my life was when I walked into his auditing 
class at the University of Illinois in the fall of 1963. It did not 
take long before Art had helped me secure a teaching assistant-
ship which started me on the path of a masters degree. And 
then Art discussed the Ph.D. program, and here I am today. 
Heaven only knows where I would be without his advice and 
help. 
You might think Art would slow up a little and rest on his 
laurels at this point in his career, but that's not the case. When 
Art was making the transition back to teaching at the Univer-
sity, I tried to get him to visit Madison for a few days. He told 
me that he could not come—he had to cut back on both his 
social and golf activities because he had to spend the summer 
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getting ready for class. That is the type of person Art is. 
And his efforts continue to pay off. Last year at the conven-
tion in Dallas, Bob Elliot and I were talking about his recent 
visit to the U. of I. Bob had spent some time with the student 
body, and one thing he learned very quickly—the students love 
Art Wyatt. 
And, of course, Art has a strong loyalty toward Arthur 
Andersen, which gave him the opportunity to move from aca-
demics into practice. He always seemed enthusiastic about his 
work there and his interactions with his Andersen colleagues. 
My sense is that his colleagues enjoyed the interaction every bit 
as much as Art. 
Art is a superb academic and a great practitioner. He is a 
role model for many. He is a wonderful human being. Con-
gratulations Art for your induction into the Accounting Hall of 
Fame. It is greatly deserved. 
CITATION 
written by 
Daniel L. Jensen 
The Ohio State University 
read by 
Donald E. Kieso and Jerry J. Weygandt 
A man of principle and conviction, known for his inde-
pendence and clear thinking, he helped shape the accounting 
profession in both national and international spheres through 
distinguished careers in both academe and accounting practice. 
At the age of five, he was struck by a car while crossing a 
street in his home town of Aurora, Illinois. The doctors told his 
parents that the fractures in his right leg were so serious that he 
might never walk again. Fortunately for this top-notch golfer 
and enthusiastic supporter of athletics, the leg mended and re-
covered fully. Working as a caddy, he learned to play and love 
golf and also met a number of public accounting partners who 
kindled his interest in an account ing career. During high 
school, a teacher recognized his boredom with an accounting-
bookkeeping class and enlisted him in maintaining the account-
ing records for the school's 45 student organizations and also 
initiated his teaching career by arranging for him to teach ac-
counting to a local businessman. 
He graduated from high school on a Friday in June of 1945 
and entered the University of Illinois on the following day in 
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order to get one semester of college out of the way before being 
drafted. Of course, the war ended that summer, and he was not 
drafted until 1955 when he began two years of service in the 
Army. Describing his undergraduate experience, he notes, "The 
decision to start school when I did was fortuitous, as I never 
had a teaching assistant or an instructor. They were all off 
fighting the war. Also, I got a semester ahead academically 
which permitted me to take lighter schedules in the spring se-
mesters when I was on the golf team." 
Upon completing his baccalaureate degree in accountancy, 
he was persuaded by Professor Cecil (Tee) Moyer to enter the 
masters program and accept a teaching assistantship. "The 
world was backwards," he recalls. "I should have been paid to 
undertake graduate work; the teaching I would have done for 
nothing." Because he enjoyed the classroom so much, he de-
cided to obtain a Ph.D. which he received in 1953, upon 
completion of a dissertation titled, "The Influence of Tradition 
in Accounting." In 1952, as his Ph.D. program concluded, he 
began 15 years of assistance to the University's golf coach—who 
had been his coach during undergraduate days—by working 
with the players and traveling with the team. He also had suc-
cess as an amateur golfer during these years, winning club and 
local championships. 
Following completion of his Ph.D. degree, he joined the 
Accountancy faculty at the University of Illinois where he 
strongly influenced graduate and undergradua te s tudents , 
authored many books and articles—including his classic study 
of accounting for business combinations—and progressed to 
the rank of full professor. Except for two years in the Army, he 
remained at Illinois until 1966. In June of that year, he left to 
begin a second career in publ ic account ing wi th Ar thur 
Andersen & Co., becoming a partner just two years later. He 
joined the firm's accounting principles group, working under 
the leadership of George Catlett. When Catlett retired, he as-
sumed leadership of the group which had responsibility for the 
firm's basic accounting policies, a role in which he was distin-
guished for his independence of thought and soundness of judg-
ment. 
In 1973, he was appointed to membership on the Account-
ing Standards Executive Committee of the American Institute 
of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA); he chaired the com-
mittee from 1977 to 1979. He served on the Financial Account-
ing Standards Advisory Council from 1978 to 1981 and the 
AICPA Board of Directors from 1980 to 1984. 
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In January 1985, he left Arthur Andersen & Co. to become a 
member of the Financial Accounting Standards Board, where 
he served until his resignation in November of 1987. Upon re-
turning to his firm, he was appointed by the AICPA as the 
United States representative on the International Accounting 
Standards Committee. He chaired that committee from July 
1990 until January 1993 and is widely credited with laying the 
groundwork for a new era of international cooperation in the 
development of accounting principles. 
His extensive record of contributions to organizations in-
cludes service as president of the American Accounting Associa-
tion, vice-president of the AICPA, and member of countless 
committees and boards of professional groups, community or-
ganizations, and businesses. He is also a tireless worker on 
behalf of his alma mater, the University of Illinois. 
When he retired from Arthur Andersen & Co. in 1992, he 
returned to the University of Illinois where he teaches senior 
accounting students. He resides in Champaign, Illinois, and 
spends his winters in Florida. His enthusiasm for golf has led 
him to sponsor several young professional golfers, and he at-
tends a number of major golf tournaments every year. He is the 




Arthur R. Wyatt 
Arthur Andersen & Co., retired, 
and University of Illinois 
I am certainly most thankful for the electors who felt the 
various aspects of my career warranted selection to the Ac-
counting Hall of Fame. I must say that this is an honor I never 
expected, and when I studied the list of prior selections, 35 of 
whom I know or knew personally, I was really quite a little 
uncertain that I fit the mold. Even so, I am both pleased and 
honored to be here today to join truly select company. 
I have often been asked how I became interested in ac-
counting. Neither of my parents went to college, but their top 
priority was to see that my brother and I were able to get a 
college education. Their sacrifices, especially during the depres-
sion years, led them to achieve their goal. My father was self-
taught in accounting, and as a youngster I found the books he 
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studied from, circa 1920, to be a bit fascinating. When it came 
time to enter high school, he insisted that I enter the college 
preparatory curriculum but that I not take courses in Latin, 
which my father had found useless. My high school had never 
permitted that combination, but my dad insisted. The result 
was that I took a bookkeeping course as a sophomore and an 
accounting course as a junior (and Spanish in my last two 
years). 
I graduated from high school on a Friday in June of 1945 
and entered the University of Illinois the following day in order 
to get one semester of college before being drafted. My ex-
pressed objective at that time was to become a CPA and work 
for a large accounting firm (large being relative, of course, as 
Arthur Andersen had only 25 partners when I entered college). 
Of course, the war ended that summer, and I actually finished 
my Ph.D. before entering the Army. 
I also had entered Illinois with the hope of playing intercol-
legiate golf. Freshmen were eligible then—war years—and I got 
my first chance as the 8th player on a team of 8 in our second 
meet of my freshman year of eligibility. I finished 3rd on our 
team that day, and never missed another meet throughout my 
four years. I sustained the golf interest through graduate school 
and thereafter, had some success in local and regional tourna-
ments, and also helped coach the U. of I. golf team while I was 
on the faculty in the 1950s and 60s. 
In my junior year I encountered Tee Moyer, the person who 
had the greatest impact on my career. Tee was deeply interested 
in his students, as many whom he taught would agree, and he 
has been a good friend and sounding board over the years. He 
encouraged me in many ways, particularly to stay on to earn a 
masters degree and later to pursue a doctorate. Hi Scovill, then 
his boss, offered me a TA position for the 1949-50 school year. I 
often said that was when I learned the world was backwards. 
They paid me (a modest amount) to teach even though after I 
got involved with the teaching, I would have done it for noth-
ing. On the other hand, no one paid me for the graduate work, 
but I felt they should have. 
Along the way Moyer became the department head and 
invited me to join his informal little accounting firm. We au-
dited the two largest businesses in Champaign, and I learned a 
great deal in those engagements about professionalism and 
confidentiality. I also had several courses from A.C. Littleton 
right at the end of his career, and his influence on my thought 
processes was vital—even though today I am convinced his em-
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phasis on historical cost as a measurement base was misplaced, 
but that is another story. I came to appreciate the necessity of 
conceptual underpinnings for any reasoning process, an appre-
ciation that served me well both in teaching and in professional 
practice. 
Moyer urged me to stay on as a full-time assistant professor 
in 1953, and I did so (except for two years in the military) until 
1966. In 1965, some changing policies in the College of Com-
merce led me to consider doing what I originally intended to 
do—enter the public accounting arena. 
I established a contact with Arthur Andersen in 1965 pri-
marily because they had been the most helpful firm some years 
earlier when I was involved with an AICPA research project 
dealing with business combinations. That project was a real 
challenge for a young Ph.D. with very little practical experience. 
But, Don Kieso (then a graduate student) and I fought through 
masses of data and reached a set of conclusions in 1960 that 
still seem sound today. 
Andersen laid out four alternative courses for me—recruit-
ing, training, audit practice, and what they called the research 
arm. The latter seemed the most challenging to me, the one that 
fit best my skills and interests, and it proved to be the right 
choice, mainly because it put me in touch with George Catlett, 
who became my mentor on the practice side as Tee Moyer had 
been in the academic arena. My years at Andersen were both 
challenging and rewarding. I can honestly never remember a 
day that I didn't eagerly look forward to going to the office. No 
two days were alike, and the great people we had in our little 
accounting principles group made each day a learning experi-
ence. 
The transition from academe to public accounting was a 
real challenge, in part because I moved over at an advanced 
level without the practice background or the inst i tut ional 
knowledge to support the position. While early on I was irri-
tated by comments such as, "That's just an academic idea," as 
time passed I realized that if such a comment was the best 
criticism one could make about a proposal, the chances were 
that it was really a pretty good idea. 
I attended every Accounting Principles Board meeting as 
Catlett's associate from June of 1966 until the Board went out 
of existence in 1973. When he retired in 1978, I assumed his 
responsibilities in the accounting principles area. I often said it 
was the best position in the accounting profession. We had 
great independence within the firm and dealt with all the lead-
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ing-edge issues facing the SEC and the FASB, including ex-
pressing the Arthur Andersen position on standards proposals, 
both in writing and in oral testimony. 
At one APB meeting George Catlett argued that the APB 
needed to develop a conceptual framework if it ever hoped to 
move away from its ad hoc approach to writing standards. Phil 
Defliese and others argued that it was not possible to develop 
such a framework. On the plane ride home all of a sudden 
George turned to me and said, "By God, we're going to do it." 
"It" turned out to be the first conceptual framework and one 
that Arthur Andersen was continuing to use, with some modifi-
cations, into the 1990s—and may still be for all I know. That 
framework had a balance sheet focus and little emphasis on 
matching, characteristics of all subsequently developed frame-
works. 
When a particularly knotty problem hit our accounting 
principles group, the first step was to gather all the relevant 
information we could. Then we tried to find guidance to a reso-
lution of the issues by reference to the framework. Of course, 
many times the position of the client was different from what 
we tentatively concluded—otherwise the issue likely would not 
have reached our group. At this point we were in as good a 
position as we could be in to assess the risk to the firm of 
moving away from the conceptually sound position. Sometimes 
we assumed that risk as bearable, and sometimes we did not. 
To fulfill our responsibilities in the firm, we clearly had to live 
the Andersen motto—Think Straight, Talk Straight. 
In mid-1984, when I had six years remaining in Andersen 
before retiring, Duane Kullberg, then my managing partner and 
also the trustee of the Financial Accounting Foundation who 
was assigned the responsibility of identifying new FASB mem-
bers, approached me about joining the Board. I had previously 
turned down specific offers on three prior occasions, including 
turning down Kullberg the prior year, for a variety of reasons. 
But, when your boss twists your arm, and especially when you 
have absorbed nearly 20 years of the Andersen culture of step-
ping up to new responsibilities, it was difficult to turn him 
down. Thus, I accepted the position with little enthusiasm and 
a real sense of loss for the position I was leaving. 
Many people influenced my career at Andersen in a favor-
able manner in addition to George Catlett—Norm Olson, Bill 
Hall, John March, Bob Mednick, Dave Landsittel, John Stewart, 
Dick Dieter, Mike Crooch—and it was hard to leave them. And, 
Ed Jenkins and I had been particularly close, being admitted to 
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the firm together and working on a number of projects jointly 
over the years. Ed had progressed to a largely administrative 
position in our hierarchy and seemed a lot more frustrated than 
I was. When I left, he assumed leadership of the accounting 
principles group—a great move for the firm as well as for Ed 
and his ongoing career. 
My time at the FASB was more frustrating than satisfying. 
Too many people with interests in the work of the Board were 
less concerned with the mission of the Board and more con-
cerned with achieving their own private agendas. My experi-
ence with having virtually no interference with accomplishing 
our mission at Andersen did not prepare me well for my experi-
ence with the Board. The Board members and staff were great 
to deal with, but too many outsiders with perceived political 
power prevented us from making the progress we could have 
made. So, in 1987, I decided to go back to having fun and 
rejoined Andersen. 
During the summer of 1987, I was in New York to meet 
with my friends on the committee of corporate reporting of the 
FEI when I accidentally bumped into Phil Chenok on a street 
corner. Phil and I had been friends from the APB days in the 
'60s, and he was then the head of the AICPA. During the conver-
sation he said he was looking for a U.S. representative to serve 
on IASC and asked if I would be interested. After thinking it 
over and discussing the possibility with Ed Jenkins, soon to be 
my boss at Andersen, we decided this was probably a good 
assignment to take on. I then learned that after two and one-
half years the U.S. would take on the chairmanship of IASC and 
that I would be put forward for that role. All in all, the five 
years with IASC were most satisfying. We were in the midst of 
moving IASC forward by strengthening its standards and adopt-
ing a conceptual framework. Their work is still progressing, and 
while it has several hurdles facing it, the time may well come 
when international standards issued by IASC become predomi-
nant in the world's markets. 
Finally, the end of 1992 came and with it final retirement 
from Andersen and completion of the work with IASC. I had 
expected that real ret i rement would be difficult for me to 
handle, so I arranged to return to the University of Illinois to 
teach in the fall semesters, then spending the next five months 
or so in Florida playing golf. People have asked me why I would 
tie myself down with teaching responsibilities when I could be 
playing golf all the time. Well, if you play about 150 founds of 
golf a year, the marginal benefit of another fifty or so is really 
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questionable. I do maintain my interest in the game and am 
currently the sole or principal sponsor for three young golfers 
trying to establish careers as professional golfers. In fact, one, 
Mike Small, is playing later today in the ATT-Pebble Beach 
Classic final round (postponed from February), and if I were 
not here, I would be there with him. 
I also find that a limited amount of board of director ap-
pointments and a limited amount of litigation consulting fit 
well with my time availability. Both are fun and are satisfying 
without the pressures that the work at Andersen required one 
to endure. 
My career has been most satisfying and has taken me far 
beyond anything I could have envisioned when I started down 
the road to become a CPA. I have really had twin interests that 
may seem diverse but that have dove-tailed nicely for me. First, 
I have tried to develop the same type of deep interest in the 
careers of my students and my associates at Andersen that Tee 
Moyer had for mine, and I continue to get great satisfaction 
from observing how my s tuden ts and former associa tes 
progress as their careers unfold. Second, I have tried to develop 
as deep an understanding as possible of the conceptual bases of 
accounting in relation to the needs of financial statement users 
for data that reflect as clearly as possible the economic effects 
of business decisions made. Even in practice that process is one 
of continual learning, and even teaching, as well, to bring the 
level of understanding of line personnel up to the expectations 
of a changing professional environment. I have continuously 
learned from my associates and colleagues and have increas-
ingly come to respect the essential virtues of looking at issues 
objectively, of being independent in reaching judgments, and of 
maintaining the highest possible level of integrity. 
I am truly honored to be here today to accept this induc-
tion into the Accounting Hall of Fame. 
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BOOK REVIEWS 
Norton M. Bedford, A History of Accountancy at the University 
of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (Urbana: Center for Interna-
tional Education and Research in Accounting, 164 pp., price 
not available) 
Dale L. Flesher, Accountancy at Ole Miss: A Sesquicentennial 
Salute (Oxford: University of Mississippi School of Account-
ancy, 1997, 92 pp., price not available) 
William G. Shenkir and William R. Wilkerson, The University of 
Virginia's McIntire School of Commerce, The First Seventy-Five 
Years 1921-1996 (Charlottesville, VA: McIntire School of Com-
merce Foundation, 1996, 170 pp., price not available) 
Reviewed by 
Kevin F. Brown 
Drexel University 
To an observer of the current, sophisticated state of the 
many programs for business education, these programs may 
appear to be inseparable components of their universities. No-
table characteristics of such business programs include well-
developed curricula, organized faculties, consistent s tudent 
bodies, and strong ties to the communities which the programs 
serve. Given such characteristics, these business programs may 
seem timeless, without any beginning. However, these pro-
grams did not always exist, and the characteristics which they 
display today are the result of development over time. Histories 
of such programs communicate how these developments oc-
curred. An understanding of the historical evolution of pro-
grams provides an important context for evaluating current de-
velopments and challenges. Unfortunately, the body of histories 
of business programs is not large. Past contributions to this 
literature include C. Aubrey Smith's Fifty Years of Education for 
Business at the University of Texas [1962] and Maur i ce 
Moonitz's History of Accounting at Berkeley [1986]. However, 
new contributions are being added to this literature and addi-
tional histories can be expected. The purpose of this essay is to 
provide a brief review of the content and style of three recent 
additions - The University of Virginia's McIntire School of Com-
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merce by William G. Shenkir and William R. Wilkerson, Ac-
countancy at Ole Miss: A Sesquicentennial Salute by Dale L. 
Flesher, and A History of Accountancy at the University of Illi-
nois at Urbana-Champaign by Norton M. Bedford. 
THE MCINTIRE SCHOOL OF COMMERCE 
With 141 pages of text, Shenkir and Wilkerson's The Uni-
versity of Virginia's McIntire School of Commerce is the longest 
of the three histories. Part I covers the first 50 years of the 
McIntire School and takes up about one-third of the text. Part 
II, which represents the remainder of the text, spans the next 25 
years of the School's history. Appendices list faculty members, 
trustees, student scholarships, and awards. While Part I follows 
a chronological ordering, the chapters of Part II are divided 
among several major themes, such as curriculum, faculty, stu-
dents, and administration. 
Shenkir and Wilkerson begin their history with a fascinat-
ing background of the founding of the McIntire School in 1921. 
While the study of economics dates to the early years of the 
University of Virginia, the effort to include business and com-
merce in the curriculum began in 1904 with the appointment of 
Edwin A. Alderman, the first president of the University of Vir-
ginia. Alderman, realizing the potential importance of business 
education in a modern economy, brought Thomas Walker Page 
to Virginia to establish the economics and commercial curricu-
lum. The first step in this process was the founding of the 
Wilson School of Economics, made possible by a $500,000 gift 
from Andrew Carnegie. As business practices continued to de-
velop, spurred on by the economic demands of World War I, 
Alderman sought to provide more resources for education fo-
cusing on business administration and commerce. A gift of 
$200,000 by Paul G. McIntire in 1920 resulted in a separate 
school for such instruction named in his honor [Wilkerson and 
Shenkir, 1996]. 
As a state institution, the University existed to provide Vir-
ginians with an education. However, the University also viewed 
itself as competing academically with the prestigious private 
institutions of the Ivy League. As a result, the University was 
forced to provide exceptionally high educational quality with 
comparatively meager resources. The authors provide an ex-
ample of the concerns about quality in discussing the struggle 
to separate the administration of the McIntire School from the 
School of Economics in the late 1940s and early 1950s. While 
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the accounting faculty lobbied for separation from economics, 
the economics faculty argued that separat ion would lower 
standards. The resolution of this issue included the formal 
separation of the McIntire School, with its own dean, and the 
creation of the Darden Graduate School of Business Adminis-
tration. Later, in 1971, the McIntire School established its MS 
in Accounting program, followed in 1989 by the creation of an 
MS in MIS. 
Shenkir and Wilkerson effectively divide the recent history 
of the McIntire School into topic areas. This division allows the 
authors to present material in detail while maintaining a pleas-
ant, readable style. For example, their discussion of the devel-
opment of the current curriculum at the McIntire School illus-
trates how the curriculum has evolved in concert with changes 
in the business environment. This evolution is evidenced by the 
inclusion of concentrations in management information sys-
tems in 1974 and international business in 1994. Interestingly, 
Shenkir and Wilkerson also devote two sections of the text to 
the planning and funding of the School's infrastructure -
"Physical Facilities and the Balfour Addition" and "Building an 
Information Technology Platform." The inclusion of this mate-
rial further demonstrates the breadth of this text. 
ACCOUNTANCY AT OLE MISS 
Flesher's Accountancy at Ole Miss: A Sesquicentennial Sa-
lute follows a roughly chronological ordering through its 90 
pages of text. The text is divided into 18 topic areas, beginning 
with the heritage of the School of Accountancy and concluding 
with a perspective on the School's future with reference to its 
current mission and objectives. 
The entrance of the accountancy program into the curricu-
lum at Ole Miss in 1917 seems less harrowing than the intro-
duction of business as a discipline at Virginia. However, Flesher 
captures the many challenges which the program has faced 
since its inception. One such challenge was the integration of 
Ole Miss resulting from the civil rights movement. The author 
reports that the uncertainty and violence of this process led to 
the loss of at least one faculty member to another university. 
Inclusion of this difficult period in Ole Miss history gives read-
ers a deeper understanding of the institution. 
One of the most interesting achievements is the formation 
of the School of Accountancy in 1979. While the introduction of 
a business curriculum may have been tranquil, the founding of 
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the School of Accountancy was a fierce political struggle. The 
idea was considered as early as 1949 by faculty member Joseph 
Cerny. However, the first real progress began in June 1974, 
when the accountancy faculty voted in support of the AICPA's 
policy on the establishment of separate schools of accountancy. 
Flesher vividly explains the five-year confrontations between 
the accountancy department and the dean of the School of 
Business Administration, including the dean's threats of em-
ployment rejection and tenure denial for proponents of the 
separate school. This reaction was not surprising given the loss 
of power facing the School of Business Administration if a 
separate school became a reality. The accountancy department 
responded by pressing the issue with the support of donors who 
served on the Professional Accountancy Advisory Council. The 
continuing struggle led to the resignation of the accountancy 
department chair, who expressed his dissatisfaction with the 
dean's opposition in the local press. The director for accredita-
tion of the AACSB joined the fray, warning that the establish-
ment of a separate school might endanger the accreditation of 
the School of Business Administration. Ultimately, the account-
ancy department mustered enough support from alumni and 
professional accounting firms to win the endorsement of the 
chancellor of Ole Miss. In response to the creation of the sepa-
rate School of Accountancy with its own dean, the dean of the 
School of Business Administration resigned his position. 
In his coverage of more contemporary material, Flesher 
continues to provide a unique perspective. Discussing the estab-
lishment of the National Tax History Research Center in 1988, 
the author notes an indebtedness to donors of materials. One 
substantial contribution came from an alumnus who salvaged a 
wealth of materials nearly discarded by a public accounting 
firm.. The inclusion of a brief section on the 1992 reaccredita-
tion review of the Ole Miss doctoral program further illustrates 
Flesher's insight. The author succinctly captures the accredita-
tion process and relates how Ole Miss addressed the process. 
With characteristic wit, Flesher comments on the conclusions 
of the AACSB visitation team, noting, "Although the team con-
cluded that the faculty was underpaid and overworked (which 
they already knew), the accreditation report was quite positive" 
[p. 52]. 
Throughout, Flesher conveys a sense of the humanity of the 
participants. He tells of the brief service of one faculty member, 
Robert Kane, who left Ole Miss in 1950 for a position with the 
AICPA in New York. Flesher notes, "Unfortunately, the move 177
et al.: Accounting Historians Journal, 1999, Vol. 26, no. 1
Published by eGrove, 1999
Book Reviews 169 
north was deadly to Kane, as he died while shoveling snow" [p. 
8]. 
ACCOUNTANCY AT THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS 
A History of Accountancy at the University of Illinois at Ur-
bana-Champaign by Norton Bedford contains seven chapters 
totaling 102 pages of text. Each chapter covers a 15-year period, 
beginning with 1900 to 1915. The final chapter conveys a sense 
of transition from the past to the future in its coverage of the 
years 1990 to 2005. Bedford titles each chapter with a theme for 
the 15-year period discussed: "The Origin," "The Organization," 
"The Stabilization," "The Standardization," "The Expansion," 
"The Restructuring," "The Future." Four appendices include 
listings of faculty, doctoral students, numbers of accountancy 
graduates, and the countries represented by visiting scholars 
since 1974. 
Of the three histories discussed here, the Illinois program 
may call forth the greatest amount of interest from the larger 
academic community due to the preeminent role which the 
University of Illinois plays in the accountancy discipline. 
Throughout the monograph, readers will find evidence of the 
efforts that helped build this reputation. For example, Bedford 
relates the importance of the early leadership of Hiram T. 
Scovill, an Illinois alumnus, who joined the faculty in 1913. Not 
only did Scovill build a high quality accountancy program at 
Illinois, he also took on a leadership role in the American Asso-
ciation of University Instructors in Accounting. This leadership 
tradition has lead to the current implementation of Project Dis-
covery, a response to the proposals of the Accounting Educa-
tion Change Commission. Throughout the text, Bedford pays 
careful attention to the evolution of the curriculum in concert 
with corresponding changes in accountancy theory and prac-
tice. 
While no history can be exhaustive, readers may wish 
Bedford had shared more of his personal insights. Referring to 
A. C. Littleton, Bedford writes: 
Over the period 1939-1943, A. C. Littleton served as 
advisor for all twelve of the first Ph.D.s granted by the 
accounting division. He was highly regarded by the 
Ph.D. students for his theoretical concepts and analy-
ses. His open faculty office carried the welcome 'Come 
In' to which one admiring student added 'and crawl 
out' [p. 22]. 
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U n f o r t u n a t e l y , Bedfo rd w i t h h o l d s any e x p l a n a t i o n for 
Littleton's apparent ominous reputation. He does, however, 
provide readers with a sense of his relationship with Robert 
Mautz, his fellow "Gold Dust Twin." In recounting their numer-
ous awards and achievements, the author conveys not a sense 
of competition, but a genuine desire to contribute to the suc-
cess of the Illinois program. Further, the author relates how the 
controversial appointment of E. J. Demaris as department head 
in 1965 resulted in innovations for the program. However, 
Bedford notes, "The task of change was a thankless endeavor 
and in 1974, Professor Demaris resigned as Head of the Depart-
ment" [p. 55]. The change started by Demaris, and continued 
under the direction of Bedford as department head, included a 
transition in accounting research to respond to the explosive 
change taking place within the discipline. 
Bedford's history is encyclopedic. Each chapter begins with 
listings of faculty serving at the beginning and the close of the 
time period under discussion as well as numerous tabular pre-
sentations. While this presentation is somewhat less readable 
than the Virginia or Ole Miss histories, this approach is not 
without merit. Bedford's history will serve as a useful reference 
for particular facts about the Illinois program. 
COMPARING HISTORIES 
One interesting contrast among these histories pertains to 
institutional relationships within the respective universities. 
Shenkir and Wilkerson convey a vivid sense of the early 
struggle for recognition for business education at the University 
of Virginia. Undoubtedly, scarcity of resources exacerbated this 
struggle. However, Shenkir and Wilkerson also demonstrate 
how benefactors can positively impact the development of an 
academic program. Such a struggle for legitimacy is not readily 
apparent at Ole Miss or Illinois. At Ole Miss, the University did 
not threaten the accountancy program. Rather, the School of 
Business Administration attempted to block the establishment 
of the School of Accountancy. Like Shenkir and Wilkerson, 
Flesher includes recognition of donors who support the Ole 
Miss program. In the case of Illinois, the author's emphasis 
differs from both McIntire and Ole Miss. Bedford conveys a 
sense of the tremendous efforts put forth by the faculty in forg-
ing and maintaining the discipline at Illinois. Also, the author 
portrays the Illinois faculty as providing leadership in national 
academic organizations. However, Bedford places less empha-
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sis on the organizational dynamics which transpired between 
the accountancy area and the university administration at Illi-
nois. Further, donor support appears to be an inevitable conse-
quence of program excellence. This difference might lead to an 
interesting debate over the relationship between program excel-
lence and financial support. 
Another contrast can be found in the choice of material 
presented by the authors. The McIntire history is not as exhaus-
tively detailed as Ole Miss and Illinois. This observation should 
not surprise readers. While both Flesher and Bedford focus 
solely on accountancy, Shenkir and Wilkerson have a broader 
scope of coverage. The other business disciplines included in 
the McIntire School require Shenkir and Wilkerson to adopt a 
more parsimonious approach. This parsimony is also illustrated 
when comparing the presentations of the development of cur-
ricula. In summary, while each history exhibits different pre-
sentation choices, those choices exhibit a sensitivity for the na-
ture of each program. 
There are also similarities among the three histories, in-
cluding rich collections of photographs of buildings, students, 
and faculty. Such photographs allow the reader to associate a 
visual image with the individuals who played roles in these 
histories. Also, the works have broad appeal not only to the 
academic community but also to those interested in the educa-
tional needs of their community. 
Perhaps the most important similarity to consider when 
comparing these histories is the role of the authors at these 
institutions. All of the authors have made important contri-
butions to the success of these institutions and thus have par-
ticipated in the histories which they have documented. This 
"participant as historian" model offers advantages and disad-
vantages. As eyewitnesses, the authors are able to report infor-
mation unavailable to other historians, and their close relation-
ships with other participants may result in greater candor. 
However, experiencing particular events as they take place may 
bias an author's characterization of those events. 
Given the dearth of histories of business programs, these 
histories provide an important contribution to scholarship in 
this area. Moreover, as business and accountancy programs 
continue to mature, one should expect that more institutions 
will develop histories to provide constituencies with greater in-
sights. As new histories are written, the pioneering efforts of 
Professors Bedford, Flesher, Shenkir, and Wilkerson will serve 
as a foundation upon which to continue to build this literature. 
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Gary John Previts and Barbara Dubis Merino, A History of Ac-
countancy in the United States: The Cultural Significance of Ac-
counting, 2nd edition (Columbus, OH: Ohio State University 
Press, 1998, 577 pp., $55.00) 
Reviewed by 
Richard G. Vangermeersch 
University of Rhode Island 
Reading this book is a thoroughly enjoyable experience. 
While the first edition [1979] was a fine effort, this second 
edition is a much more academically rich achievement. The 
second edition has an overriding theme of the importance of 
property rights and its corollary in accounting, the proprietary 
theory. Reflecting the authors ' academic and professional 
growth, the second edition is critical but hopeful. Likewise, the 
second edition is much richer in its historical discussion, re-
flecting Previts' experience in team teaching the history of 
American industrial enterprise, his presidency of the Ohio Soci-
ety of CPAs, and his leadership role in the American Institute of 
CPAs; and Merino's long involvement with the critical school of 
historical thought. The authors took a much broader view of 
the field in this edition. For instance, the topic "Cost and Mana-
gerial Accounting" had 14 pages noted in the index for the first 
edition, while "Cost Accounting" had 70 pages and "Manage-
ment Accounting" had seven in the second edition. The authors 
are also to be commended for highlighting the importance of 
the political nature of accounting in the United States. 
The deepening of this second edition is also reflected by the 
following comparisons in Table 1. 
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Within the overriding theme of the importance of property 
rights, Previts and Merino developed major topics in their chap-
ters. The reviewer noted nine of these topics. The "bottom line" 
is introduced early on and becomes the focal point for the con-
cluding paragraph of the text. The second is the ambivalence of 
accountants in defining in a uniform manner a cash-like statis-
tic of earnings within the traditional framework of accounting. 
The third is the Progressive movement in which accountants 
play important roles in increased efficiency in government and 
industry, in regulation of large businesses, and in income taxa-
tion. 
The fourth is the topic of accounting for goodwill, spring-
ing from the watered stock arising from mergers and new is-
sues of securities. The fifth is the "New Deal" and its actual 
effect on the development of financial reporting. The long-last-
ing, historical-cost allocation model is the sixth topic. 
The seventh stresses the political, rather than the theoreti-
cal, basis for determining accounting principles. The second-
class role of accounting for the not-for-profit sector, in relation 
to the private sector, is the eighth topic the reviewer noted. The 
ninth is the hopeful role accounting does and will play in both 
the national and the international arenas. The development of 
these nine topics within the overriding theme of property rights 
adds much continuity and readability to this book. 
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The excellence of this edition notwithstanding, the reviewer 
offers these points for consideration. The first edition, coming 
off the exciting U.S. bicentennial movement and somewhat less 
academic in nature, may have had some appeal to accounting 
practitioners. The second edition probably will have less appeal 
to them, except for those in leadership positions with profes-
sional bodies. Also, our students are generally considered to be 
less knowledgeable in U.S. history than 20 years ago. In the 
reviewer's opinion, this means that adopters of this edition as a 
text will have to devote some time to developing a proper 
knowledge base for the historical discussions. Perhaps adopters 
may consider either team teaching from the book with a history 
colleague or, at least, asking for help in developing a reading 
program for the course. 
The second edition should be used as the basis for the 
capstone course in a 150-credit-hour program. Every Ph.D. stu-
dent in accounting should read it, as well as every accounting 
professor. This reviewer looks forward to the continuous devel-
opment of the third edition. 
Robert B. Williams, Accounting for Steam and Cotton: Two 
Eighteenth Century Case Studies (New York: Garland Publish-
ing, Inc., 1997, 282 pp., $57) 
Reviewed by 
Joann Noe Cross 
University of Wisconsin Oshkosh 
The title of this book is, unfortunately, terribly misleading. 
Although it is true that it touches on accounting for steam and 
cotton, it does so much more that steam engines and cotton 
cloth become mere footnotes to the main theme. This book is 
really about providing a historical and biographical perspective 
on the development of cost accounting techniques and their 
contributions toward advancing the British Industrial Revolu-
tion. 
The book has three major sections. The first and second 
chapters are an intriguing synopsis of the economic history of 
manufacturing and the role accounting played in the evolution 
of business from selling to manufacturing. The first chapter 
carefully outlines the environment that encouraged the develop-
ment of the factory system, the core of the Industrial Revolu-
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tion. The second chapter, entitled "The People," considers the 
individuals who developed the principles of costing and cost 
accounting within that factory system. More than that, how-
ever, this chapter describes the cultural factors which moti-
vated and molded these individuals. Many of those factors, such 
as the scientific tone of the Enlightenment and the role of dis-
senting religious views, become obvious once the author ex-
plains their somewhat obscure relationship to factory manage-
ment and accounting. 
The third and fourth chapters consider the specific contri-
butions and embryonic development of cost accounting prac-
tices by Samuel Oldknow and James Watt jnr. It is from these 
chapters that the book gets its title. Samuel Oldknow embodied 
the character of the Enlightenment. He was a rationalist and a 
religious dissenter and as a result focused much of his energy 
on experimentation with industrial processes and products. Ac-
cording to Williams "Oldknow was involved with the cotton 
industry almost from the time it began its rush to prominence" 
[p. 77]. After a brief biographical sketch, this chapter examines 
in detail the types of records maintained over the course of 
Oldknow's career and highlights the evolution of those records. 
As a serendipitous side benefit, the reader gains considerable 
knowledge about the history of the manufacture of cotton cloth. 
James Watt jnr is the topic of the fourth chapter. Again 
beginning with a biographical sketch, Williams contrasts and 
compares the preparation of Oldknow and Watt jnr for their 
respective positions. Whereas Oldknow was a dreamer whose 
inspiration far outstripped his ability to support his dreams, 
Watt jnr had been raised specifically to manage his father's 
businesses in a systematic and rational way. The chapter then 
turns to the organization of the Soho Foundry and the develop-
ment of the detailed cost records used by James Watt jnr in 
setting the prices for his steam engines. 
I found this book exciting and engaging. It is easy to read 
and certainly fulfills its intention of describing the foundations 
of cost accounting in the early Industrial Revolution. Its pri-
mary benefit, however, is the elegant way the author draws the 
reader into the story as a participant in the activities described. 
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Xie Shaomin, Accounting Evolution in China, 1949 to 1994 
(Chugoku no kigyokaikeiseido) (Tokyo: Soseisha, 1997, 461 pp. 
(published in Japanese), $43) 
Reviewed by 
Yang Yuqi, Nihon University 
Hiroshi Kawakita, Toa University 
Yoshiro Kimizuka, Denkitsushin University, Emeritus 
This book works to clarify the history, the status quo, and 
the unique characteristics of the Chinese Business Accounting 
System (CBAS) since 1949, when the People's Republic of 
China (PRC) was born. To the best of our knowledge, it is the 
only systematic book on the modern accounting history of the 
PRC. The author, Xie Shaomin, was born in the PRC and is 
now an associate professor at Shizuoka Seika College in Japan. 
From 1986 to 1989, prior to earning her doctorate in 1995 in 
Japan, she was an assistant professor of finance and economics 
at Shanghai University. We cannot but admire her efforts as 
well as her talents that enabled her to master the intricacies of 
the Japanese language and complete this wonderful work in 
such a short period of time. 
Dr. Xie Shaomin outlines her objectives in the preface: (1) 
to introduce the CBAS objectively and in its economic and so-
cial contexts; (2) to grasp the character of the CBAS as it re-
flects accounting methods for state enterprises; (3) to under-
stand trends through comparison and analysis of financial 
statements; (4) to hypothesize that the CBAS is a subsystem of 
public finance; that is, that that system evolved in response to 
changes in the distribution of economic profits; and (5) to ex-
plain how the new accounting system reflects a change in ac-
countability from the government to the business entity itself. 
This ambitious work is divided into two parts - the devel-
opment of the Chinese accounting system and the internation-
alization of that system. The three chapters in Part I describe 
the development of the planned economy following the revolu-
tion in 1949, the socialist market economy since 1979, and the 
socialist market economy since 1993 when CBAS, CPA Law, 
and Company Law were published. 
Some of the interesting facts from Part I include the prob-
lems caused by the Great Cultural Revolution (circa 1966 to 
1977), creating disorder similar to the disregard for accounting 
practice following the 1917 revolution in Russia [Chapter 1]. 
Later, when the PRC reopened diplomatic relations with the 
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U.S. in 1979, economic innovation and the open-door policy 
resulted in numerous changes in accounting regulations. The 
ensuing trend towards separation of management from owner-
ship introduced new forms of business as part or all of state 
enterprises were put out to contract, leased or sold to employee 
groups [Chapter 2]. As a result, the weight of state enterprises 
in the gross products decreased from 78.5% in 1979 to 48 .1% in 
1991, while that of group-owned enterprises increased from 
21.5% and 38.0% respectively [p. 148]. 
Unfortunately, this reorganization of state enterprises was 
accompanied by the disappearance of enormous amounts of 
state assets as the hasty privatization bred private profiteering 
and hopeless disorder (similar to what has occurred more re-
cently in Russia). It was estimated that between 1982 and 1992, 
100 million yuan evaporated every day. Eventually, systematic 
accounting regulations, including standards of business ac-
counting and finance, were introduced, including the modern 
concepts of GAAP, double-entry bookkeeping (assets = liabili-
ties + capital), accounting for bad debts, and LIFO inventory 
cost flow. Accounting thus played an important role in the ra-
tionalization and modernization of the Chinese economy, re-
sulting in renovations in numerous social and cultural institu-
tions [Chapter 3]. 
Part II discusses the internationalization of CBAS and in-
cludes chapters on accounting for joint ventures, foreign invest-
ments, and equity-based enterprises. Though familiar in the 
West, these concepts were novel for accountants in the PRC. 
The efforts to establish Business Accounting Standards (BAS) 
began in 1988 at the Finance Ministry, though the Chinese Ac-
counting Association had formed a research group the preced-
ing year. A specialist on International Accounting Standards 
from the World Bank also participated in the standard-setting 
efforts. BAS became law on July 1, 1993. In Part II, Dr. Xie 
Shaomin also makes numerous comparisons between the Chi-
nese accounting system and those of Japan, the U.S., and the 
IASC. 
In our opinion, this extraordinary effort is a nonperishable 
fruit. Certainly, Dr. Xie Shaomin has made a notable and last-
ing contribution to the study of Chinese accounting history. 
The abundant information and the many tables and figures 
help make intricate relations and unique terms understandable. 
Her earnest, wholehearted devotion to inquiry realized an 
abundant harvest, one that is professional, coherent, and read-
able. 
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" . . . but you gods will give us/Some faults to make us 
men . . . " (Antony and Cleopatra 5:1, pp. 32-33). There may be 
no perfect writings without any demerits, and we find a few 
questions to be unresolved even in this work. First is the insuffi-
cient narration on the groundwork of socialism. As far as we 
know, socialist modes of production are built on the planned 
economy and state ownership of the means of production. A 
mere contrast of balance sheet items does not justify one of the 
author's vital conclusions, that the nature of "traditional" Chi-
nese accounting is a combination of public accounting and in-
dividual business accounting. We think the composition of the 
balance sheet is reasonable regardless of historic stage, such as 
feudalism or socialism, but the contents differ remarkably ac-
cording to ownership. 
Our next question derives from the first. Dr. Xie Shaomin 
regards the accounting system under the planned economy as 
"traditional," but, as we read her description of the accounting 
books published in the PRC, the Soviet model appears to be the 
prototype of the Chinese "traditional" system. Evidence of this 
perception is the absence of any model to be applied to the 
socialist economy just after the revolution. Readers will not 
easily understand the meaning of "traditional" in this respect. 
The second question leads us to the last. What is the differ-
ence between the early CBAS and the Soviet accounting sys-
tem? We wish to know the differences, if any. 
Despite the above comments, Professor Xie has bequeathed 
a monumental treasure to research in accounting history. The 
historians will say to her, "xie xie" (pronounced "shie shie," 
meaning thank you in Chinese). 
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